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ABSTRACT
Mature push button tools have emerged for checking trace proper-
ties (e.g. secrecy or authentication) of security protocols. The case
of indistinguishability-based privacy properties (e.g. ballot privacy
or anonymity) is more complex and constitutes an active research
topic with several recent propositions of techniques and tools.
We explore a novel approach based on type systems and pro-
vide a (sound) type system for proving equivalence of protocols,
for a bounded or an unbounded number of sessions. The result-
ing prototype implementation has been tested on various proto-
cols of the literature. It provides a significant speed-up (by orders
of magnitude) compared to tools for a bounded number of sessions
and complements in terms of expressiveness other state-of-the-art
tools, such as ProVerif and Tamarin: e.g., we show that our analy-
sis technique is the first one to handle a faithful encoding of the
Helios e-voting protocol in the context of an untrusted ballot box.
1 INTRODUCTION
Formal methods proved to be indispensable tools for the analysis
of advanced cryptographic protocols such as those for key distri-
bution [43], mobile payments [30], e-voting [12, 29, 35], and e-
health [38]. In the last years, mature push-button analysis tools
have emerged and have been successfully applied to many pro-
tocols from the literature in the context of trace properties such
as authentication or confidentiality. These tools employ a variety
of analysis techniques, such as model checking (e.g., Avispa [10]
and Scyther [33]), Horn clause resolution (e.g., ProVerif [19]), term
rewriting (e.g., Scyther [33] andTamarin [40]), and type systems [11,
17, 22, 36].
A current and very active topic is the adaptation of these tech-
niques to the more involved case of trace equivalence properties.
These are the natural symbolic counterpart of cryptographic indis-
tinguishability properties, and they are at the heart of privacy prop-
erties such as ballot privacy [35], untraceability [7], or anonymity [4,
8]. They are also used to express stronger forms of confidentiality,
such as strong secrecy [31], or game-based like properties [27].
Related Work. Numerous model checking-based tools have re-
cently been proposed for the case of a bounded number of ses-
sions, i.e., when protocols are executed a bounded number of times.
These tools encompass SPEC [34], APTE [13, 24], Akiss [23], or
SAT-Equiv [28]. These tools vary in the class of cryptographic prim-
itives and the class of protocols they can consider. However, due
to the complexity of the problem, they all suffer from the state ex-
plosion problem and most of them can typically analyse no more
than 3-4 sessions of (relatively small) protocols, with the excep-
tion of SAT-Equiv which can more easily reach about 10 sessions.
The only tools that can verify equivalence properties for an un-
bounded number of sessions are ProVerif [21]. Maude-NPA [42],
and Tamarin [16]. ProVerif checks a property that is stronger than
trace equivalence, namely diff equivalence, which works well in
practice provided that protocols have a similar structure. However,
as for trace properties, the internal design of ProVerif renders the
tool unable to distinguish between exactly one session and infin-
itely many: this over-approximation often yields false attacks, in
particular when the security of a protocol relies on the fact that
some action is only performed once. Maude-NPA also checks diff-
equivalence but often does not terminate. Tamarin can handle an
unbounded number of sessions and is very flexible in terms of sup-
ported protocol classes but it often requires human interactions.
Finally, some recent work has started to leverage type systems to
enforce relational properties for programs, exploring this approach
also in the context of cryptographic protocol implementation [14]:
like ProVerif, the resulting tool is unable to distinguish between
exactly one session and infinitely many, and furthermore it is only
semi-automated, in that it often requires non-trivial lemmas to
guide the tool and a specific programming discipline.
Many recent results have been obtained in the area of relational
verification of programs using Relational Hoare Logic [15, 18, 44].
The results hold on programs and cannot be directly applied to
cryptographic protocols due to the more special treatment of the
primitives.
Ourcontribution. In this paper,we consider a novel type checking-
based approach. Intuitively, a type system over-approximates pro-
tocol behavior. Due to this over-approximation, it is no longer pos-
sible to decide security properties but the types typically convey
sufficient information to prove security. Extending this approach
to equivalence properties is a delicate task. Indeed, two protocols
P andQ are in equivalence if (roughly) any trace of P has an equiv-
alent trace in Q (and conversely). Over-approximating behavior
may not preserve equivalence.
Instead, we develop a somewhat hybrid approach: we design
a type system to over-approximate the set of possible traces and
we collect the set of sent messages into constraints. We then pro-
pose a procedure for proving (static) equivalence of the constraints.
These do not only contain sent messages but also reflect internal
checks made by the protocols, which is crucial to guarantee that
whenever a message is accepted by P , it is also accepted byQ (and
conversely).
As a result, we provide a sound type system for proving equiva-
lence of protocols for both a bounded and an unbounded number
of sessions, or a mix of both. This is particularly convenient to
analyse systems where some actions are limited (e.g., no revote, or
limited access to some resource). More specifically, we show that
whenever two protocols P and Q are type-checked to be equiva-
lent, then they are in trace equivalence, for the standard notion
of trace equivalence [39], against a full Dolev-Yao attacker. In par-
ticular, one advantage of our approach is that it proves security
directly in a security model that is similar to the ones used by
the other popular tools, in contrast to many other security proofs
based on type systems. Our result holds for protocols with all stan-
dard primitives (symmetric and asymetric encryption, signatures,
pairs, hash), with atomic long-term keys (no fresh keys) and no
private channels. Similarly to ProVerif, we need the two protocols
P and Q to have a rather similar structure.
We provide a prototype implementation of our type system, that
we evaluate on several protocols of the literature. In the case of a
bounded number of sessions, our tool provides a significant speed-
up (less than one second to analyse a dozen of sessions while other
tools typically do not answer within 12 hours, with a few excep-
tions). To be fair, let us emphasize that these tools can decide equiv-
alence while our tool checks sufficient conditions by the means of
our type system. In the case of an unbounded number of sessions,
the performance of our prototype tool is comparable to ProVerif.
In contrast to ProVerif, our tool can consider a mix of bounded and
unbounded number of sessions. As an application, we can prove
for the first time ballot privacy of the well-known Helios e-voting
protocol [6], without assuming a reliable channel between honest
voters and the ballot box. ProVerif fails in this case as ballot privacy
only holds under the assumption that honest voters vote at most
once, otherwise the protocol is subject to a copy attack [41]. For
similar reasons, also Tamarin fails to verify this protocol.
In most of our example, only a few straightforward type anno-
tations were needed, such as indicated which keys are supposed to
be secret or public. The case of the helios protocol is more involved
and requires to describe the form of encrypted ballots that can be
sent by a voter.
Our prototype, the protocolmodels, as well as a technical report
are available here [1].
2 OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
In this section, we introduce the key ideas underlying our approach
on a simplified version of the Helios voting protocol. Helios [6] is
a verifiable voting protocol that has been used in various elections,
including the election of the rector of the University of Louvain-la-
Neuve. Its behavior is depicted below:
S → Vi : ri
Vi → S : [{vi }
ri,r
′
i
pk(ks )
]
ki
S → V1, . . . ,Vn : v1, . . . ,vn
where {m}r
pk(k)
denotes the asymmetric encryption of messagem
with the key pk(k) randomized with the nonce r , and [m]k denotes
the signature ofm with key k . vi is a value in the set {0, 1}, which
represents the candidate Vi votes for. In the first step, the voter
casts her vote, encrypted with the election’s public key pk(ks ) and
then signed. Since generating a good random number is difficult
for the voter’s client (typically a JavaScript run in a browser), a
typical trick is to input some randomness (ri ) from the server and
to add it to its own randomness (r ′i ). In the second step the server
outputs the tally (i.e., a randomized permutation of the valid votes
received in the voting phase). Note that the original Helios pro-
tocol does not assume signed ballots. Instead, voters authenticate
themselves through a login mechanism. For simplicity, we abstract
this authenticated channel by a signature.
A voting protocol provides vote privacy [35] if an attacker is not
able to know which voter voted for which candidate. Intuitively,
this can be modeled as the following trace equivalence property,
which requires the attacker not to be able to distinguish A voting
0 and B voting 1 from A voting 1 and B voting 0. Notice that the
attacker may control an unbounded number of voters:
Voter (ka, 0) | Voter (kb , 1) | CompromisedVoters | S
≈t Voter (ka, 1) | Voter (kb , 0) | CompromisedVoters | S
Despite its simplicity, this protocol has a few interesting features
thatmake its analysis particularly challenging. First of all, the server
is supposed to discard ciphertext duplicates, otherwise a malicious
eligible voter E could intercept A’s ciphertext, sign it, and send it
to the server [32], as exemplified below:
A→ S : [{va }
ra,r
′
a
pk(ks )
]
ka
E → S : [{va }
ra,r
′
a
pk(ks )
]
ke
B → S : [{vb }
rb,r
′
b
pk(ks )
]
kb
S → A,B : va ,vb ,va
This would make the two tallied results distinguishable, thereby
breaking trace equivalence since va ,vb ,va 6≈t vb ,va ,vb
Even more interestingly, each voter is supposed to be able to
vote only once, otherwise the same attack would apply [41] even if
the server discards ciphertext duplicates (as the randomness used
by the voter in the two ballots would be different). This makes
the analysis particularly challenging, and in particular out of scope
of existing cryptographic protocol analyzers like ProVerif, which
abstract away from the number of protocol sessions.
With our type system, we can successfully verify the aforemen-
tioned privacy property using the following types:
ra : τ
LL,1
ra , rb : τ
LL,1
rb , r
′
a : τ
HH,1
r ′a
, r ′b : τ
HH,1
r ′
b
ka : key
HH({Jτ LL,10 ; τ LL,11 K ∗ HL ∗ τ HH,1r ′a }ks )
kb : key
HH({Jτ LL,11 ; τ LL,10 K ∗ HL ∗ τ HH,1r ′
b
}
ks
)
ks : key
HH
(
(Jτ LL,10 ; τ LL,11 K ∗ HL ∗ τ HH,1r ′a ) ∨
(Jτ LL,11 ; τ LL,10 K ∗ HL ∗ τ HH,1r ′
b
)
)
Weassume standard security labels: HH stands for high confidential-
ity and high integrity, HL for high confidentiality and low integrity,
and LL for low confidentiality and low integrity (for simplicity, we
omit the low confidentiality and high integrity type, since we do
not need it in our examples). The type τ l,1i describes randomness
of security label l produced by the randomness generator at posi-
tion i in the program, which can be invoked at most once. τ l,∞i is
similar, with the difference that the randomness generator can be
invoked an unbounded number of times. These types induce a par-
tition on random values, in which each set contains at most one
element or an unbounded number of elements, respectively. This
turns out to be useful, as explained below, to type-check protocols,
like Helios, in which the number of times messages of a certain
shape are produced is relevant for the security of the protocol.
The type of ka (resp. kb ) says that this key is supposed to en-
crypt 0 and 1 (resp. 1 and 0) on the left- and right-hand side of
the equivalence relation, further describing the type of the ran-
domness. The type of ks inherits the two payload types, which
are combined in disjunctive form. In fact, public key types implic-
itly convey an additional payload type, the one characterizing mes-
sages encrypted by the attacker: these are of low confidentiality
and turn out to be the same on the left- and right-hand side. Key
types are crucial to type-check the server code: we verify the sig-
natures produced by A and B and can then use the ciphertext type
derived from the type of ka and kb to infer after decryption the
vote cast by A and B, respectively. While processing the other bal-
lots, the server discards the ciphertexts producedwith randomness
matching the one used by A or B: given that these random values
are used only once, we know that the remaining ciphertexts must
come from the attacker and thus convey the same vote on the left-
and on the right-hand side. This suffices to type-check the final out-
put, since the two tallied results on the left- and right-hand side are
the same, and thus fulfill trace equivalence.
The type system generates a set of constraints, which, if “con-
sistent”, suffice to prove that the protocol is trace equivalent. In-
tuitively, these constraints characterize the indistinguishability of
the messages output by the process. The constraints generated for
this simplified version of Helios are reported below:
C = {({sign(aenc(〈0, 〈x, r ′a〉〉, pk(kS )),ka ) ∼
sign(aenc(〈1, 〈x, r ′a〉〉, pk(kS )),ka ),
aenc(〈0, 〈x, r ′a〉〉, pk(kS )) ∼ aenc(〈1, 〈x, r
′
a〉〉, pk(kS )),
sign(aenc(〈1, 〈y, r ′
b
〉〉, pk(kS )),kb ) ∼
sign(aenc(〈0, 〈y, r ′
b
〉〉, pk(kS )),kb ),
aenc(〈1, 〈y, r ′
b
〉〉, pk(kS )) ∼ aenc(〈0, 〈y, r
′
b
〉〉, pk(kS ))},
[x : LL,y : LL])}
These constraints are consistent if the set of left messages of the
constraints is in (static) equivalence with the set of the right mes-
sages of the constraints. This is clearly the case here, since encryp-
tion hides the content of the plaintext. Just to give an example of
non-consistent constraints, consider the following ones:
C ′ = {{h(n1) ∼ h(n2), h(n1) ∼ h(n1)}}
wheren1,n2 are two confidential nonces. While the first constraint
alone is consistent, since n1 and n2 are of high confidentiality and
the attacker cannot thus distinguish between h(n1) and h(n2), the
two constraints all together are not consistent, since the attacker
can clearly notice if the two terms output by the process are the
same or not. We developed a dedicated procedure to check the con-
sistency of such constraints.
3 FRAMEWORK
In symbolic models, security protocols are typically modeled as
processes of a process algebra, such as the applied pi-calculus [3].
We present here a calculus close to [25] inspired from the calculus
underlying the ProVerif tool [20].
3.1 Terms
Messages aremodeled as terms.We assume an infinite set of names
N for nonces, further partitioned into the set FN of free nonces
(created by the attacker) and the set BN of bound nonces (created
by the protocol parties), an infinite set of namesK for keys, ranged
over by k , and an infinite set of variablesV . Cryptographic prim-
itives are modeled through a signature F , that is a set of function
symbols, given with their arity (that is, the number of arguments).
Here, we will consider the following signature:
Fc = {pk, vk, enc, aenc, sign, 〈·, ·〉, h}
that models respectively public and verification key, symmetric
and asymmetric encryption, concatenation and hash. The compan-
ion primitives (symmetric and asymmetric decryption, signature
check, and projections) are represented by the following signature:
Fd = {dec, adec, checksign,π1, π2}
Wealso consider a set C of (public) constants (used as agents names
for instance). Given a signature F , a set of names N and a set of
variablesV , the set of terms T (F ,V,N) is the set inductively de-
fined by applying functions to variables inV and names inN . We
denote by names(t) (resp. vars(t)) the set of names (resp. variables)
occurring in t . A term is ground if it does not contain variables.
Here, we will consider the set T (Fc ∪ Fd ∪ C,V,N ∪ K) of
cryptographic terms, simply called terms. Messages are terms from
T (Fc ∪C,V,N ∪K) with atomic keys, that is, a term t ∈ T (Fc ∪
C,V,N ∪ K) is a message if any subterm of t of the form pk(t ′),
vk(t ′), enc(t1, t
′), aenc(t1, t2), or sign(t1, t
′) is such that t ′ ∈ K
and t2 = pk(t
′
2) with t
′
2 ∈ K. We assume the set of variables to be
split into two subsets V = X ⊎ AX where X are variables used
in processes while AX are variables used to store messages. An
attacker term is a term from T (Fc ∪ Fd ∪ C,AX,FN).
A substitution σ = {M1/x1, . . . ,Mk /xk } is a mapping from vari-
ables x1, . . . ,xk ∈ V to messages M1, . . . ,Mk . We let dom(σ ) =
{x1, . . . , xk }. We say that σ is ground if all messages M1, . . . ,Mk
are ground. We let names(σ ) =
⋃
1≤i≤k names(Mi ). The applica-
tion of a substitution σ to a term t is denoted tσ and is defined as
usual.
The evaluation of a term t , denoted t ↓, corresponds to the ap-
plication of the cryptographic primitives. For example, the decryp-
tion succeeds only if the right decryption key is used. Formally, t ↓
Destructors used in processes:
d ::= dec(·,k) | adec(·,k) | checksign(·, vk(k)) | π1(·) | π2(·)
Processes:
P ,Q ::=
0
| new n.P for n ∈ BN(n bound in P)
| out(M).P
| in(x).P for x ∈ X(x bound in P)
| P | Q
| let x = d(y) in P else Q for x,y ∈ X(x bound in P)
| if M = N then P else Q
| !P
whereM,N are messages.
Figure 1: Syntax for processes.
is recursively defined as follows.
u ↓ = u if u ∈ N ∪V ∪ K ∪ C
pk(t) ↓ = pk(t ↓) if t ↓∈ K
vk(t) ↓ = vk(t ↓) if t ↓∈ K
h(t) ↓ = h(t ↓) if t ↓, ⊥
〈t1, t2〉 ↓ = 〈t1 ↓, t2 ↓〉 if t1 ↓, ⊥ and t2 ↓, ⊥
enc(t1, t2) ↓ = enc(t1 ↓, t2 ↓) if t1 ↓, ⊥ and t2 ↓∈ K
sign(t1, t2) ↓ = sign(t1 ↓, t2 ↓) if t1 ↓, ⊥ and t2 ↓∈ K
aenc(t1, t2) ↓ = aenc(t1 ↓, t2 ↓) if t1 ↓, ⊥ and t2 ↓= pk(k)
for some k ∈ K
π1(t) ↓ = t1 if t ↓= 〈t1, t2〉
π2(t) ↓ = t2 if t ↓= 〈t1, t2〉
dec(t1, t2) ↓ = t3 if t1 ↓= enc(t3, t4) and t4 = t2 ↓
adec(t1, t2) ↓ = t3 if t1 ↓= aenc(t3, pk(t4)) and t4 = t2 ↓
checksign(t1, t2) ↓ = t3 if t1 ↓= sign(t3, t4) and t2 ↓= vk(t4)
t ↓ = ⊥ otherwise
Note that the evaluation of term t succeeds only if the underlying
keys are atomic and always returns a message or ⊥. We write t =↓
t ′ if t ↓= t ′ ↓.
3.2 Processes
Security protocols describe how messages should be exchanged
between participants. We model them through a process algebra,
whose syntax is displayed in Figure 1. We identify processes up
to α-renaming, i.e., capture avoiding substitution of bound names
and variables, which are defined as usual. Furthermore, we assume
that all bound names and variables in the process are distinct.
A configuration of the system is a quadruple (E; P;ϕ;σ ) where:
• P is a multiset of processes that represents the current ac-
tive processes;
• E is a set of names, which represents the private names of
the processes;
• ϕ is a substitution with dom(ϕ) ⊆ AX and for any x ∈
dom(ϕ), ϕ(x) (also denoted xϕ) is a message that only con-
tains variables in dom(σ ). ϕ represents the terms already
output.
• σ is a ground substitution;
The semantics of processes is given through a transition relation
α
−−→ on the quadruples provided in Figure 2 (τ denotes a silent ac-
tion). The relation
w
−−→∗ is defined as the reflexive transitive clo-
sure of
α
−−→, where w is the concatenation of all actions. We also
write equality up to silent actions =τ .
Intuitively, process new n.P creates a fresh nonce, stored in E,
and behaves like P . Process out(M).P emits M and behaves like
P . Process in(x).P inputs any term computed by the attacker pro-
vided it evaluates as a message and then behaves like P . Process
P | Q corresponds to the parallel composition of P and Q . Process
let x = d(y) in P else Q behaves like P in which x is replaced
by d(y) if d(y) can be successfully evaluated and behaves like Q
otherwise. Process if M = N then P else Q behaves like P if M
and N correspond to two equal messages and behaves likeQ other-
wise. The replicated process !P behaves as an unbounded number
of copies of P .
A trace of a process P is any possible sequence of transitions
in the presence of an attacker that may read, forge, and send mes-
sages. Formally, the set of traces trace(P) is defined as follows.
trace(P) = {(w, new E.ϕ, σ )|(∅; {P}; ∅; ∅)
w
−−→∗ (E;P;ϕ;σ )}
Example 3.1. Consider theHelios protocol presented in Section 2.
For simplicity, we describe here a simplified version with only two
(honest) votersA and B and a voting server S . This (simplified) pro-
tocol can be modeled by the process:
new ra .Voter (ka ,va , ra ) | new rb .Voter (kb ,vb , rb ) | PS
where Voter (k,v, r ) represents voter k willing to vote for v using
randomness r while PS represents the voting server. Voter (k,v, r )
simply outputs a signed encrypted vote.
Voter (k,v, r ) = out(sign(aenc(〈v, r 〉, pk(kS )),k))
The voting server receives ballots from A and B and then out-
puts the decrypted ballots, after some mixing.
PS =in(x1).in(x2).
let y1 = checksign(x1, vk(ka)) in
let y2 = checksign(x2, vk(kb )) in
let z1 = adec(y1,ks ) in let z
′
1 = π1(z1) in
let z2 = adec(y2,ks ) in let z
′
2 = π1(z2) in
(out(z ′1) | out(z
′
2))
3.3 Equivalence
When processes evolve, sent messages are stored in a substitution
ϕ while private names are stored in E. A frame is simply an ex-
pression of the form new E.ϕ where dom(ϕ) ⊆ AX. We define
dom(new E.ϕ) as dom(ϕ). Intuitively, a frame represents the knowl-
edge of an attacker.
Intuitively, two sequences of messages are indistinguishable to
an attacker if he cannot perform any test that could distinguish
them. This is typically modeled as static equivalence [3]. Here, we
consider of variant of [3] where the attacker is also given the abil-
ity to observe when the evaluation of a term fails, as defined for
example in [25].
(E; {P1 | P2} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
τ
−−→ (E; {P1, P2} ∪ P;ϕ; σ ) Par
(E; {0} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
τ
−−→ (E; P;ϕ;σ ) Zero
(E; {new n.P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
τ
−−→ (E ∪ {n}; {P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ ) New
(E; {out(t).P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
new axn .out(axn )
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (E; {P} ∪ P;ϕ ∪ {t/axn };σ ) Out
if tσ is a ground term, axn ∈ AX and n = |ϕ | + 1
(E; {in(x).P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
in(R)
−−−−−→ (E; {P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ ∪ {(Rϕσ ) ↓ /x}) In
if R is an attacker term such that vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕ),
and (Rϕσ ) ↓, ⊥
(E; {let x = d(M) in P else Q} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
τ
−−→ (E; {P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ ∪ {d(Mσ ) ↓ /x}) Let-In
ifMσ is ground and d(Mσ ) ↓, ⊥
(E; {let x = d(M) in P else Q} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
τ
−−→ (E; {Q} ∪ P;ϕ; σ ) Let-Else
ifMσ is ground and d(Mσ ) ↓= ⊥, i.e. d cannot be applied toMσ
(E; {if M = N then P else Q} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
τ
−−→ (E; {P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ ) If-Then
ifM , N are messages such thatMσ , Nσ are ground and Mσ = Nσ
(E; {if M = N then P else Q} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
τ
−−→ (E; {Q} ∪ P;ϕ; σ ) If-Else
ifM , N are messages such thatMσ , Nσ are ground and Mσ , Nσ
(E; {!P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ )
τ
−−→ (E; {P , !P} ∪ P;ϕ;σ ) Repl
Figure 2: Semantics
Definition 3.2 (Static Equivalence). Two ground frames new E.ϕ
and new E′.ϕ′ are statically equivalent if and only if they have
the same domain, and for all attacker terms R, S with variables in
dom(ϕ) = dom(ϕ′), we have
(Rϕ =↓ Sϕ) ⇐⇒ (Rϕ
′
=↓ Sϕ
′)
Then two processes P andQ are in equivalence if no matter how
the adversary interacts with P , a similar interaction may happen
withQ , with equivalent resulting frames.
Definition 3.3 (Trace Equivalence). Let P ,Q be two processes.We
write P ⊑t Q if for all (s,ψ ,σ ) ∈ trace(P), there exists (s
′
,ψ ′,σ ′) ∈
trace(Q) such that s =τ s
′ and ψσ and ψ ′σ ′ are statically equiva-
lent.We say that P andQ are trace equivalent, andwewrite P ≈t Q ,
if P ⊑t Q and Q ⊑t P .
Note that this definition already includes the attacker’s behav-
ior, since processes may input any message forged by the attacker.
Example 3.4. As explained in Section 2, ballot privacy is typi-
cally modeled as an equivalence property [35] that requires that
an attacker cannot distinguish when Alice is voting 0 and Bob is
voting 1 from the scenario where the two votes are swapped.
Continuing Example 3.1, ballot privacy ofHelios can be expressed
as follows:
new ra .Voter (ka, 0, ra ) | new rb .Voter (kb , 1, rb ) | PS
≈t new ra .Voter (ka, 1, ra ) | new rb .Voter (kb , 0, rb ) | PS
4 TYPING
We now introduce a type system to statically check trace equiv-
alence between processes. Our typing judgements thus capture
properties of pairs of terms or processes, which we will refer to
as left and right term or process, respectively.
l ::= LL | HL | HH
T ::= l | T ∗T | keyl (T ) | (T )k | {T }k
| Jτ l,an ; τ l ′,am K with a ∈ {1,∞} | T ∨ T
Figure 3: Types for terms (selected)
4.1 Types
A selection of the types for messages are defined in Figure 3 and ex-
plained below.We assume three security labels (namely, HH, HL, LL),
ranged over by l , whose first (resp. second) component denotes the
confidentiality (resp. integrity) level. Intuitively, messages of high
confidentiality cannot be learned by the attacker, while messages
of high integrity cannot originate from the attacker. Pair types
describe the type of their components, as usual. Type keyl (T ) de-
scribes keys of security level l used to encrypt (or sign) messages
of type T . The type (T )k (resp. {T }k ) describes symmetric (resp.
asymmetric) encryptions with key k of a message of type T . The
type τ l,ai describes nonces and constants of security level l : the
label a ranges over {∞, 1}, denoting whether the nonce is bound
within a replication or not (constants are always typed with a = 1).
We assume a different identifier i for each constant and restriction
in the process. The type τ l,1i is populated by a single name, (i.e., i
describes a constant or a non-replicated nonce) and τ l,∞i is a spe-
cial type, that is instantiated to τ l,1i j in the jth replication of the
process. Type Jτ l,an ; τ l ′,am K is a refinement type that restricts the
set of values which can be taken by a message to values of type
τ
l,a
n on the left and type τ
l ′,a
m on the right. For a refinement typeJτ l,an ; τ l,an K with equal types on both sides we simply write τ l,an .
Messages of typeT ∨ T ′ are messages that can have typeT or type
T ′.
4.2 Constraints
When typing messages, we generate constraints of the form (M ∼
N ), meaning that the attacker sees M and N in the left and right
process, respectively, and these two messages are thus required to
be indistinguishable.
4.3 Typing Messages
Typing judgments are parametrized over a typing environment Γ,
which is a list of mappings from names and variables to types. The
typing judgement for messages is of the form the form Γ ⊢ M ∼
N : T → c which reads as follows: under the environment Γ, M
and N are of type T and either this is a high confidentiality type
(i.e., M and N are not disclosed to the attacker) or M and N are
indistinguishable for the attacker assuming the set of constraints c
holds true. We present an excerpt of the typing rules for messages
in Figure 4 and comment on them in the following.
Confidential nonces (i.e. nonces with label l = HH or l = HL)
are typed with their label from the typing environment. As the
attacker may not observer them, they may be different in the left
and the right message andwe do not add any constraints (TNonce).
Public terms are given type LL if they are the same in the left and
the right message (TNonceL, TCstFN, TPubKey, TVKey). We re-
quire keys and variables to be the same in the two processes, de-
riving their type from the environment (TKey and TVar). The rule
for pairs operates recursively component-wise (TPair).
For symmetric key encryptions (TEnc), we have to make sure
that the payload type matches the key type (which is achieved by
rule TEncH). We add the generated ciphertext to the set of con-
straints, because even though the attacker cannot read the plain-
text, he can perform an equality check on the ciphertext that he
observed. If we type an encryption with a key that is of low confi-
dentiality (i.e., the attacker has access to it), then we need to make
sure the payload is of type LL, because the attacker can simply de-
crypt the message and recover the plaintext (TEncL). The rules
for asymmetric encryption are the same, with the only difference
that we can always chose to ignore the key type and use type LL
to check the payload. This allows us to type messages produced
by the attacker, which has access to the public key but does not
need to respect its type. Signatures are also handled similarly, the
difference here is that we need to type the payload with LL even
if an honest key is used, as the signature does not hide the con-
tent. The first typing rule for hashes (THash) gives them type LL
and adds the term to the constraints, without looking at the argu-
ments of the hash function: intuitively this is justified, because the
hash function makes it impossible to recover the argument. The
second rule (THashL) gives type LL only if we can also give type
LL to the argument of the hash function, but does not add any con-
straints on its own, it is just passing on the constraints created for
the arguments. Thismeans we are typing themessage as if the hash
function would not have been applied and use the message with-
out the hash, which is a strictly stronger result. Both rules have
their applications: while the former has to be used whenever we
hash a secret, the latter may be useful to avoid the creation of un-
necessary constraints when hashing terms like constants or public
nonces. Rule THigh states that we can give type HL to every mes-
sage, which intuitively means that we can treat every message as
if it were confidential. Rule TSub allows us to type messages ac-
cording to the subtyping relation, which is standard and defined
in Figure 5. Rule TOr allows us to give a union type to messages,
if they are typable with at least one of the two types. TLR1 and
TLR∞ are the introduction rules for refinement types, while TLR’
and TLRL’ are the corresponding elimination rules. Finally, TLR-
Var allows to derive a new refinement type for two variables for
which we have singleton refinement types, by taking the left re-
finement of the left variable and the right refinement of the right
variable. We will see application of this rule in the e-voting proto-
col, where we use it to combine A’s vote (0 on the left, 1 on the
right) and B’s vote (1 on the left, 0 on the right), into a message
that is the same on both sides.
4.4 Typing Processes
The typing judgement for processes is of the form Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
and can be interpreted as follows: If two processes P and Q can
be typed in Γ and if the generated constraint set C is consistent,
then P and Q are trace equivalent. We assume in this section that
P and Q do not contain replication and that variables and names
are renamed to avoid any capture. We also assume processes to be
given with type annotations for nonces.
When typing processes, the typing environment Γ is passed down
and extended from the root towards the leafs of the syntax tree of
the process, i.e., following the execution semantics. The generated
constraints C however, are passed up from the leafs towards the
root, so that at the root we get all generated constraints, modeling
the attacker’s global view on the process execution.
More precisely, each possible execution path of the process -
there may be multiple paths because of conditionals - creates its
own set of constraints c together with the typing environment
Γ that contains types for all names and variables appearing in c .
Hence a constraint set C is a set elements of the form (c, Γ) for a
set of constraints c . The typing environments are required in the
constraint checking procedure, as they helps us to be more precise
when checking the consistency of constraints.
An excerpt of our typing rules for processes is presented in Fig-
ure 6 and explained in the following. Rule PZero copies the cur-
rent typing environment in the constraints and checks the well-
formedness of the environment (Γ ⊢ ⋄), which is defined as ex-
pected. Messages output on the network are possibly learned by
the attacker, so they have to be of type LL (POut). The generated
constraints are added to each element of the constraint set for the
continuation process, using the operator ∪∀ defined as
C∪∀c
′ :=
{
(c ∪ c ′, Γ) | (c, Γ) ∈ C
}
.
Conversely, messages input from the network are given type LL
(PIn). Rule PNew introduces a new nonce, which may be used
in the continuation processes. While typing parallel composition
(PPar), we type the individual subprocesses and take the product
union of the generated constraint sets as the new constraint set.
The product union of constraint sets is defined as
C∪×C
′ := {(c ∪ c ′, Γ ∪ Γ′) |
(c, Γ) ∈ C ∧ (c ′, Γ′) ∈ C ′ ∧ Γ, Γ′ are compatible}
where compatible environments are those that agree on the type of
all arguments of the shared domain. This operationmodels the fact
Γ(n) = τ
l,a
n Γ(m) = τ
l,a
m l ∈ {HH, HL}
Γ ⊢ n ∼m : l → ∅
(TNonce)
Γ(n) = τ
LL,a
n
Γ ⊢ n ∼ n : LL → ∅
(TNonceL)
a ∈ C ∪ FN
Γ ⊢ a ∼ a : LL → ∅
(TCstFN)
k ∈ dom(Γ)
Γ ⊢ pk(k) ∼ pk(k) : LL→ ∅
(TPubKey)
k ∈ dom(Γ)
Γ ⊢ vk(k) ∼ vk(k) : LL→ ∅
(TVKey)
Γ(k) = T
Γ ⊢ k ∼ k : T → ∅
(TKey)
Γ(x) = T
Γ ⊢ x ∼ x : T → ∅
(TVar)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T ′ → c ′
Γ ⊢ 〈M,M ′〉 ∼ 〈N ,N ′〉 : T ∗T ′ → c ∪ c ′
(TPair)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c
Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼ enc(N ,k) : (T )k → c
(TEnc)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T )k → c Γ(k) = key
HH(T )
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c ∪ {M ∼ N }
(TEncH)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (LL)k → c Γ(k) = key
LL(T )
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
(TEncL)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c
Γ ⊢ aenc(M, pk(k)) ∼ aenc(N , pk(k)) : {T }k → c
(TAenc)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : {T }k → c Γ(k) = key
HH(T )
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c ∪ {M ∼ N }
(TAencH)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : {LL}k → c k ∈ dom(Γ)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
(TAencL)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c ′ Γ(k) = keyHH(T )
Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k) : LL→ c ∪ c ′ ∪ {sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k)}
(TSignH)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c Γ(k) = keyLL(T )
Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k) : LL → c
(TSignL)
names(M) ∪ names(N ) ∪ vars(M) ∪ vars(N ) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ FN
Γ ⊢ h(M) ∼ h(N ) : LL → {h(M) ∼ h(N )}
(THash)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
Γ ⊢ h(M) ∼ h(N ) : LL → c
(THashL)
names(M) ∪ names(N ) ∪ vars(M) ∪ vars(N ) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ FN
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : HL→ ∅
(THigh)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ′ → c T ′ <: T
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c
(TSub)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ∨ T ′ → c
(TOr)
Γ(m) = τ
l,1
m or m ∈ FN ∪ C ∧ l = LL
Γ(n) = τ
l ′,1
n or n ∈ FN ∪ C ∧ l
′
= LL
Γ ⊢m ∼ n : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → ∅ (TLR
1)
Γ(m) = τ
l,∞
m Γ(n) = τ
l ′,∞
n
Γ ⊢m ∼ n : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅ (TLR
∞)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : Jτ l,am ; τ l,an K → c l ∈ {HL, HH}
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : l → c
(TLR’)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : Jτ LL,an ; τ LL,an K → c
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
(TLRL’)
Γ ⊢ x ∼ x : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → ∅ Γ ⊢ y ∼ y : Jτ l ′′,1m′ ; τ l ′′′,1n′ K → ∅
Γ ⊢ x ∼ y : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′′′,1n′ K → ∅ (TLRVar)
Figure 4: Rules for Messages
that a process P | P ′ can have every trace that is a combination of
any trace of P with any trace of P ′. The branches that are discarded
due to incompatible environments correspond to impossible execu-
tions (e.g., taking the left branch in P and the right branch in P ′
in two conditionals with the same guard). POr is the elimination
rule for union types, which requires the continuation process to be
well-typed with both types.
To ensure that the destructor application fails or succeeds equally
in the two processes, we allow only the same destructor to be ap-
plied to the same variable in both processes (PLet). As usual, we
then type-check the then as well as the else branch and then take
the union of the corresponding constraints. The typing rules for de-
structors are presented in Figure 7. These are mostly standard: for
instance, after decryption, the type of the payload is determined
by the one of the decryption key, as long as this is of high integrity
(DDecH). We can as well exploit strong types for ciphertexts, typ-
ically introduced by verifying a surrounding signature (see, e.g.,
the types for Helios) to derive the type of the payload (DDecT). In
the case of public key encryption, we have to be careful, since the
public encryption key is accessible to the attacker: we thus give
the payload typeT ∨ LL (rule DAdecH). For operations involving
corrupted keys (label LL) we know that the payload is public and
hence give the derived message type LL.
In the special case in which we know that the concrete value of
the argument of the destructor application is a nonce or constant
due to a refinement type, and we know statically that any destruc-
tor applicationwill fail, we only need to type-check the else branch
T <: T
(SRefl)
T <: HL
(SHigh)
T <: T ′ T ′ <: T ′′
T <: T ′′
(STrans)
LL ∗ LL <: LL
(SPairL)
T1 <: T
′
1 T2 <: T
′
2
T1 ∗T2 <: T
′
1 ∗T
′
2
(SPair)
HH ∗T <: HH
(SPairS)
T ∗ HH <: HH
(SPairS’)
keyl (T ) <: l
(SKey)
T <: T ′
(T )k <: (T
′)k
(SEnc)
T <: T ′
{T }k <: {T
′}k
(SAenc)
Figure 5: Subtyping Rules
(PLetLR). As for destructor applications, the difficulty while typ-
ing conditionals is to make sure that the same branch is taken in
both processes (PIfL). To ensure this we use a trick: We type both
the left and the right operands of the conditional with type LL and
add both generated sets of constraints to the constraint set. Intu-
itively, this means that the attacker could perform the equality test
himself, since the guard is of type LL, which means that the condi-
tional must take the same branch on the left and on the right. In
the special case in which we can statically determine the concrete
value of the terms in the conditional (because the corresponding
type is populated by a singleton), we have to typecheck only the
single combination of branches that will be executed (PIfLR). An-
other special case is if the messages on the right are of type HH
and the ones on the left of type LL. As a secret of high integrity
can never be equal to a public value of low integrity, we know that
both processes will take the else branch (PIfS). This rule is crucial,
since it may allow us to prune the low typing branch of asymmetric
decryption. The last special case for conditionals is whenwe have a
refinement type with replication for both operands of the equality
check (PIfLR*). Although we know that the nonces on both sides
are of the same type and hence both are elements of the same set,
we cannot assume that they are equal, as the sets are infinite, un-
like in rule PIfLR. Yet, concrete instantiations of nonces will have
the same index for the left and the right process. This is because
we check for a variant of diff-equivalence. This ensures that the
equality check always yields the same result in the two processes.
All these special cases highlight how a careful treatment of names
in terms of equivalence classes (statically captured by types) is a
powerful device to enhance the expressiveness of the analysis.
Finally, notice that we do not have any typing rule for replica-
tion: this is in line with our general idea of typing a bounded num-
ber of sessions and then extending this result to the unbounded
case in the constraint checking phase, as detailed in Section 6.
5 CONSISTENCY OF CONSTRAINTS
Our type system guarantees trace equivalence of two processes
only if the generated constraints are consistent. In this section we
give a slightly simplified definition of consistency of constraints
and explain how it captures the attacker’s capability to distinguish
processes based on their outputs.
To define consistency, we need the following ingredients:
• ϕl(c) and ϕr(c) denote the frames that are composed of the
left and the right terms of the constraints respectively (in
the same order).
• ϕΓ
LL
denotes the frame that is composed of all low confiden-
tiality nonces and keys in Γ, as well as all public encryption
keys and verification keys in Γ. This intuitively corresponds
to the initial knowledge of the attacker.
• Let EΓ be the set of all nonces occurring in Γ.
• Two ground substitutions σ ,σ ′ are well-formed in Γ if they
preserve the types for variables in Γ (i.e., Γ ⊢ σ (x) ∼ σ ′(x) :
Γ(x) → cx ).
Definition 5.1 (Consistency). A set of constraints c is consistent
in an environment Γ if for all substitutions σ ,σ ′ well-typed in Γ the
frames new EΓ .(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(c)σ ) and new EΓ .(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕr(c)σ
′) are stat-
ically equivalent. We say that (c, Γ) is consistent if c is consistent
in Γ and that a constraint set C is consistent in Γ if each element
(c, Γ) ∈ C is consistent.
We define consistency of constraints in terms of static equivalence,
as this notion exactly captures all capabilities of our attacker: to dis-
tinguish two processes, he can arbitrarily apply constructors and
destructors on observed messages to create new terms, on which
he can then perform equality tests or check the applicability of de-
structors. We require that this property holds for any well-typed
substitutions, to soundly cover that fact that we do not know the
content of variables statically, except for the information we get
by typing. In Section 6.3 we introduce an algorithm to check con-
sistency of constraints.
6 MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our two main soundness theorems, entail-
ing trace equivalence by typing for the bounded and unbounded
case, and we explain how to automatically check consistency.
6.1 Soundness of the type system
Our type system soundly enforces trace equivalence: if we can
typecheck P and Q then P and Q are equivalent, provided that the
corresponding constraint set is consistent.
Theorem 6.1 (Typing implies trace eqivalence). For all P ,
Q , andC , for all Γ containing only keys, if Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C and C is
consistent, then P ≈t Q .
To prove this theorem, we first show that typing is preserved by
reduction, and guarantees that the same actions can be observed
on both sides. More precisely, we show that if P and Q are multi-
sets of processes which are pairwise typably equivalent (with con-
sistent constraints), and if a reduction step with action α can be
performed to reduce P into P ′, then Q can be reduced in one or
several steps, with the same action α , to some multiset Q ′ such
that the processes in P ′ and Q ′ are still typably equivalent (with
consistent constraints). This is done by carefully examining all the
possible typing rules used to type the processes in P and Q. In ad-
dition we show that the frames of messages output when reducing
Γ ⊢ ⋄ Γ does not contain union types
Γ ⊢ 0 ∼ 0 → (∅, Γ)
(PZero)
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
Γ ⊢ out(M).P ∼ out(N ).Q → C∪∀c
(POut)
Γ, x : LL ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
Γ ⊢ in(x).P ∼ in(x).Q → C
(PIn)
Γ,n : τ l,an ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
Γ ⊢ new n : τ l,an .P ∼ new n : τ
l,a
n .Q → C
(PNew)
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ P | P ′ ∼ Q | Q ′ → C∪×C
′
(PPar)
Γ, x : T ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ, x : T ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′
Γ, x : T ∨ T ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ∪C ′
(POr)
Γ ⊢ d(y) : T Γ, x : T ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ let x = d(y) in P else P ′ ∼ let x = d(y) in Q else Q ′ → C ∪C ′
(PLet)
Γ(y) = Jτ l,an ; τ l ′,am K Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ let x = d(y) in P else P ′ ∼ let x = d(y) in Q else Q ′ → C ′
(PLetLR)
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′ Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL→ c ′
Γ ⊢ if M = M ′ then P else P ′ ∼ if N = N ′ then Q else Q ′ →
(
C ∪C ′
)
∪∀(c ∪ c
′)
(PIfL)
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → ∅ Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l ′′,1m′ ; τ l ′′′,1n′ K → ∅
b = (τ
l,1
m
?
= τ
l ′′,1
m′
) b ′ = (τ
l ′,1
n
?
= τ
l ′′′,1
n′
) Γ ⊢ Pb ∼ Qb ′ → C
Γ ⊢ if M1 = M2 then P⊤ else P⊥ ∼ if N1 = N2 then Q⊤ else Q⊥ → C
(PIfLR)
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′ Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : HH → c ′
Γ ⊢ if M = M ′ then P else P ′ ∼ if N = N ′ then Q else Q ′ → C ′
(PIfS)
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅ Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ if M1 = M2 then P else P
′ ∼ if N1 = N2 then Q else Q
′ → C ∪C ′
(PIfLR*)
Figure 6: Rules for processes
P and Q are typably equivalent with consistent constraints; and
that this entails their static equivalence.
This implies that if P and Q are typable with a consistent con-
straint, then for each trace of P , by induction on the length of the
trace, there exists a trace of Q with the same sequence of actions,
and with a statically equivalent frame. That is to say P ⊑t Q . Sim-
ilarly we show Q ⊑t P , and we thus have P ≈t Q .
Since we do not have typing rules for replication, Theorem 6.1
only allows us to prove equivalence of protocols for a finite number
of sessions. An arguably surprising result, however, is that, thanks
to our infinite nonce types, we can prove equivalence for an un-
bounded number of sessions, as detailed in the next section.
6.2 Typing replicated processes
For more clarity, in this section, without loss of generality we con-
sider that for each infinite nonce type τ l,∞m appearing in the pro-
cesses, the set of names BN contains an infinite number of fresh
names {mi | i ∈ N} which do not appear in the processes or envi-
ronments. We similarly assume that for all the variables x appear-
ing in the processes, the set X of all variables also contains fresh
variables {xi | i ∈ N} which do not appear in the processes or
environments.
Intuitively, whenever we can typecheck a process of the form
new n : τ l,1n . newm : τ
l,∞
m . P , we can actually typecheck
new n : τ l,1n . (newm1 : τ
l,1
m1 .P1 | . . . | newmk : τ
l,1
mk .Pk )
where in Pi , the noncem has been replaced bymi and variables x
have been renamed to xi .
Formally, we denote by [ t ]Γi , the term t in which names n such
that Γ(n) = τ l,∞n for some l are replaced by ni , and variables x are
replaced by xi .
Similarly, when a term is of type Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K, it can be of typeJτ l,1mi ; τ l ′,1pi K for any i . The nonce type τ l,∞m represents infinitely
many nonces (one for each session). That is, forn sessions, the typeJτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K represents all Jτ l,1mi ; τ l ′,1pi K. Formally, given a type T ,
Γ(k) = keyHH(T ) Γ(x) = LL
Γ ⊢ dec(x,k) : T
(DDecH)
Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) Γ(x) = LL
Γ ⊢ dec(x,k) : LL
(DDecL)
Γ(x) = (T )k
Γ ⊢ dec(x,k) : T
(DDecT)
Γ(k) = keyHH(T ) Γ(x) = LL
Γ ⊢ adec(x,k) : T ∨ LL
(DAdecH)
Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) Γ(x) = LL
Γ ⊢ adec(x,k) : LL
(DAdecL)
Γ(x) = {T }k
Γ ⊢ adec(x,k) : T
(DAdecT)
Γ(k) = keyHH(T ) Γ(x) = LL
Γ ⊢ checksign(x, vk(k)) : T
(DCheckH)
Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) Γ(x) = LL
Γ ⊢ checksign(x, vk(k)) : LL
(DCheckL)
Γ(x) = T ∗T ′
Γ ⊢ π1(x) : T
(DFst)
Γ(x) = T ∗T ′
Γ ⊢ π2(x) : T
′
(DSnd)
Γ(x) = LL
Γ ⊢ π1(x) : LL
(DFstL)
Γ(x) = LL
Γ ⊢ π2(x) : LL
(DSndL)
Figure 7: Destructor Rules
we define its expansion to n sessions, denoted [T ]n , as follows.
[ l ]n = l
[T ∗T ′ ]n = [T ]n ∗ [T ′ ]n
[T +T ′ ]n = [T ]n + [T ′ ]n[
keyl (T )
]n
= keyl ([T ]n )
[ (T )k ]
n
= ([T ]n)k
[ {T }k ]
n
= {[T ]n}k
[T ∨ T ′ ]n = [T ]n ∨ [T ′ ]n[ Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K ]n = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K[ Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K ]n = ∨nj=1Jτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K
where l , l ′ ∈ {LL, HH, HL},k ∈ K. Note that the size of the expanded
type [T ]n depends on n.
We need to adapt typing environments accordingly. For any typ-
ing environment Γ, we define its renaming for session i as:
[ Γ ]i = {xi : T | Γ(x) = T } ∪ {k : T | Γ(k) = T }
∪ {m : τ l,1m | Γ(m) = τ
l,1
m }
∪ {mi : τ
l,1
mi | Γ(m) = τ
l,∞
m }.
and then its expansion to n sessions as
[ Γ ]ni = {xi : [T ]
n | [ Γ ]i (xi ) = T } ∪ {k : [T ]
n | [ Γ ]i (k) = T }
∪ {m : τ l,1m | [ Γ ]i (m) = τ
l,1
m }.
Note that in [ Γ ]ni , due to the expansion, the size of the types
depends on n.
By construction, the environments contained in the constraints
generated by typing do not contain union types. However, refine-
ment types with infinite nonce types introduce union types when
expanded. In order to recover environments without union types
after expanding, which, as wewill explain in the next subsection, is
needed for our consistency checking procedure,we define branches([ Γ ]ni )
as the set of all Γ′, with the same domain as [ Γ ]ni , such that for all
x , Γ′(x) is not a union type, and either
• [ Γ ]ni (x) = Γ
′(x);
• or there exist typesT1,. . . ,Tk ,T
′
1 ,. . . ,T
′
k′
such that
[ Γ ]ni (x) = T1 ∨ . . . ∨ Tk ∨ Γ
′(x) ∨ T ′1 ∨ . . . ∨ T
′
k′
Finally, when typechecking two processes containing nonces
with infinite nonce types, we collect constraints that represent fam-
ilies of constraints.
Given a set of constraints c , and an environment Γ, we define the
renaming of c for session i in Γ as [ c ]Γi = {[ u ]
Γ
i ∼ [v ]
Γ
i | u ∼ v ∈
c}. This is propagated to constraint sets as follows: the renaming
of C for session i is [C ]i = {([ c ]
Γ
i , [ Γ ]i ) | (c, Γ) ∈ C} and its
expansion to n sessions is [C ]ni = {([ c ]
Γ
i , Γ
′) | ∃Γ. (c, Γ) ∈ C ∧
Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni )}.
Again, note that the size of [C ]i does not depend on the number
of sessions considered, while the size of the types present in [C ]ni
does. For example, forC = {({h(x) ∼ h(x)}, [x : Jτ HH,∞m ; τ HH,∞p K])},
we have [C ]i = {({h(xi ) ∼ h(xi )}, [xi : Jτ HH,∞m ; τ HH,∞p K])} and
[C ]ni = {({h(xi ) ∼ h(xi )}, [xi :
∨n
j=1Jτ HH,1mj ; τ HH,1pj K])}.
Our type system is sound for replicated processes provided that
the collected constraint sets are consistent, when instantiated with
all possible instantiations of the nonces and keys.
Theorem 6.2. Consider P ,Q , P ′ ,Q ′,C ,C ′, such that P ,Q and P ′,
Q ′ do not share any variable. Consider Γ, containing only keys and
nonces with types of the form τ l,1n .
Assume that P and Q only bind nonces with infinite nonce types,
i.e. using new m : τ l,∞m for some label l ; while P
′ and Q ′ only bind
nonces with finite types, i.e. using newm : τ l,1m .
Let us abbreviate by new n the sequence of declarations of each
noncem ∈ dom(Γ). If
• Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ,
• Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′,
• C ′∪×(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i ) is consistent for all n,
then new n. ((!P) | P ′) ≈t new n. ((!Q) | Q
′).
Theorem 6.1 requires to check consistency of one constraint set.
Theorem 6.2 now requires to check consistency of an infinite fam-
ily of contraint sets. Instead of deciding consistency, we provide a
procedure that checks a slightly stronger condition.
6.3 Procedure for consistency
Checking consistency of a set of constraints amounts to checking
static equivalence of the corresponding frames. Our procedure fol-
lows the spirit of [5] for checking computational indistinguisha-
bility: we first open encryption, signatures and pairs as much as
possible. Note that the type of a key indicates whether it is public
or secret. The two resulting frames should have the same shape.
Then, for unopened components, we simply need to check that
they satisfy the same equalities.
From now on, we only consider constraint sets that can actually
be generated when typing processes, as these are the only ones for
which we need to check consistency.
Formally, the procedure check_const is described in Figure 8. It
consists of four steps. First, we replace variables with refinements
of finite nonce types by their left and right values. In particular
a variable with a union type is not associated with a single value
and thus cannot be replaced. This is why the branching operation
needs to be performed when expanding environments containing
refinements with types of the form τ l,∞n . Second, we recursively
open the constraints as much as possible. Third, we check that the
resulting constraints have the same shape. Finally, as soon as two
constraints M ∼ M ′ and N ∼ N ′ are such that M , N are unifiable,
we must have M ′ = N ′, and conversely. The condition is slightly
more involved, especially when the constraints contain variables
of refined types with infinite nonce types.
Example 6.3. Continuing Example 3.1, when typechecked with
appropriate key types, the simplified model of Helios yields con-
straint sets containing notably the following two constraints.
{ aenc(〈0, ra〉, pk(ks )) ∼ aenc(〈1, ra〉, pk(ks )),
aenc(〈1, rb 〉, pk(ks )) ∼ aenc(〈0, rb 〉, pk(ks )) }
For simplicity, consider the set c containing only these two con-
straints, together with a typing environment Γ where ra and rb
are respectively given types τ HH,1ra and τ
HH,1
rb , and ks is given type
keyHH(T ) for someT .
The procedure check_const({(c, Γ)}) can detect that the con-
straint c is consistent and returns true. Indeed, as c does not con-
tain variables, step1Γ(c) simply returns (c, Γ). Since c only con-
tains messages encrypted with secret keys, step2Γ(c) also leaves
c unmodified. step3Γ(c) then returns true, since the messages ap-
pearing in c are messages asymmetrically encrypted with secret
keys, which contain a secret nonce (ra or rb ) directly under pairs.
Finally step4Γ(c) trivially returns true, as themessages aenc(〈0, ra〉, pk(ks ))
and aenc(〈1, rb 〉, pk(ks )) cannot be unified, as well as the messages
aenc(〈1, ra〉, pk(ks )) and aenc(〈0, rb 〉, pk(ks )).
Consider now the following set c ′, where encryption has not
been randomised:
c ′ = { aenc(0, pk(ks )) ∼ aenc(1, pk(ks )),
aenc(1, pk(ks )) ∼ aenc(0, pk(ks )) }
The procedure check_const({(c ′, Γ)}) returns false. Indeed,
contrary to the case of c , step3Γ(c
′) fails, as the encrypted mes-
sage do not contain a secret nonce. Actually, the corresponding
frames are indeed not statically equivalent since the adversary can
reconstruct the encryption of 0 and 1 with the key pk(ks ) (in his
initial knowledge), and check for equality.
step1Γ(c) := JcKσF ,σ ′F
, with
F := {x ∈ dom(Γ) |
∃m, n, l, l ′ . Γ(x ) = Jτ l ,1m ; τ
l ′,1
n K}
and σF , σ
′
F defined by
• dom(σF ) = dom(σ
′
F ) = F
• ∀x ∈ F . ∀m, n, l, l ′ .
Jτ l ,1m ; τ
l ′,1
n K ⇒ σF (x ) =m ∧ σ
′
F
(x ) = n
step2Γ(c) is recursively defined by, for all M , N , M
′, N ′:
• step2Γ({ 〈M, N 〉 ∼ 〈M
′
, N ′〉 } ∪ c ′) :=
step2Γ({M ∼ M
′
, N ∼ N ′ } ∪ c ′)
• For all k ∈ K , if ∃T .Γ(k) = keyLL(T ):
• step2Γ({enc(M, k) ∼ enc(M
′
, k)} ∪ c, c ′) :=
step2Γ({M ∼ M
′ } ∪ c ′)
• step2Γ({aenc(M, pk(k)) ∼ aenc(M
′
, pk(k))} ∪ c, c ′) :=
step2Γ({M ∼ M
′ } ∪ c ′)
• step2Γ({sign(M, k) ∼ sign(M
′
, k)} ∪ c ′) :=
step2Γ({M ∼ M
′ } ∪ c ′)
• For all k ∈ K , if ∃T .Γ(k) = keyHH(T ):
step2Γ({sign(M, k) ∼ sign(M
′
, k)} ∪ c ′) :=
{sign(M, k) ∼ sign(M ′, k)} ∪ step2Γ({M ∼ M
′} ∪ c ′)
• For all other terms M, N :
step2Γ({M ∼ N } ∪ c
′) := {M ∼ N } ∪ step2Γ(c
′).
step3Γ(c) := check that for all M ∼ N ∈ c , M and N are both
• a key k ∈ K such that ∃T .Γ(k) = keyLL(T );
• noncesm, n ∈ N such that
∃a ∈ {1, ∞}. Γ(n) = τ LL,an ∧ Γ(m) = τ
LL,a
n ,
• or public keys, verification keys, or constants;
• or enc(M ′, k), enc(N ′, k) such that ∃T .Γ(k) = keyHH(T );
• or either h(M ′), h(N ′) or aenc(M ′, pk(k)), aenc(N ′, pk(k)), where
∃T .Γ(k) = keyHH(T ); such that M ′ and N ′ contain directly under
pairs some n with Γ(n) = HH or k such that ∃T .Γ(k) = keyHH(T );
• or sign(M ′, k), sign(N ′, k) such that ∃T .Γ(k) = keyHH(T ).
step4Γ(c) := If for all M ∼ M
′ and N ∼ N ′ ∈ c such that M , N are
unifiable with a most general unifier µ , and such that
∀x ∈ dom(µ).∃l, l ′,m, p . (Γ(x ) = Jτ l ,∞m ; τ
l ′,∞
p K) ⇒
(x µ ∈ X ∨ ∃i . x µ =mi )
we have
M ′αθ = N ′αθ
where
∀x ∈ dom(µ).∀l, l ′,m, p, i .
(Γ(x ) = Jτ l ,∞m ; τ
l ′,∞
p K ∧ µ(x ) =mi ) ⇒ θ (x ) = pi
and α is the restriction of µ to {x ∈ dom(µ) | Γ(x ) = LL ∧ µ(x ) ∈ N};
and if the symmetric condition for the case whereM ′, N ′ are unifiable
holds as well, then return true.
check_const(C) := for all (c, Γ) ∈ C , let c1 := step2Γ(step1Γ(c)) and
check that step3Γ(c1) = true and step4Γ(c1) = true.
Figure 8: Procedure for checking consistency.
For constraint sets without infinite nonce types, check_const
entails consistency.
Theorem 6.4. Let C be a set of constraints such that
∀(c, Γ) ∈ C . ∀l , l ′,m,p. Γ(x) , Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K.
If check_const(C) = true, then C is consistent.
We prove this theorem by showing that, for each of the first
two steps of the procedure, if stepiΓ(c) is consistent in Γ, then c
is consistent in Γ. It then suffices to check the consistency of the
constraint step2Γ(step1Γ(c)) in Γ. Provided that step3Γ holds, we
show that this constraint is saturated in the sense that any message
obtained by the attacker by decomposing terms in the constraint
already occurs in the constraint; and the constraint only contains
messages which cannot be reconstructed by the attacker from the
rest of the constraint. Using this property, we finally prove that the
simple unification tests performed in step4 are sufficient to ensure
static equivalence of each side of the constraint for any well-typed
instantiation of the variables.
As a direct consequence of Theorems 6.1 and 6.4, we now have
a procedure to prove trace equivalence of processes without repli-
cation.
For proving trace equivalence of processes with replication, we
need to check consistency of an infinite family of constraint sets, as
prescribed by Theorem 6.2. Asmentioned earlier, not only the num-
ber of constraints is unbounded, but the size of the type of some
(replicated) variables is also unbounded (i.e. of the form
∨n
j=1Jτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K).
We use here two ingredients: we first show that it is sufficient to
apply our procedure to two constraints only. Second, we show that
our procedure applied to variables with replicated types, i.e. nonce
types of the form τ l,∞n implies consistency of the corresponding
constraints with types of unbounded size.
6.4 Two constraints suffice
Consistency of a constraint set C does not guarantee consistency
of ∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i . For example, consider
C = {({h(m) ∼ h(p)}, [m : τ HH,∞m ,p : τ
HH,1
p ])}
which can be obtained when typing
newm : τ HH,∞m . new p : τ
HH,1
p . out(h(m)) ∼
newm : τ HH,∞m . new p : τ
HH,1
p . out(h(p)).
C is consistent: since m, p are secret, the attacker cannot distin-
guish between their hashes. However ∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i contains (to-
gether with some environment):
{h(m1) ∼ h(p), h(m2) ∼ h(p), . . . , h(mn) ∼ h(p)}
which is not, since the attacker can notice that the value on the
right is always the same, while the value on the left is not.
Note however that the inconsistency of ∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i would
have been discovered when checking the consistency of two copies
of the constraint set only. Indeed, [C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2 contains (together
with some environment):
{h(m1) ∼ h(p), h(m2) ∼ h(p)}
which is already inconsistent, for the same reason.
Actually, checking consistency (with our procedure) of two con-
straints [C ]n1 and [C ]
n
2 entails consistency of∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i . Note
that this does not mean that consistency of [C ]n1 and [C ]
n
2 im-
plies consistency of∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i . Instead, our procedure ensures
a stronger property, for which two constraints suffice.
Theorem 6.5. Let C and C ′ be two constraint sets, which do not
contain any common variables. For all n ∈ N,
check_const([C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 ) = true ⇒
check_const((∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i )∪×[C
′ ]n1 ) = true.
It is rather easy to show that if
check_const([C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×
[
C ′
]n
1 ) = true,
then the first three steps of the procedure check_const can be
successfully applied to each element of (∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i )∪×[C
′ ]n1 .
However the case of the fourth step is more intricate. When apply-
ing the procedure check_const to an element of the constraint set
(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i )∪×[C
′ ]n1 , if step4 fails, then the constraint con-
tains an inconsistency, i.e. elements M ∼ M ′ and N ∼ N ′ for
which the unification condition from step4 does not hold. Intu-
itively, the property holds by contraposition thanks to the fact that
a similar inconsistency, up to reindexing the nonces and variables,
can then already be found when considering only the first two
constraint sets, i.e. in [C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 . The actual proof re-
quires a careful examination of the structure of the constraint set
(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i )∪×[C
′ ]n1 , to establish this reindexing.
6.5 Reducing the size of types
The procedure check_const applied to replicated types implies
consistency of corresponding constraints with unbounded types.
Theorem 6.6. Let C be a constraint set. Then for all i ,
check_const([C ]i ) = true ⇒
∀n ≥ 1.check_const([C ]ni ) = true
Again here, it is rather easy to show that if check_const([C ]i ) =
true then the first three steps of the procedure check_const can
successfully be applied to each element of [C ]ni . The case of step4
is more involved. The property holds thanks to the condition on
the most general unifier expressed in step4. Intuitively, this con-
dition is written in such a way that if, when applying step4 to
an element of [C ]ni , two messages can be unified, then the corre-
sponding messages (with replicated types) in [C ]i can be unified
with a most general unifier µ satisfying the condition. The proof
uses this idea to show that if step4 succeeds on all elements of
[C ]i , then it also succeeds on the elements of [C ]
n
i .
6.6 Checking the consistency of the infinite
constraint
Theorems 6.2, 6.5, and 6.6 provide a sound procedure for checking
trace equivalence of processes with and without replication.
Theorem 6.7. Let C , and C ′ be two constraint sets without any
common variable.
check_const([C ]1∪×[C ]2∪×[C
′ ]1) = true ⇒
∀n. [C ′ ]n1∪×(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i ) is consistent.
All detailed proofs are available online [1].
7 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented a prototype type-checker TypeEq and ap-
plied it on various examples briefly described below.
Symmetric key protocols. For the sake of comparison, we
consider 5 symmetric key protocols taken from the benchmark
of [28], and described in [26]: Denning-Sacco, Wide Mouth Frog,
Needham-Schroeder, Yahalom-Lowe, and Otway-Rees. All these
protocols aim at exchanging a key k . We prove strong secrecy of
the key, as defined in [2], i.e., P(k1) ≈t P(k2) where k1 and k2
are public names. Intuitively, an attacker should not be able to
tell which key is used even if he knows the two possible values
in advance. For some of the protocols, we truncated the last step,
when it consists in using the exchanged key for encryption, since
our framework currently covers only encryption with long-term
(fixed) keys.
Asymmetric key protocols. In addition to the symmetric key
protocols, we consider the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
(NSL) protocol [37] and we again prove strong secrecy of the nonce
sent by the receiver (Bob).
Helios. We model the Helios protocol for two honest voters
and infinitely many dishonest ones, as informally described in Sec-
tion 2. The corresponding process includes a non trivial else branch,
used to express the weeding phase [32], where dishonest ballots
equal to some honest one are discarded. As emphasised in Sec-
tion 2, Helios is secure only if honest voters vote at most once.
Therefore the protocol includes non replicated processes (for vot-
ers) as well as a replicated process (to handle dishonest ballots).
All our experiments have been run on a single Intel Xeon E5-
2687Wv3 3.10GHz core, with 378GB of RAM (shared with the 19
other cores). All corresponding files can be found online at [1].
7.1 Bounded number of sessions
We first compare our tool with tools designed for a bounded num-
ber of sessions: SPEC [34], APTE (and its APTE-POR variant) [13,
24], Akiss [23], or SAT-Equiv [28]. The protocolmodelsmay slightly
differ due to the subtleties of each tool. For example, several of
these tools require simple processes where each sub-process emits
on a distinct channel. We do not need such an assumption. In addi-
tion, SAT-Equiv only covers symmetric encryption and therefore
could not be applied to Helios or NSL. SAT-Equiv further assumes
protocols to be well-typed, which sometimes requires to tag proto-
cols. Since we consider only untagged versions (following the orig-
inal description of each protocol), SAT-Equiv failed to prove the
Otway-Rees protocol. Moreover, Helios involves non-trivial else
branches, which are only supported by APTE.
The number of sessions we consider denotes the number of pro-
cesses in parallel in each scenario. For symmetric key protocols,we
start with a simple scenario with only two honest participants A, B
and a honest server S (3 sessions). We consider increasingly more
complex scenarios (6, 7, 10, 12, and 14 sessions) featuring a dis-
honest agent C. In the complete scenario (14 sessions) each agent
among A, B (and C) runs the protocol once as the initiator, and
once as the responder with each other agent (A, B, C). In the case
of NSL, we similarly consider a scenario with two honest agents A,
B running the protocol once (2 sessions), and two scenarios with
Protocols (# sessions) Akiss APTE APTE-POR Spec Sat-Eq TypeEq
3 0.08s 0.32s 0.02s 9s 0.09s 0.002s
6 3.9s TO 1.6s 191m 0.3s 0.003s
Denning - 7 29s 3.6s TO 0.8s 0.004s
Sacco 10 SO 12m 1.8s 0.004s
12 TO 3.4s 0.005s
14 5s 0.006s
3 0.03s 0.05s 0.009s 8s 0.06s 0.002s
6 0.4s 28m 0.4s 52m 0.2s 0.003s
Wide Mouth 7 1.4s TO 1.9s MO 2.3s 0.003s
Frog 10 46s 5m31s 5s 0.004s
12 71m TO 1m 0.005s
14 TO 4m20s 0.006s
3 0.1s 0.4s 0.02s 52s 0.5s 0.003s
6 20s TO 4s MO 4s 0.003s
Needham - 7 2m 8m 36s 0.003s
Schroeder 10 SO TO 1m50s 0.005s
12 4m47s 0.005s
14 11m 0.007s
3 0.16s 3.6s 0.03s 6s 1.4s 0.003s
6 33s TO 44s 132m 1m 0.004s
Yahalom - 7 11m 36m MO 17m 0.004s
Lowe 10 SO TO 63m 0.009s
12 TO 0.04s
14 0.05s
Otway-Rees
3 2m12s BUG 1.7s 27m x 0.004s
6 TO SO MO 0.011s
7 0.012s
10 0.02s
12 0.03s
14 0.1s
Needham- 2 0.1s 4s 0.06s 31s x 0.003s
Schroeder- 4 2m BUG BUG MO 0.003s
Lowe 8 TO 0.007s
Helios 3 x TO BUG x x 0.002s
Figure 9: Experimental results for the bounded case
an additional dishonest agent C, up to the complete scenario (8 ses-
sions) where each agent runs NSL once as initiator, once as respon-
der, with each agent. For Helios, we consider 2 honest voters, and
one dishonest voter only, as well as a ballot box. The correspond-
ing results are reported in Figure 9. We write TO for Time Out (12
hours), MO for Memory Out (more than 64 GB of RAM), SO for
Stack Overflow, BUG in the case of APTE, when the proof failed
due to bugs in the tool, and x when the tool could not handle the
protocol for the reasons discussed previously. In all cases, our tool
is almost instantaneous and outperforms by orders of magnitude
the competitors.
7.2 Unbounded numbers of sessions
We then compare our type-checker with ProVerif [21], for an un-
bounded number of sessions, on three examples: Helios, Denning-
Sacco, and NSL. As expected, ProVerif cannot prove Helios secure
since it cannot express that voters vote only once. This may sound
surprising, since proofs of Helios in ProVerif already exist (e.g. [9,
32]). Interestingly, these models actually implicitly assume a reli-
able channel between honest voters and the voting server: when-
ever a voter votes, she first sends her vote to the voting server on
a secure channel, before letting the attacker see it. This model pre-
vents an attacker from reading and blocking a message, while this
can be easily done in practice (by breaking the connection).We also
failed to prove (automatically) Helios in Tamarin [16]. The reason
Protocols ProVerif TypeEq
Helios x 0.003s
Denning-Sacco 0.05s 0.05s
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe 0.08s 0.09s
Figure 10: Experimental results for unbounded numbers of
sessions
is that the weeding procedure makes Tamarin enter a loop where
it cannot detect that, as soon as a ballot is not weed, it has been
forged by the adversary.
For the sake of comparison, we run both tools (ProVerif and
TypeEq) on a symmetric protocol (Denning-Sacco) and an asym-
metric protocol (Needham-Schroeder-Lowe). The execution times
are very similar. The corresponding results are reported in Fig-
ure 10.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented a novel type system for verifying trace equivalence
in security protocols. It can be applied to various protocols, with
support for else branches, standard cryptographic primitives, as
well as a bounded and an unbounded number of sessions. We be-
lieve that our prototype implementation demonstrates that this ap-
proach is promising and opens theway to the development of an ef-
ficient technique for proving equivalence properties in even larger
classes of protocols.
Several interesting problems remain to be studied. For example,
a limitation of ProVerif is that it cannot properly handle global
states. We plan to explore this case by enriching our types to ex-
press the fact that an event is “consumed”. Also, for the moment,
our type system only applies to protocols P ,Q that have the same
structure. One advantage of a type system is its modularity: it is rel-
atively easy to add a few ruleswithout redoing thewhole proof.We
plan to add rules to cover protocols with different structures (e.g.
when branches are swapped). Another direction is the treatment
of primitives with algebraic properties (e.g. Exclusive Or, or homo-
morphic encryption). It seems possible to extend the type system
and discharge the difficulty to the consistency of the constraints,
which seems easier to handle (since this captures the static case).
Finally, our type system is sound w.r.t. equivalence in a symbolic
model. An interesting question is whether it also entails computa-
tional indistinguishability. Again, we expect that an advantage of
our type system is the possibility to discharge most of the difficulty
to the constraints.
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Γ ⊢ ⋄ branches(Γ) = {Γ}
Γ ⊢ 0 ∼ 0 → (∅, Γ)
(PZero)
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
Γ ⊢ out(M).P ∼ out(N ).Q → C∪∀c
(POut)
Γ, x : LL ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
Γ ⊢ in(x).P ∼ in(x).Q → C
(PIn)
Γ,n : τ l,an ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
Γ ⊢ new n : τ l,an .P ∼ new n : τ
l,a
n .Q → C
(PNew)
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ P | P ′ ∼ Q | Q ′ → C∪×C
′
(PPar)
Γ, x : T ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ, x : T ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′
Γ, x : T ∨ T ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ∪C ′
(POr)
Γ ⊢ d(y) : T Γ, x : T ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ let x = d(y) in P else P ′ ∼ let x = d(y) in Q else Q ′ → C ∪C ′
(PLet)
Γ(y) = Jτ l,an ; τ l ′,am K Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ let x = d(y) in P else P ′ ∼ let x = d(y) in Q else Q ′ → C ′
(PLetLR)
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′ Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL→ c ′
Γ ⊢ if M = M ′ then P else P ′ ∼ if N = N ′ then Q else Q ′ →
(
C ∪C ′
)
∪∀(c ∪ c
′)
(PIfL)
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → ∅ Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l ′′,1m′ ; τ l ′′′,1n′ K → ∅
b = (τ
l,1
m
?
= τ
l ′′,1
m′
) b ′ = (τ
l ′,1
n
?
= τ
l ′′′,1
n′
) Γ ⊢ Pb ∼ Qb ′ → C
Γ ⊢ if M1 = M2 then P⊤ else P⊥ ∼ if N1 = N2 then Q⊤ else Q⊥ → C
(PIfLR)
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′ Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : HH → c ′
Γ ⊢ if M = M ′ then P else P ′ ∼ if N = N ′ then Q else Q ′ → C ′
(PIfS)
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅ Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ if M1 = M2 then P else P
′ ∼ if N1 = N2 then Q else Q
′ → C ∪C ′
(PIfLR*)
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c Γ ⊢ t ∼ t : LL→ c ′ t ∈ K ∪ N ∪ C
Γ ⊢ if M = t then P else P ′ ∼ if N = t then Q else Q ′ → C ∪C ′
(PIfP)
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′ Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ∗T ′ → c Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → ∅
Γ ⊢ if M = M ′ then P else P ′ ∼ if N = N ′ then Q else Q ′ → C ′
(PIfI)
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → ∅ Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l ′′,a′m′ ; τ l ′′′,a′n′ K → ∅
τ
l,a
m , τ
l ′′,a′
m′
, τ
l ′,a
n , τ
l ′′′,a′
n′
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C
Γ ⊢ if M1 = M2 then P else P
′ ∼ if N1 = N2 then Q else Q
′ → C
(PIfLR’*)
Figure 11: Rules for processes
APPENDIX A TYPING RULES AND DEFINITIONS
We give on Figures 11 and 12 a complete version of our typing rules for processes, as well as the formal definition of the well-formedness
judgement for typing environments.
In this section, we also provide additional definitions (or more precise versions of previous definitions) regarding constraints, and espe-
cially their consistency, that the proofs require.
Definition A.1 (Constraint). A constraint is defined as a couple of messages, separated by the symbol ∼:
u ∼ v
[] ⊢ ⋄ (GNil)
Γ ⊢ ⋄ n ∈ BN
Γ,n : τ l,an ⊢ ⋄
(GNonce)
Γ ⊢ ⋄ keys(T ) ⊆ dom(Γ)
Γ, x : T ⊢ ⋄
(GVar)
Γ ⊢ ⋄ keys(T ) ⊆ dom(Γ)
Γ,k : keyl (T ) ⊢ ⋄
(GKey)
Figure 12: Well-formedness of the typing environment
We will consider sets of constraints, which we usually denote c . We will also consider couples (c, Γ) composed of such a set, and a typing
environment Γ. Finally we will denote sets of such tuples C , and call them constraint sets.
Definition A.2 (Compatible environments). We say that two typing environments Γ, Γ′ are compatible if they are equal on the intersection
of their domains, i.e. if
∀x ∈ dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ′). Γ(x) = Γ′(x)
Definition A.3 (Union of environments). Let Γ, Γ′ be two compatible environments. Their union Γ ∪ Γ′ is defined by
• dom(Γ ∪ Γ′) = dom(Γ) ∪ dom(Γ′)
• ∀x ∈ dom(Γ). (Γ ∪ Γ′)(x) = Γ(x)
• ∀x ∈ dom(Γ′). (Γ ∪ Γ′)(x) = Γ′(x)
Note that this function is well defined since Γ and Γ′ are assumed to be compatible.
Definition A.4 (Operations on constraint sets). We define two operations on constraints.
• the product union of constraint sets:
C∪×C
′ := {(c ∪ c ′, Γ ∪ Γ′) |
(c, Γ) ∈ C ∧ (c ′, Γ′) ∈ C ′ ∧ Γ, Γ′ are compatible}
• the addition of a set of constraints c ′ to all elements of a constraint set C :
C∪∀c
′ :=C∪×{(c
′
, ∅)}
=
{
(c ∪ c ′, Γ) | (c, Γ) ∈ C
}
Definition A.5. For any typing environment Γ, we denote by ΓX its restriction to variables, by ΓN,K its restriction to names and keys,
and by EΓ the set of the names it contains, i.e. N ∩ dom(Γ).
Definition A.6 (Well-typed substitutions). Let Γ be a typing environment, θ , θ ′ two substitutions, and c a set of constraints. We say that θ ,
θ ′ are well-typed in Γ, and write ΓN,K ⊢ θ ∼ θ
′ : ΓX → c , if they are ground and
• dom(θ) = dom(θ ′) = dom(ΓX),
• and
∀x ∈ dom(ΓX), ΓN,K ⊢ θ(x) ∼ θ
′(x) : Γ(x) → cx
for some cx such that c =
⋃
x ∈dom(ΓX ) cx .
Definition A.7 (LL substitutions). Let Γ be an environment, ϕ, ϕ′ two substitutions and c a set of constraints. We say that ϕ, ϕ′ have type
LL in Γ with constraint c , and write Γ ⊢ ϕ ∼ ϕ′ : LL → c if
• dom(ϕ) = dom(ϕ′);
• for all x ∈ dom(ϕ) there exists cx such that Γ ⊢ ϕ(x) ∼ ϕ
′(x) : LL→ cx and c =
⋃
x ∈dom(ϕ ) cx .
Definition A.8 (Frames associated to a set of constraints). If c is a set of constraints, let ϕl(c) and ϕr(c) be the frames composed of the
terms respectively on the left and on the right of the ∼ symbol in the constraints of c (in the same order).
Definition A.9 (Instantiation of constraints). If c is a set of constraints, and σ , σ ′ are two substitutions, let JcKσ ,σ ′ be the instantiation of
c by σ on the left and σ ′ on the right, i.e. JcKσ ,σ ′ = {Mσ ∼ Nσ ′ | M ∼ N ∈ c}.
Similarly we write for a constraint set C JCKσ ,σ ′ = {(JcKσ ,σ ′, Γ) | (c, Γ) ∈ C}.
Definition A.10 (Frames associated to environments). If Γ is a typing environment, we denote ϕΓ
LL
the frame containing all the keys k such
that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) for some T , all the public keys pk(k) and vk(k) for k ∈ dom(Γ), and all the nonces n such that Γ(n) = τ LL,an (for
a ∈ {∞, 1}).
Definition A.11 (Branches of a type). IfT is a type, we write branches(T ) the set of all typesT ′ such thatT ′ is not a union type, and either
• T = T ′;
• or there exist typesT1,. . . ,Tk ,T
′
1 ,. . . ,T
′
k′
such that
T = T1 ∨ . . . ∨ Tk ∨ T ∨ T
′
1 ∨ . . . ∨ T
′
k′
Definition A.12 (Branches of an environment). For a typing environment Γ, we write branches(Γ) the sets of all environments Γ′ such that
• dom(Γ′) = dom(Γ)
• ∀x ∈ dom(Γ). Γ′(x) ∈ branches(Γ(x)).
Definition A.13 (Consistency). We say that c is consistent in a typing environment Γ, if for any subsets c ′ ⊆ c and Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that
Γ
′
N,K = ΓN,K and vars(c
′) ⊆ dom(Γ′), for any ground substitutions σ , σ ′ well-typed in Γ′, the frames new EΓ .(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c
′)σ ) and
new EΓ .(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c
′)σ ′) are statically equivalent.
We say that (c, Γ) is consistent if c is consistent in Γ.
We say that a constraint set C is consistent if each element (c, Γ) ∈ C is consistent.
APPENDIX B PROOFS
In this section, we provide the detailed proofs to all of our theorems.
Unless specified otherwise, the environments Γ considered in the lemmas are implicitly assumed to be well-formed.
B.1 General results and soundness
In this subsection, we prove soundness for non replicated processes, as well as several results regarding the type system that this proof
uses.
Lemma B.1 (Subtyping properties). The following properties of subtyping hold:
(1) ∀T . HL <: T =⇒ T = HL
(2) ∀T . LL <: T =⇒ T = LL ∨ T = HL
(3) ∀T . HH <: T =⇒ T = HH ∨ T = HL
(4) ∀T1,T2,T3. T1 ∗T2 <: T3 =⇒ T3 = LL ∨ T3 = HL ∨ T3 = HH ∨ (∃T4,T5. T3 = T4 ∗T5) i.e. T3 is LL, HL, HH or a pair type.
(5) ∀T ,T1,T2. T <: T1 ∗T2 =⇒ (∃T
′
1 ,T
′
2 . T = T
′
1 ∗T
′
2 ∧ T
′
1 <: T1 ∧ T
′
2 <: T2)
(6) ∀T1,T2 . T1 ∗T2 <: LL =⇒ T1 <: LL ∧ T2 <: LL
(7) ∀T1,T2 . T1 ∗T2 <: HH =⇒ T1 <: HH ∨ T2 <: HH
(8) ∀T1,T2,k . T1 <: (T2)k =⇒ (∃T3 <: T2. T1 = (T3)k )
(9) ∀T1,T2,k . T1 <: {T2}k =⇒ (∃T3 <: T2. T1 = {T3}k )
(10) ∀T1,T2,k . (T1)k <: T2 =⇒ T2 = HL ∨ (∃T3 .T1 <: T3 ∧ T2 = (T3)k )
(11) ∀T1,T2,k . {T1}k <: T2 =⇒ T2 = HL ∨ (∃T3.T1 <: T3 ∧ T2 = {T3}k )
(12) ∀T ,m,n, l , l ′. T <: Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K =⇒ T = Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K
(13) ∀T ,m,n, l , l ′. Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K <: T =⇒ T = HL ∨ T = Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K
(14) ∀T1,T2 . T1 <: T2 =⇒ neitherT1 nor T2 are union types unless T2 = HL or T1 = T2.
(15) ∀T , l ,T ′. T <: keyl (T ′) =⇒ T = keyl (T ′).
(16) ∀T . T <: LL =⇒ T is a pair type ∨ (∃T ′. T = keyLL(T ′)) ∨ T = LL.
(17) ∀T . T <: HH =⇒ T is a pair type ∨ (∃T ′. T = keyHH(T ′)) ∨ T = HH.
Proof. • Points 1 to 3 are immediate by induction on the subtyping proof (the proofs of the second and third points use the first
one in the STrans case).
• Point 4 is immediate by induction on the proof ofT1 ∗T2 <: T3 (the STrans case uses the first three points).
• Point 5 is proved by induction on the proof ofT <: T1 ∗T2 (the STrans case uses the induction hypothesis).
• Points 6 and 7 are proved by induction on the proof ofT1 ∗T2 <: LL (resp. HH; using the previous points in the STrans case).
• Point 8 and 9 immediate by induction on the subtyping proof.
• Points 10 to 13 are proved by induction on the subtyping proof (using the first two points in the STrans case).
• Points 14 and 15 are immediate by induction on the subtyping proof.
• Points 16 and 17 are proved by induction on the subtyping proof, using points 5, 8, 9 in the STrans case.

Lemma B.2 (Terms of type T ∨ T ′). For all Γ, T , T ′, for all ground terms t , t ′, for all c , if
Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T ∨ T ′ → c
then
Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c or Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T ′ → c
Proof. We prove this property by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T ∨ T ′ → c .
The last rule of the derivation cannot be TNonce, TNonceL, TCstFN, TPair, TKey, TPubKey, TVKey, TEnc, TEncH, TEncL, TAenc,
TAencH, TSignH, TSignL, THash, THashL, THigh, TLR1, TLR∞, TLRVar, TLR’, or TLRL’ since the type in their conclusion cannot be
T ∨ T ′. It cannot be TVar since t , t ′ are ground.
In the TSub case we know that Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T ′′ → c (with a shorter derivation) for someT ′′ <: T ∨ T ′; thus, by Lemma B.1,T ′′ = T ∨ T ′,
and the claim holds by the induction hypothesis.
Finally in the TOr case, the premise of the rule directly proves the claim. 
Lemma B.3 (Terms and branch types). For all Γ, T , c , for all ground terms t , t ′, if
Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c
then there exists T ′ ∈ branches(T ) such that
Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T ′ → c
Proof. This property is a corollary of Lemma B.2. We indeed prove it by successively applying this lemma to Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c until T
is not a union type. 
Lemma B.4 (Substitutions type in a branch). For all Γ, c , for all ground substitutions σ , σ ′, if
ΓN,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : ΓX → c
then there exists Γ′ ∈ branches(Γ) such that
Γ
′
N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → c
Proof. This property follows from Lemma B.3. Indeed, by definition, c =
⋃
x ∈dom(Γ) cx for some cx such that for all x ∈ dom(Γ)(=
dom(σ ) = dom(σ ′)),
Γ ⊢ σ (x) ∼ σ ′(x) : Γ(x) → cx
Hence by applying Lemma B.3 we obtain a typeTx ∈ branches(Γ(x)) such that
Γ ⊢ σ (x) ∼ σ ′(x) : Tx → cx
Thus if we denote Γ′′ by ∀x ∈ dom(ΓX).Γ
′′(x) = Tx , and Γ
′
= ΓN,K ∪ Γ
′′, we have Γ′ ∈ branches(Γ) and Γ′N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → c . 
Lemma B.5 (Typing terms in branches). For all Γ, T , c , for all terms t , t ′, for all Γ′ ∈ branches(Γ), if Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c then
Γ
′ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c .
Corollary: in that case, there exists T ′ ∈ branches(T ) such that Γ′ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T ′ → c .
Proof. We prove this property by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c . In most cases for the last rule applied, Γ(x) is
not directly involved in the premises, for any variable x . Rather, Γ appears only in other typing judgements, or is used in Γ(k) or Γ(n) for
some key k or nonce n, and keys or nonces cannot have union types. Hence, since the typing rules for terms do not change Γ, the claim
directly follows from the induction hypothesis. For instance in the TPair case, we have t = 〈t1, t2〉, t
′
= 〈t ′1, t
′
2〉, T = T1 ∗ T2, c = c1 ∪ c2,
Γ ⊢ t1 ∼ t
′
1 : T1 → c1, and Γ ⊢ t2 ∼ t
′
2 : T2 → c2. Thus by the induction hypothesis, Γ
′ ⊢ t1 ∼ t
′
1 : T1 → c1, and Γ
′ ⊢ t2 ∼ t
′
2 : T2 → c2;
and therefore by rule TPair, Γ′ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c . The cases of rules TEnc, TEncH, TEncL, TAenc, TAencH, TAencL, THashL, TSignH,
TSignL, TLR’, TLRL’, TLRVar, TSub, TOr are similar.
The cases of rules TNonce, TNonceL, TCst, TKey, TPubKey, TVKey, THash, THigh, TLR1, and TLR∞ are immediate since these rules
use neither Γ nor another typing judgement in their premise.
Finally, in the TVar case, t = t ′ = x for some variable x such that Γ(x) = T , and c = ∅. Rule TVar also proves that Γ′ ⊢ x ∼ x : Γ′(x) → ∅.
Since Γ′(x) ∈ branches(Γ(x)), by applying rule TOr as many times as necessary, we have Γ′ ⊢ x ∼ x : Γ(x) → ∅, i.e. Γ′ ⊢ x ∼ x : T → ∅,
which proves the claim.
The corollary then follows, again by induction on the typing derivation. If T is not a union type, branches(T ) = {T } and the claim is
directly the previous property. Otherwise, the last rule applied in the typing derivation can only be TVar, TSub, or TOr. The TSub case
follows trivially from the induction hypothesis; since T is a union type, it is its own only subtype. In the TVar case, t = t ′ = x for some
variable x such that Γ(x) = T . Hence, by definition, Γ′(x) ∈ branches(T ), and by rule TVar we have Γ′ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : Γ′(x) → c . Finally, in the
TOr case, we have T = T1 ∨ T2 for some T1, T2 such that Γ ⊢ t ∼ t
′ : T1 → c . By the induction hypothesis, there exists T
′
1 ∈ branches(T1)
such that Γ′ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T ′1 → c . Since, by definition, branches(T1) ⊆ branches(T1 ∨ T2), this proves the claim. 
Lemma B.6 (Typing destructors in branches). For all Γ, T , d , x , for all Γ′ ∈ branches(Γ), if Γ ⊢ d(x) : T then Γ′ ⊢ d(x) : T .
Proof. This property is immediate by examining the typing rules for destructors. Indeed, Γ and Γ′ only differ on variables, and the rules
for destructors only involve Γ(x) for x ∈ X in conditions of the form Γ(x) = T for some typeT which is not a union type.
Hence in these cases Γ′(x) is also T , and the same rule can be applied to Γ′ to prove the claim. 
Lemma B.7 (Typing processes in branches). For all Γ,C , for all processes P , Q , for all Γ′ ∈ branches(Γ), if Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C then there
exists C ′ ⊆ C such that Γ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C . In all the cases for the last rule applied in this derivation,
we can show that the conditions of this rule still hold in Γ′ (instead of Γ) using
• Lemma B.5 for the conditions of the form Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c;
• Lemma B.6 for the conditions of the form Γ ⊢ d(y) : T ;
• the fact that if Γ(x) is not a union type,then Γ′(x) = Γ(x), for conditions such as "Γ(x) = LL", "Γ(x) = Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K" (in the PLetLR
case);
• the induction hypothesis for the conditions of the form Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′′. In this case, the induction hypothesis produces a
C ′′′ ⊆ C ′′, which can then be used to show C ′ ⊆ C , since C ′ and C are usually respectively C ′′′ and C ′′ with some terms added.
We detail here the cases of rules POut, PPar, and POr. The other cases are similar, as explained above.
If the last rule is POut, then we have P = out(M).P ′, Q = out(N ).Q ′, C = C ′′∪∀c for some P
′, Q ′, M , N , C ′′, c , such that Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼
Q ′ → C ′′ and Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c . Hence by Lemma B.5, Γ′ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c , and by the induction hypothesis applied to P ′, Q ′,
Γ
′ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′′′ for some C ′′′ such that C ′′′ ⊆ C ′′. Therefore by rule POut, Γ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′′′∪∀c , and since C
′′′∪∀c ⊆ C
′′∪∀c(= C),
this proves the claim.
If the last rule is PPar, then we have P = P1 | P2, Q = Q1 | Q2, C = C1∪×C2 for some P1, P2, Q1, Q2, C1, C2 such that Γ ⊢ P1 ∼ Q1 → C1
and Γ ⊢ P2 ∼ Q2 → C2. Thus by applying the induction hypothesis twice, we have Γ
′ ⊢ P1 ∼ Q1 → C
′
1 and Γ
′ ⊢ P2 ∼ Q2 → C
′
2 with
C ′1 ⊆ C1 and C
′
2 ⊆ C2. Therefore by rule PPar, Γ
′ ⊢ P1 | P2 ∼ Q1 | Q2 → C
′
1∪×C
′
2, and since C
′
1∪×C
′
2 ⊆ C1∪×C2(= C), this proves the claim.
If the last rule is POr, then there exist Γ′′, x , T1, T2, C1 and C2 such that Γ = Γ
′′
, x : T1 ∨ T2, C = C1 ∪ C2, Γ
′′
,x : T1 ⊢ P ∼ Q → C1
and Γ′′, x : T2 ⊢ P ∼ Q → C2. By definition of branches, it is clear that branches(Γ) = branches(Γ
′′
,x : T1 ∨ T2) = branches(Γ
′′
, x : T1) ∪
branches(Γ′′,x : T2). Thus, since Γ
′ ∈ branches(Γ), we know that Γ′ ∈ branches(Γ′′,x : T1) or Γ
′ ∈ branches(Γ′′,x : T2). We write the proof
for the case where Γ′ ∈ branches(Γ′′,x : T1), the other case is analogous. By applying the induction hypothesis to Γ
′′
,x : T1 ⊢ P ∼ Q → C1,
there exists C ′1 ⊆ C1 such that Γ
′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′1. Since C1 ⊆ C , this proves the claim. 
Lemma B.8 (Environments in the constraints). For all Γ,C , for all processes P , Q , if
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
then for all (c, Γ′) ∈ C ,
dom(Γ′) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ bvars(P) ∪ bvars(Q) ∪ nnames(P) ∪ nnames(Q)
(where bvars(P), nnames(P) respectively denote the sets of bound variables and names in P).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the typing derivation of Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C .
If the last rule applied in this derivation is PZero, we have C = {(∅, Γ)}, and the claim clearly holds.
In the PPar case, we have P = P1 | P2, Q = Q1 | Q2, and C = C1∪×C2 for some P1, P2, Q1, Q2, C1, C2 such that Γ ⊢ P1 ∼ Q1 → C1 and
Γ ⊢ P2 ∼ Q2 → C2. Thus any element of C is of the form (c1 ∪ c2, Γ1 ∪ Γ2) where (c1, Γ1) ∈ C1, (c2, Γ2) ∈ C2, and Γ1, Γ2 are compatible.
By the induction hypothesis, dom(Γ1) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ bvars(P1) ∪ bvars(Q1) ∪ nnames(P1) ∪ nnames(Q1) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ bvars(P) ∪ bvars(Q) ∪
nnames(P) ∪ nnames(Q), and similarly for Γ2. Therefore, since dom(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) = dom(Γ1) ∪ dom(Γ2) (by definition), the claim holds.
In the PIn and PLet cases, the typing judgement appearing in the condition of the rule uses Γ extended with an additional variable,
which is bound in P and Q . We detail the PIn case, the other case is similar. We have P = in(x).P ′, Q = in(x).Q ′ for some x , P ′, Q ′ such
that x < dom(Γ) and Γ,x : LL ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C . Hence by the induction hypothesis, if (c, Γ′) ∈ C , dom(Γ′) ⊆ dom(Γ, x : LL) ∪ bvars(P ′) ∪
bvars(Q ′) ∪ nnames(P ′) ∪ nnames(Q ′). Since bvars(P) = {x} ∪ bvars(P ′) and bvars(Q) = {x} ∪ bvars(Q ′), this proves the claim.
The case of rule PNew is similar, extending Γ with a nonce instead of a variable.
In the POut case, there exist P ′, Q ′, M , N , C ′, c such that P = out(M).P ′, Q = out(N ).Q ′, C = C ′∪∀c , Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c and
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′. If (c ′, Γ′) ∈ C , by definition of ∪∀ there exists c
′′ such that (c ′′, Γ′) ∈ C ′ and c ′ = c ∪ c ′′. By the induction hypothesis,
we thus have
dom(Γ′) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ bvars(P ′) ∪ bvars(Q ′) ∪ nnames(P ′) ∪ nnames(Q ′)
and since bvars(P ′) = bvars(P), nnames(P ′) = nnames(P), and similarly for Q , this proves the claim.
In the PIfL case, there exist P ′, P ′′, Q ′, Q ′′, M , N , M ′, N ′, C ′, C ′′, c , c ′ such that P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N =
N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′, C = (C ′ ∪C ′′)∪∀(c ∪ c
′), Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c , Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c ′, Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, and Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′.
If (c ′′, Γ′) ∈ C , by definition of ∪∀ there exist c
′′′, such that (c ′′′, Γ′) ∈ C ′∪C ′′ and c ′′ = c ′′′ ∪ c ∪ c ′. We write the proof for the case where
(c ′′′, Γ′) ∈ C ′, the other case is analogous. By the induction hypothesis, we thus have
dom(Γ′) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ bvars(P ′) ∪ bvars(Q ′) ∪ nnames(P ′) ∪ nnames(Q ′)
and since bvars(P ′) ⊆ bvars(P), nnames(P ′) ⊆ nnames(P), and similarly for Q , this proves the claim.
The cases of rules POr, PLetLR, PIfLR, PIfS, PIfLR*, PIfP, PIfI, and PIfLR’* remain. All these cases are similar, we write the proof for
the PIfLR* case. In this case, there exist P ′, P ′′, Q ′, Q ′′, M , N , M ′, N ′, C ′, C ′′, l , l ′, m, n such that P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′,
Q = if N = N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′,C = C ′ ∪C ′′, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅, Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅, Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, and
Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′. If (c, Γ′) ∈ C , we thus know that (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′ or (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′′. We write the proof for the case where (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′, the
other case is analogous. By the induction hypothesis, we thus have
dom(Γ′) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ bvars(P ′) ∪ bvars(Q ′) ∪ nnames(P ′) ∪ nnames(Q ′)
and since bvars(P ′) ⊆ bvars(P), nnames(P ′) ⊆ nnames(P), and similarly for Q , this proves the claim. 
Lemma B.9 (Environments in the constraints do not contain union types). For all Γ,C , for all processes P , Q , if
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
then for all (c, Γ′) ∈ C ,
branches(Γ′) = {Γ′}
i.e. for all x ∈ dom(Γ′), Γ′(x) is not a union type.
Proof. This property is immediate by induction on the typing derivation. 
Lemma B.10 (Typing is preserved by extending the environment). For all Γ, Γ′, P ,Q ,C , c , t , t ′,T , c , if Γ ⊢ ⋄ and Γ ∪ Γ′ ⊢ ⋄ (we do not
require that Γ′ is well-formed):
• if dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ′) = ∅, and if Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c , then Γ ∪ Γ′ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c .
• if dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ′) = ∅, and if Γ ⊢ d(y) : T , then Γ ∪ Γ′ ⊢ d(y) : T .
• if (dom(Γ) ∪ bvars(P) ∪ bvars(Q) ∪ nnames(P) ∪ nnames(Q)) ∩ dom(Γ′) = ∅, and if Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C , then Γ ∪ Γ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′.
where C ′ = {(c, Γc ∪ Γ
′′)|(c, Γc ) ∈ C ∧ Γ
′′ ∈ branches(Γ′)} (note that the union is well defined, i.e. Γc and Γ
′′ are compatible, thanks to
Lemma B.8)
Proof. • The first point is immediate by induction on the type derivation.
• The second point is immediate by examining the typing rules for destructors.
• The third point is immediate by induction on the type derivation of the processes. In the PZero case, to satisfy the condition that
the environment is its own only branch, rule POr needs to be applied first, in order to split all the union types in Γ′, which yields
the environments branches(Γ ∪ Γ′) in the constraints.

Lemma B.11 (Consistency for Subsets). The following statements about constraints hold:
(1) If (c, Γ) is consistent, and c ′ ⊆ c then (c ′, Γ) is consistent.
(2) Let C be a consistent constraint set. Then every subset C ′ ⊆ C is also consistent.
(3) If C∪∀c
′ is consistent then C also is.
(4) If C1 ⊆ C2 and C
′
1 ⊆ C
′
2, then C1∪×C
′
1 ⊆ C2∪×C
′
2.
(5) J·Kσ ,σ ′ commutes with ∪, ∪×, ∪∀, i.e. for all C ,C ′, σ , σ ′, JC∪×C ′Kσ ,σ ′ = JCKσ ,σ ′∪×JC ′Kσ ,σ ′ and similarly for ∪, ∪∀.
(6) If σ1 and σ
′
1 are ground and have disjoint domains, as well as σ2 and σ
′
2, then for all c ,
qJcKσ1,σ2yσ ′1,σ ′2 = JcKσ1∪σ ′1,σ2∪σ ′2
(7) ifC is consistent, if ΓN,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : ΓX → c for some c , and if for all (c
′
, Γ
′) ∈ C , Γ ⊆ Γ′, then JCKσ ,σ ′ is consistent.
Proof. Points 1 and 2 follow immediately from the definition of consistency and of static equivalence.
Point 3 follows from the point 1: for every (c, Γ) ∈ C , (c ∪ c ′, Γ) is in C∪∀c
′; which is consistent since C∪∀c
′ is; therefore (c, Γ) also is.
Point 4 follows from the definition of ∪×. If (c, Γ) ∈ C1∪×C
′
1, there exists (c1, Γ1) ∈ C1, (c
′
1, Γ
′
1 ) ∈ C
′
1 such that (c, Γ) = (c1 ∪ c
′
1, Γ1 ∪ Γ
′
1 )
(and Γ1, Γ
′
1 are compatible). Since C1 ⊆ C2, (c1, Γ1) ∈ C2. Similarly, (c
′
1, Γ
′
1 ) ∈ C
′
2. Therefore (c, Γ) ∈ C2∪×C
′
2.
Points 5 and 6 follow from the definitions of J·Kσ ,σ ′ , ∪×, ∪∀.
Point 7 follows from the definitions of J·Kσ ,σ ′ , and of consistency. Indeed, let (c ′′, Γ′′) ∈ JCKσ ,σ ′ . There exists c ′′′ such that c ′′ = Jc ′′′Kσ ,σ ′ ,
and (c ′′′, Γ′′) ∈ C . Let c1 ⊆ c
′′ and Γ1 ⊆ Γ
′′ such that Γ1N,K = Γ
′′
N,K and vars(c1) ⊆ dom(Γ1). Let θ , θ
′ be well-typed in Γ1. Since
c ′′ = Jc ′′′Kσ ,σ ′ , there exists c2 ⊆ c ′′′ such that c1 = Jc2Kσ ,σ ′ . If we show that σθ and σ ′θ ′ are well-typed in Γ1 ∪ Γ, it will follow from the
consistency of C that new EΓ2 .(ϕ
Γ2
LL
∪ ϕl(c2)σθ) and new EΓ2 .(ϕ
Γ2
LL
∪ ϕr(c2)σ
′θ ′) are statically equivalent, where Γ2 = Γ1 ∪ Γ ⊆ Γ
′′. Since
Γ1N,K = Γ
′′
N,K and Γ ⊆ Γ
′′, we have EΓ2 = EΓ1 , and ϕ
Γ2
LL
= ϕ
Γ1
LL
. Hence new EΓ1 .(ϕ
Γ1
LL
∪ϕl(c1)θ) and new EΓ1 .(ϕ
Γ1
LL
∪ϕr(c1)θ
′) are statically
equivalent,
It only remains to be proved that σθ and σ ′θ ′ are well-typed in Γ2.
Since σ is ground, σθ = σ ∪ θ |dom(Γ1)\dom(Γ) , and similarly for σ
′θ ′. Hence, since σ , σ ′ are well-typed in Γ, and θ , θ ′ are well-typed in Γ1,
their compositions also are, which concludes the proof. 
Lemma B.12 (Environments in constraints contain a branch of the typing environment). For all Γ, C , for all processes P , Q , if
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C then for all (c, Γ′) ∈ C , there exists Γ′′ ∈ branches(Γ) such that Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′.
Proof. Weprove this property by induction on the type derivation of Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C . In the PZero case,C = {(∅, Γ)}, and by assumption
branches(Γ) = {Γ}, hence the claim trivially holds.
In the PPar case, we have P = P1 | P2, Q = Q1 | Q2, and C = C1∪×C2 for some P1, P2, Q1, Q2, C1, C2 such that Γ ⊢ P1 ∼ Q1 → C1 and
Γ ⊢ P2 ∼ Q2 → C2. Thus any element of C is of the form (c1 ∪ c2, Γ1 ∪ Γ2) where (c1, Γ1) ∈ C1, (c2, Γ2) ∈ C2, and Γ1, Γ2 are compatible. By the
induction hypothesis, bothC1 and C2 contain a branch of Γ. The claim holds, as these are necessarily the same branch, since Γ1 and Γ2 are
compatible.
In the POr case, we have Γ = Γ′′, x : T1 ∨ T2 for some x , Γ
′′, T1,T2 such that Γ
′′
,x : T1 ⊢ P ∼ Q → C1 and Γ
′′
,x : T2 ⊢ P ∼ Q → C2, and
C = C1∪C2. Thus by the induction hypothesis, if (c, Γ
′) ∈ Ci (for i ∈ {1, 2}), then Γ
′ contains some Γ′′′ ∈ branches(Γ′′,x : Ti ) ⊆ branches(Γ),
and the claim holds.
In the POut case, there exist P ′, Q ′, M , N , C ′, c such that P = out(M).P ′, Q = out(N ).Q ′, C = C ′∪∀c , Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c and
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′. If (c ′, Γ′) ∈ C , by definition of ∪∀ there exists c
′′ such that (c ′′, Γ′) ∈ C ′ and c ′ = c∪c ′′. Hence by applying the induction
hypothesis to Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, there exists Γ′′ ∈ branches(Γ) such that Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′.
In the PIfL case, there exist P ′, P ′′, Q ′, Q ′′, M , N , M ′, N ′, C ′, C ′′, c , c ′ such that P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N =
N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′, C = (C ′ ∪C ′′)∪∀(c ∪ c
′), Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c , Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c ′, Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, and Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′.
If (c ′′, Γ′) ∈ C , by definition of ∪∀ there exist c
′′′, such that (c ′′′, Γ′) ∈ C ′∪C ′′ and c ′′ = c ′′′ ∪ c ∪ c ′. We write the proof for the case where
(c ′′′, Γ′) ∈ C ′, the other case is analogous. By applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, there exists Γ′′ ∈ branches(Γ) such
that Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′, which proves the claim.
All remaining cases are similar. We write the proof for the PIfLR* case. In this case, there exist P ′, P ′′, Q ′, Q ′′, M , N , M ′, N ′, C ′, C ′′, l ,
l ′,m, n such that P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N = N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′, C = C ′ ∪ C ′′, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅,
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅, Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, and Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′. If (c, Γ′) ∈ C , we thus know that (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′ or (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′′.
We write the proof for the case where (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′, the other case is analogous. By applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′,
there exists Γ′′ ∈ branches(Γ) such that Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′, which proves the claim. 
Lemma B.13 (All branches are represented in the constraints). For all Γ, ∆,C , for all processes P , Q , if Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C then for all
Γ
′ ∈ branches(Γ), there exists (c, Γ′′) ∈ C , such that Γ′ ⊆ Γ′′.
Proof. Weprove this property by induction on the type derivation of Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C . In the PZero case,C = {(∅, Γ)}, and by assumption
branches(Γ) = {Γ}, hence the claim trivially holds.
In the PPar case, we have P = P1 | P2, Q = Q1 | Q2, and C = C1∪×C2 for some P1, P2, Q1, Q2, C1, C2 such that Γ ⊢ P1 ∼ Q1 → C1 and
Γ ⊢ P2 ∼ Q2 → C2. By the induction hypothesis, there exists (c1, Γ1) ∈ C1 and (c2, Γ2) ∈ C2 such that Γ
′ ⊆ Γ1 and Γ
′ ⊆ Γ2. By Lemma B.8,
dom(Γ1) and dom(Γ2) only contain dom(Γ)(= dom(Γ
′)) and variables and names in bvars(P1) ∪ bvars(Q1) ∪ nnames(P1) ∪ nnames(Q1)
and bvars(P2) ∪ bvars(Q2) ∪ nnames(P2) ∪ nnames(Q2) respectively. Since Γ1(x) = Γ2(x) = Γ
′(x) for all x ∈ dom(Γ′), and since the sets
bvars(P1) ∪ bvars(Q1) ∪ nnames(P1) ∪ nnames(Q1) and bvars(P2) ∪ bvars(Q2) ∪ nnames(P2) ∪ nnames(Q2) are disjoint by well formedness
of the processes P1 | P2 and Q1 | Q2, Γ1 and Γ2 are compatible. Thus (c1 ∪ c2, Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ∈ C1∪×C2(= C), and the claim holds since Γ
′ ⊆ Γ1 ∪ Γ2.
In the POr case, we have Γ = Γ′′,x : T1 ∨ T2 for some x , Γ
′′, T1, T2 such that Γ
′′
,x : T1 ⊢ P ∼ Q → C1 and Γ
′′
, x : T2 ⊢ P ∼ Q → C2,
and C = C1 ∪ C2. Since branches(Γ) = branches(Γ
′′
, x : T1) ∪ branches(Γ
′′
,x : T2), we know that Γ
′ ∈ branches(Γ′′, x : Ti ) for some i . We
conclude this case directly by applying the induction hypothesis to Γ′′,x : Ti ⊢ P ∼ Q → Ci .
In the POut case, there exist P ′, Q ′, M , N , C ′, c such that P = out(M).P ′, Q = out(N ).Q ′, C = C ′∪∀c , Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c and
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′. By applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, there exists (c ′′, Γ′′) ∈ C ′ such that Γ′ ⊆ Γ′′. By definition
of ∪∀, (c
′′ ∪ c, Γ′′) ∈ C , which proves the claim.
In the PIfL case, there exist P ′, P ′′, Q ′, Q ′′, M , N , M ′, N ′, C ′, C ′′, c , c ′ such that P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N =
N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′,C = (C ′∪C ′′)∪∀(c∪c
′), Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c , Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL→ c ′, Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, and Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′. By
applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, there exists (c ′′, Γ′′) ∈ C ′ such that Γ′ ⊆ Γ′′. By definition of∪∀, (c
′′∪c∪c ′, Γ′′) ∈ C ,
which proves the claim.
All remaining cases are similar. We write the proof for the PIfLR* case. In this case, there exist P ′, P ′′, Q ′, Q ′′, M , N , M ′, N ′, C ′, C ′′, l ,
l ′,m, n such that P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N = N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′, C = C ′ ∪ C ′′, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅,
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → ∅, Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, and Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′. By applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′,
there exists (c ′′, Γ′′) ∈ C ′ such that Γ′ ⊆ Γ′′.
If (c, Γ′) ∈ C , we thus know that (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′ or (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′′. We write the proof for the case where (c, Γ′) ∈ C ′, the other case is analogous.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′, there exists Γ′′ ∈ branches(Γ) such that Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′, which proves the claim.

Lemma B.14 (Refinement types). For all Γ, for all terms t , t ′, for allm, n, a, l , l ′, c , if Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → c then c = ∅ and
• either t =m, t ′ = n, a = ∞ and Γ(m) = τ l,am and Γ(n) = τ
l ′,a
n ;
• or t =m, t ′ = n, a = 1, and (Γ(m) = τ l,am ) ∨ (m ∈ FN ∪ C ∧ l = LL), and (Γ(n) = τ
l ′,a
n ) ∨ (n ∈ FN ∪ C ∧ l
′
= LL);
• or t and t ′ are variables x,y ∈ X and there exist labels l ′′, l ′′′, and namesm′, n′ such that Γ(x) = Jτ l,am ; τ l ′′,an′ K and Γ(y) = Jτ l ′′′,am′ ; τ l ′,an K.
In particular if t , t ′ are ground then only the first case can occur.
Proof. The proof of this property is immediate by induction on the typing derivation for the terms. Indeed, because of the form of the
type, and by well-formedness of Γ, the only rules which can lead to Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → c are TVar, TLR1, TLR∞, TLRVar, and
TSub.
In the TVar, TLR1, TLR∞ cases the claim directly follows from the premises of the rule.
In the TLRVar case, t and t ′ are necessarily variables, and their types in Γ are obtained directly by applying the induction hypothesis to
the premises of the rule.
Finally in the TSub case, Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : T → c and T <: Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K. By Lemma B.1, T = Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K and we conclude by the induction
hypothesis. 
Lemma B.15 (Encryption types). For all environment Γ, typeT , key k ∈ K, messagesM , N , and set of constraints c :
(1) If Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T )k → c then
• either there exist M ′, N ′, such that M = enc(M ′,k), N = enc(N ′,k), and Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T → c with a shorter derivation (than the
one for Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T )k → c);
• or M and N are variables.
(2) If Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : {T }k → c then
• either there exist M ′, N ′, such that M = aenc(M ′, pk(k)), N = aenc(N ′, pk(k)), and Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T → c with a shorter derivation
(than the one for Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : {T }k → c);
• or M and N are variables.
(3) If T <: LL and Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼ N : T → c then T = LL.
(4) If T <: LL and Γ ⊢ aenc(M, pk(k)) ∼ N : T → c then T = LL.
(5) If Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼ N : LL→ c then there exists N ′ such that N = enc(N ′,k), and
• either there exist T ′ and c ′ such that Γ(k) = keyHH(T ′), c = {enc(M,k) ∼ N } ∪ c ′, and Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : T ′ → c ′;
• or there exists T ′ such that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′) and Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : LL → c .
(6) If Γ ⊢ aenc(M, pk(k)) ∼ N : LL→ c then there exists N ′ such that N = aenc(N ′, pk(k)), and
• either there exist T ′ and c ′ such that Γ(k) = keyHH(T ′), c = {aenc(M, pk(k)) ∼ N } ∪ c ′, and Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : T ′ → c ′;
• or k ∈ dom(Γ) and Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : LL→ c .
(7) The symmetric properties to the previous four points, i.e. when the term on the right is an encryption, also hold.
Proof. We prove point 1 by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T )k → c . Because of the form of the type, and by well-
formedness of Γ, the only possibilities for the last rule applied are TVar, TEnc, and TSub. The claim clearly holds in the TVar and TEnc
cases. In the TSub case, we have Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ′ <: (T )k → c , and by Lemma B.1, there exists T
′′
<: T such that T ′ = (T ′′)k . Therefore, by
applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ′ → c
• either M and N are either two variables, and the claim holds;
• or there exist M ′, N ′ such thatM = enc(M ′,k), N = enc(N ′,k), and Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T ′′ → c , with a derivation shorter than the one
for Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ′ → c . Thus by subtyping (rule TSub), Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T → c with a shorter derivation that Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T )k → c ,
which proves the property.
Point 2 has a similar proof to point 1.
We now prove point 3 by induction on the proof of Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼ N : T → c . Because of the form of the terms, the last rule applied
can only be THigh, TOr, TEnc, TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TLR’, TLRL’ or TSub.
The THigh, TLR’, TOr, TEnc cases are actually impossible by Lemma B.1, since T <: LL. In the TSub case, we have Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼
N : T ′ → c for some T ′ such that T ′ <: T . By transitivity of <:,T ′ <: LL, and the induction hypothesis proves the claim. In all other cases,
T = LL and the claim holds.
Point 4 has a similar proof to point 3.
We prove point 5 by induction on the proof of Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼ N : LL→ c . Because of the form of the terms and of the type (i.e. LL) the
last rule applied can only be TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TLRL’ or TSub.
The TLRL’ case is impossible, since by Lemma B.14 it would imply that enc(M,k) is either a variable or a nonce.
In the TSub case, we have Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼ N : T ′ → c for some T ′ such that T ′ <: LL. By point 3, T ′ = LL, and the premise of the rule
thus gives a shorter derivation of Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼ N : LL→ c . The induction hypothesis applied to this shorter derivation proves the claim.
The TAencH and TAencL cases are impossible, since the condition of the rule would then imply Γ ⊢ enc(M,k) ∼ N : {T }k → c
′ for
some T , k , c ′, which is not possible by point 2.
Finally, in the TEncH and TEncL cases, the premises of the rule directly proves the claim.
Point 6 has a similar proof to point 5.
The symmetric properties, as described in point 7, have analogous proofs. 
Lemma B.16 (Signature types). For all environment Γ, typeT , key k ∈ K, messages M , N , and set of constraints c :
(1) If T <: LL and Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ N : T → c then T = LL.
(2) If Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ N : LL → c then there exists N ′ such that N = sign(N ′,k), and
• either there exist T ′, c ′ and c ′′ such that Γ(k) = keyHH(T ′), c = {sign(M,k) ∼ N } ∪ c ′ ∪ c ′′, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : T ′ → c ′, and
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : LL→ c ′′;
• or there exists T ′ such that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′) and Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : LL → c .
(3) The symmetric properties to the previous four points, i.e. when the term on the right is a signature, also hold.
Proof. We prove point 1 by induction on the proof of Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ N : T → c . Because of the form of the terms, the last rule
applied can only be THigh, TOr, TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TSignH, TSignL, TLR’, TLRL’ or TSub.
The THigh, TLR’, TOr cases are actually impossible by Lemma B.1, sinceT <: LL. In the TSub case, we have Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ N : T ′ → c
for some T ′ such that T ′ <: T . By transitivity of <:,T ′ <: LL, and the induction hypothesis proves the claim. In all other cases, T = LL and
the claim holds.
We prove point 2 by induction on the proof of Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ N : LL → c . Because of the form of the terms and of the type (i.e. LL)
the last rule applied can only be TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TSignH, TSignL, TLRL’ or TSub.
The TLRL’ case is impossible, since by Lemma B.14 it would imply that sign(M,k) is either a variable or a nonce.
In the TSub case, we have Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ N : T ′ → c for some T ′ such that T ′ <: LL. By point 3, T ′ = LL, and the premise of the
rule thus gives a shorter derivation of Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ N : LL → c . The induction hypothesis applied to this shorter derivation proves the
claim.
The TEncH, TEncL, TAencH and TAencL cases are impossible, since the condition of the rule would then imply Γ ⊢ sign(M,k) ∼ N :
(T )k → c
′ (or {T }k ) for someT , k , c
′, which is not possible by Lemma B.15.
Finally, in the TSignH and TSignL cases, the premises of the rule directly proves the claim.
The symmetric properties, as described in point 3, have analogous proofs. 
Lemma B.17 (Pair types). For all environment Γ, for all M , N , T , c :
(1) For allT1, T2, if Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T1 ∗T2 → c then
• either there exist M1, M2, N1, N2, c1, c2 such that M = 〈M1,M2〉, N = 〈N1,N2〉, c = c1 ∪ c2, and Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : T1 → c1 and
Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : T2 → c2;
• or M and N are variables.
(2) For allM1,M2, if T <: LL and Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : T → c then either T = LL or there exists T1, T2 such thatT = T1 ∗T2.
(3) For allM1,M2, if Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : LL → c then there exist N1, N2, c1, c2, such that c = c1∪c2,N = 〈N1,N2〉, Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : LL→ c1
and Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : LL → c2.
(4) The symmetric properties to the previous two points ( i.e. when the term on the right is a pair) also hold.
Proof. Let us prove point 1 by induction on the typing derivation Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T1 ∗ T2 → c . Because of the form of the type, and by
well-formedness of Γ, the only possibilities for the last rule applied are TVar, TPair, and TSub.
The claim clearly holds in the TVar and TPair cases.
In the TSub case, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ′ → c for some T ′ <: T1 ∗ T2, and by Lemma B.1, T
′
= T ′1 ∗ T
′
2 for some T
′
1 , T
′
2 such that T
′
1 <: T1
and T ′2 <: T2. Therefore, by applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T
′
1 ∗ T
′
2 → c , M and N are either two variables, and the
claim holds; or two pairs, i.e. there exist M1, M2, N1, N2, c1, c2 such that M = 〈M1,M2〉, N = 〈N1,N2〉, c = c1 ∪ c2, and for i ∈ {1, 2},
Γ ⊢ Mi ∼ Ni : T
′
i → ci . Hence, by subtyping, Γ ⊢ Mi ∼ Ni : Ti → ci , and the claim holds.
We now prove point 2 by induction on the proof of Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : T → c . Because of the form of the terms, the last rule applied
can only be THigh, TOr, TPair, TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TLR’, TLRL’ or TSub.
The THigh, TLR’, and TOr cases are actually impossible by Lemma B.1, since T <: LL.
The TLRL’ and case is also impossible, since by Lemma B.14 it would imply that 〈M1,M2〉 is either a variable or a nonce.
The TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL cases are impossible, since the condition of the rule would then imply Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : (T )k →
c ′ (or {T }k ) for some T , k , c
′, which is not possible by Lemma B.15.
In the TPair case, the claim clearly holds.
Finally, in the TSub case, we have Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : T
′ → c for some T ′ such that T ′ <: T . By transitivity of <:,T ′ <: LL, and we may
apply the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : T
′ → c . Hence either T ′ = LL or T ′ = T ′1 ∗T
′
2 for some T
′
1 , T
′
2 . By Lemma B.1, this
implies in the first case that T = LL and in the second case that T = LL or T is also a pair type (T , HL and T , HH in both cases, since we
already know that T <: LL).
We prove point 3 as a consequence of the first two points, by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : LL → c . The last rule
in this derivation can only be TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TLR’, TLRL’ or TSub by the form of the types and terms, but similarly to
the previous point TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TLR’ and TLRL’ are actually not possible.
Hence the last rule of the derivation is TSub. We have Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : T → c for some T such that T <: LL. By point 2, either
T = LL or there exist T1, T2 such that T = T1 ∗T2. IfT = LL, we have a shorter proof of Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 ∼ N : LL→ c and we conclude by the
induction hypothesis. Otherwise, since T <: LL, by Lemma B.1, T1 <: LL and T2 <: LL. Moreover by the first property, there exist N1, N2,
c1, c2 such that N = 〈N1,N2〉, c = c1 ∪ c2, Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : T1 → c1, and Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : T2 → c2.
Thus by subtyping, Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : LL→ c1 and Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : LL→ c2, which proves the claim. 
Lemma B.18 (Type for keys, nonces and constants). For all environment Γ, for all messages M , N , for all key k ∈ K, for all nonce or
constant n ∈ N ∪ C, for all c , l , the following properties hold:
(1) For allT , if Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : keyl (T ) → c , then c = ∅; and eitherM = N are in K and Γ(M) = keyl (T ); orM and N are variables.
(2) If l ∈ {LL, HH}, and Γ ⊢ k ∼ N : l → c , then N = k , c = ∅, and there exists T such that Γ(k) = keyl (T ).
(3) If Γ ⊢ pk(k) ∼ N : LL→ c , then k ∈ dom(Γ) and N = pk(k).
(4) If Γ ⊢ vk(k) ∼ N : LL→ c , then k ∈ dom(Γ) and N = vk(k).
(5) If Γ ⊢ n ∼ N : HH → c , then n ∈ BN , c = ∅ and either Γ(n) = τ HH,1n or τ
HH,∞
n .
(6) If Γ ⊢ n ∼ N : LL → c , then N = n, c = ∅, and either there exists a ∈ {1,∞} such that Γ(n) = τ LL,an , or n ∈ FN ∪ C.
(7) The symmetric properties to the previous five points ( i.e. with k (resp. pk(k), vk(k), n) on the right) also hold.
Proof. Point 1 is easily proved by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : keyl (T ) → c . Indeed, by the form of the type the last rule
can only be TKey, TVar, or TSub. In the TKey and TVar cases the claim clearly holds. In the TSub case, by Lemma B.1, keyl (T ) is its only
subtype, thus there exists a shorter derivation of Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : keyl (T ) → c , an the claim holds by the induction hypothesis.
We prove point 2 by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ k ∼ N : l → c . Because of the form of the terms and type, and by well-formedness
of Γ, the last rule applied can only be TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TLR’, TLRL’ or TSub.
The TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL cases are impossible since they would imply that Γ ⊢ k ∼ N : (T ′)k′ → c
′ (or {T ′}k′ ) for some
T ′, k ′, c ′, which is impossible by Lemma B.15.
The TLR’ and TLRL’ cases are impossible. Indeed in these cases, we have Γ ⊢ k ∼ N : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → ∅ for somem, n. Lemma B.14 then
implies thatm = k (and n = N ), which is contradictory.
Finally, in the TSub case, we have Γ ⊢ k ∼ N : T → c for some T such that T <: l . By Lemma B.1, this implies that T is either a pair
type, a key type, or l . The first case is impossible by Lemma B.17, since k ∈ K. The last case is trivial by the induction hypothesis. Only the
case where T = keyl (T ′) (for some T ′) remains. By point 1, in that case, since k is not a variable, we have Γ(k) = keyl (T ′) and k = N , and
therefore the claim holds.
Similarly, we prove point 3 by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ pk(k) ∼ N : LL→ c . Because of the form of the terms and type, and by
well-formedness of Γ, the last rule applied can only be TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, TLR’, TLRL’, TPubKey or TSub.
The TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL cases are impossible since they would imply that Γ ⊢ pk(k) ∼ N : (T ′)k′ → c
′ (or {T ′}k′ ) for
some T ′, k ′, c ′, which is impossible by Lemma B.15.
The TLR’ and TLRL’ cases are impossible. Indeed in these cases, we have Γ ⊢ pk(k) ∼ N : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → ∅ for somem, n. Lemma B.14
then implies thatm = pk(k) (and n = N ), which is contradictory.
In the TSub case, we have Γ ⊢ pk(k) ∼ N : T → c for some T such that T <: l . By Lemma B.1, this implies that T is either a pair type, a
key type, or l . Just as in the previous point, the first case is impossible and the last one is trivial. The case whereT = keyl (T ′) (for someT ′)
is also impossible by point 1, since pk(k) is not in K ∪X.
Finally in the TPubKey case, the claim clearly holds.
Point 4 has a similar proof to point 3.
The remaining properties have similar proofs to point 2. For point 5, i.e. if Γ ⊢ n ∼ t : HH → c , only the TNonce, TSub, and TLR’ cases
are possible. The claim clearly holds in the TNonce
In the TLR’ case, we have Γ ⊢ n ∼ t : Jτ HH,am ; τ HH,ap K → ∅ for somem, p. Lemma B.14 then implies thatm = n, and p = t , and Γ(n) = τ HH,am ,
and Γ(p) = τ HH,ap , which proves the claim.
In the TSub case, Γ ⊢ n ∼ t : T → c for some T <: HH, thus by Lemma B.1 T is either a pair type (impossible by Lemma B.17), a key type
(impossible by point 1), or HH (and we conclude by the induction hypothesis).
For point 6, similarly, only the TNonceL, TCstFN, TSub, TLRL’ cases are possible. The TSub case is proved in the same way as for the
third property. The TLRL’ case is proved similarly to the previous point. Finally the claim clearly holds in the TNonceL and TCstFN cases.
The symmetric properties, as described in point 7, have analogous proofs. 
Lemma B.19 (Type LL implies same head symbol). For all Γ, M , N , c , if Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c then either M and N have the same head
symbol and use the same key if this symbol is enc, aenc or sign(,;) or M , N both are variables.
Proof. We prove a slightly more general property: for all T <: LL, if Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c then either M and N have the same head
symbol and use the same key if this symbol is enc, aenc or sign(,;) orM , N both are variables.
This is proved by induction on the typing derivation. Many of the cases for the last rule applied are immediate, since they directly state
that the two terms have the same head symbol (with the same key) or are variables. This covers rules TNonceL, TCstFN, TPubKey, TVKey,
TKey,TVar,TPair, TEnc,TAenc,TSignH, TSignL, THash,THashL,TLRVar. Among the remaining cases, some are also immediate thanks
to the assumption that T <: LL, as they contradict it (which we prove using Lemma B.1). This covers rules TNonce, THigh, TOr, TLR1,
TLR∞, TLR’. Moreover in the case of rule TSub the claim follows directly from the application of the induction hypothesis to the premise
of the rule.
Only the cases of rules TEncH, TEncL, TAencH, TAencL, and TLRL’ remain. In the TEncH case, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T )k → c for some T ,
k , and therefore by Lemma B.15M and N are either two variables or some terms encrypted with k , and in both cases the claim holds. The
TEncL, TAencH, TAencL cases are similar, using Lemma B.15. In the TLRL’ case, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : Jτ LL,am ; τ LL,am K → c for somem. Thus by
Lemma B.14, either M and N are two variables orM = N =m, and in any case the claim holds, which concludes this proof. 
Lemma B.20 (Application of destructors). For all Γ, y, such that y < dom(Γ), for all d , T , T ′, c , for all ground messages M , N , if
Γ,y : T ⊢ d(y) : T ′ and Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c , then:
(1) We have:
(d(M)) ↓= ⊥ ⇐⇒ (d(N )) ↓= ⊥
(2) And if (d(M)) ↓, ⊥ then there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that
Γ ⊢ (d(M)) ↓∼ (d(N )) ↓: T ′ → c ′
Proof. We distinguish four cases for d .
• d = dec(·,k). We know that Γ,y : T ⊢ d(y) : T ′, which can be proved using either rule DDecH, rule DDecL, or rule DDecT. In the
first two cases, T = LL, and in the last case T = (T ′)k .
– Let us prove 1) by contraposition. Assume d(M) ↓, ⊥. Hence,M = enc(M ′,k) for someM ′. Lemma B.19 in theDDecH and DDecL
cases (where Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c), and Lemma B.15 in the DDecT case (where Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T ′)k → c), guarantee that there
exists N ′ such that N = enc(N ′,k). Therefore d(N ) ↓, ⊥ which proves the first direction of 1). The other direction is analogous.
– Moreover, still assuming d(M) ↓, ⊥, and keeping the notations from the previous point, we have d(M) ↓= M ′ and d(N ) ↓= N ′.
The destructor typing rule applied to prove Γ,y : LL ⊢ d(y) : T ′ can be DDecT, DDecH, or DDecL.
∗ In the DDecT case we have T = (T ′)k and therefore Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T
′)k → c . Lemma B.15 (point 1) then guarantees that
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T ′ → c , which proves point 2).
∗ In the DDecH case we have T = LL and Γ(k) = keyHH(T ′). Thus, we have Γ ⊢ enc(M ′,k) ∼ enc(N ′,k) : LL → c , and by
Lemma B.15 (point 5), we know that there exists c ′ such that c = c ′ ∪ {M ∼ N } and Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T ′ → c ′, which proves point
2).
∗ In the DDecL case we have T = T ′ = LL and there exists T ′′ such that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′′). Thus, we have Γ ⊢ enc(M ′,k) ∼
enc(N ′,k) : LL→ c , and by Lemma B.15 (point 5), we know that Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c , which proves point 2).
In all cases, point 2) holds, which concludes this case.
• d = adec(·,k). We know that Γ,y : T ⊢ d(y) : T ′, which can be proved using either rule DAdecH, rule DAdecL, or rule DAdecT. In
the first two cases, T = LL, and in the last case T = {T ′}k .
– Let us prove 1) by contraposition. Assume d(M) ↓, ⊥. Hence,M = aenc(M ′, pk(k)) for someM ′. Lemma B.19 in the DAdecH and
DAdecL cases (where Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c), and Lemma B.15 in the DAdecT case (where Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : {T ′}k → c), guarantee that
there exists N ′ such that N = aenc(N ′, pk(k)). Therefore d(N ) ↓, ⊥ which proves the first direction of 1). The other direction is
analogous.
– Moreover, still assuming d(M) ↓, ⊥, and keeping the notations from the previous point, we have d(M) ↓= M ′ and d(N ) ↓= N ′.
The destructor typing rule applied to prove Γ,y : LL ⊢ d(y) : T ′ can be DAdecT, DAdecH, or DAdecL.
∗ In the DAdecT case we have T = {T ′}k and thus Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : {T
′}k → c . Lemma B.15 then guarantees that Γ ⊢ M
′ ∼ N ′ :
T ′ → c which proves the claim.
∗ In the DAdecH case we have T = LL, and there exists T ′′ such that T ′ = T ′′ ∨ LL and Γ(k) = keyHH(T ′′). Thus, we have
Γ ⊢ aenc(M ′, pk(k)) ∼ aenc(N ′, pk(k)) : LL → c . Hence by Lemma B.15 (point 5), we know that either there exists c ′ such that
c = c ′∪{M ∼ N } and Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T ′′ → c ′; or Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL→ c . By rule TOr, we then have Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T ′′ ∨ LL → c ′
(resp. c), which proves point 2).
∗ In the DAdecL case we haveT = T ′ = LL and there existsT ′′ such that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′′). Thus, we have Γ ⊢ aenc(M ′, pk(k)) ∼
aenc(N ′, pk(k)) : LL → c , and by Lemma B.15 (point 5), we know that Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c , which proves point 2).
In all cases, point 2) holds, which concludes this case.
• d = checksign(·, vk(k)). We know that Γ,y : T ⊢ d(y) : T ′, which can be proved using either rule DCheckH or rule DCheckL. In
both cases, T = LL.
– Let us prove 1) by contraposition. Assume d(M) ↓, ⊥. Hence, M = sign(M ′,k) for someM ′. Lemma B.19 (applied to Γ ⊢ M ∼ N :
LL → c) guarantees that there exists N ′ such that N = sign(N ′,k). Therefore d(N ) ↓, ⊥ which proves the first direction of 1).
The other direction is analogous.
– Moreover, still assuming d(M) ↓, ⊥, and keeping the notations from the previous point, we have d(M) ↓= M ′ and d(N ) ↓= N ′.
The destructor typing rule applied to prove Γ,y : LL ⊢ d(y) : T ′ can be DCheckH or DCheckL.
∗ In the DCheckH case we have T = LL, and Γ(k) = keyHH(T ′). Thus we have Γ ⊢ sign(M ′,k) ∼ sign(N ′,k) : LL → c . Hence
by Lemma B.16 (point 2), we know that there exist c ′, c ′′ such that c = c ′ ∪ c ′′ ∪ {M ∼ N }, Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : T ′ → c ′, and
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c ′′. This proves point 2).
∗ In the DCheckL case we have T = LL, and there exists T ′′ such that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′′). Hence by Lemma B.16 (point 2), we
know that Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL→ c . This proves point 2).
In all cases, point 2) holds, which concludes this case.
• d = π1. We know that Γ,y : T ⊢ d(y) : T
′, which can be proved using either rule DFst or DFstL. In the first case, T = T1 ∗T2 is a pair
type, and in the second case T = LL.
– We prove 1) by contraposition. Assume d(M) ↓, ⊥. Hence, M = 〈M1,M2〉 for some M1,M2. Thus, by applying Lemma B.17 to
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c , in any case we know that there exist N1, N2 such that N = 〈N1,N2〉. Therefore d(N ) ↓, ⊥ which proves the
first direction of 1). The other direction is analogous.
– Moreover, still assuming d(M) ↓, ⊥, and keeping the notations from the previous point, we have d(M) ↓= M1 and d(N ) ↓= N1. In
addition, we know that Γ,y : T ⊢ d(y) : T ′, which can be proved using either rule DFst or DFstL. Lemma B.17, which we applied
in the previous point, also implies that there exist c1, c2, such that c = c1 ∪ c2 and for i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊢ Mi ∼ Ni : Ti → ci (in the
DFst case) or Γ ⊢ Mi ∼ Ni : LL → ci (in the DFstL case).
We distinguish two cases for the rule applied to prove Γ,y : T ⊢ d(y) : T ′.
∗ DFst: Then T = T1 ∗T2 and T
′
= T1, and Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : T1 → c1(⊆ c) proves 2).
∗ DFstL: Then T = T ′ = LL, and Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : LL → c1(⊆ c) proves 2).
In both cases, point 2) holds, which concludes this case.
• d = π2. This case is similar to the previous one.

Lemma B.21 (LL type is preserved by attacker terms). For all Γ, for all frames ψ = new EΓ .ϕ and ψ
′
= new EΓ .ϕ
′ with Γ ⊢ ϕ ∼ ϕ′ :
LL → c , for all attacker term R such that vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕ),
either there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that
Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′
or
Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
Proof. Let us recall that EΓ denotes the set of names in Γ.
We show this property by induction over the attacker term R.
Induction Hypothesis: the statement holds for all subterms of R. There are several cases for R. The base cases are the cases where R is a
variable, a name in FN or a constant in C.
(1) R = x Since vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕ), we have x ∈ dom(ϕ) = dom(ϕ′), hence Rϕ ↓= ϕ(x) and Rϕ′ ↓= ϕ′(x). Since Γ ⊢ ϕ ∼ ϕ′ : LL → c , we
have Γ ⊢ ϕ(x) ∼ ϕ′(x) : LL → cx for some cx ⊆ c , and the claim holds.
(2) R = a with a ∈ C ∪ FN . Then Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= a and by rule TCstFN, we have Γ ⊢ a ∼ a : LL→ ∅. Hence the claim holds.
(3) R = pk(K)We apply the induction hypothesis to K and distinguish three cases.
(a) If Kϕ ↓= ⊥ then Kϕ′ ↓= ⊥, hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) If Kϕ ↓, ⊥ and is not a key then Kϕ′ ↓, ⊥ (by IH), and by IH we have Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′ for some c ′ ⊆ c . Then by
Lemma B.19, Kϕ′ ↓ is not a key either. Hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(c) If Kϕ ↓ is a key, then by IH there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. Hence by Lemma B.18 Kϕ ↓= Kϕ′ ↓, and
Γ(Kϕ ↓) = Γ(Kϕ′ ↓) = keyLL(T ) for some T . Therefore by rule TPubKey, Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL → ∅ and the claim holds.
(4) R = vk(K)We apply the induction hypothesis to K and distinguish three cases.
(a) If Kϕ ↓= ⊥ then Kϕ′ ↓= ⊥, hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) If Kϕ ↓, ⊥ and is not a key then Kϕ′ ↓, ⊥ (by IH), and by IH we have Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′ for some c ′ ⊆ c . Then, by
Lemma B.19, Kϕ′ ↓ is not a key either. Hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(c) If Kϕ ↓ is a key, then by IH there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. Hence by Lemma B.18 Kϕ ↓= Kϕ′ ↓, and
Γ(Kϕ ↓) = Γ(Kϕ′ ↓) = keyLL(T ) for some T . Therefore by rule TVKey, Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL → ∅ and the claim holds.
(5) R = 〈R1,R2〉 where R1 and R2 are also attacker terms. We then apply the induction hypothesis to the same frames and R1, R2. We
distinguish two cases:
(a) R1ϕ ↓= ⊥ ∨ R2ϕ ↓= ⊥ In this case we also have R1ϕ
′ ↓= ⊥ ∨ R2ϕ
′ ↓= ⊥ and therefore Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) R1ϕ ↓, ⊥ ∧ R2ϕ ↓, ⊥ In this case, by the induction hypothesis, we also have R1ϕ
′ ↓, ⊥∧R2ϕ
′ ↓, ⊥, and we also know that there
exist c1 ⊆ c and c2 ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ R1ϕ ↓∼ R1ϕ
′ ↓: LL→ c1 and Γ ⊢ R2ϕ ↓∼ R2ϕ
′ ↓: LL→ c2.
Thus, by the rule TPair followed by TSub, Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL → c1 ∪ c2. Since c1 ∪ c2 ⊆ c , this proves the case.
(6) R = enc(S,K)We apply the induction hypothesis to K and distinguish three cases.
(a) If Kϕ ↓= ⊥ then Kϕ′ ↓= ⊥, hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) If Kϕ ↓, ⊥ and is not a key then Kϕ′ ↓, ⊥ (by IH), and by IH we have Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′ for some c ′ ⊆ c . Then, by
Lemma B.19, Kϕ′ ↓ is not a key either. Hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(c) If Kϕ ↓ is a key, then by IH there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. Hence by Lemma B.18 Kϕ ↓= Kϕ′ ↓, and
Γ(Kϕ ↓) = Γ(Kϕ′ ↓) = keyLL(T ) for someT . We then apply the IH to S , and either Sϕ ↓= Sϕ′ ↓= ⊥, in which case Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥;
or there exists c ′′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′′. Since Rϕ ↓= enc(Sϕ ↓,Kϕ ↓), and similarly for ϕ′, by rule TEnc, we
have Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: (LL)Kϕ↓ → c
′′, and then by rule TEncL, Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL→ c ′′.
(7) R = aenc(S,K)We apply the induction hypothesis to K and distinguish three cases.
(a) If Kϕ ↓= ⊥ then Kϕ′ ↓= ⊥, hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) If Kϕ ↓, ⊥ and is not pk(k) for some k ∈ K then Kϕ′ ↓, ⊥ (by IH), and by IH there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓:
LL → c ′. Then, by Lemma B.19, Kϕ′ ↓ is not a public key either. Hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(c) If Kϕ ↓= pk(k) for some k ∈ K , then by IH there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ pk(k) ∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. Thus, by Lemma B.18,
Kϕ′ ↓= pk(k) and k ∈ dom(Γ). We then apply the IH to S , and either Sϕ ↓= Sϕ′ ↓= ⊥, in which case Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥; or there
exists c ′′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′′. Therefore, by rule TAenc, Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: {LL}k → c
′′, and by rule TAencL
we have Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′′.
(8) R = sign(S,K)We apply the induction hypothesis to K and distinguish three cases.
(a) If Kϕ ↓= ⊥ then Kϕ′ ↓= ⊥, hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) If Kϕ ↓, ⊥ and is not a key k ∈ K then Kϕ′ ↓, ⊥ (by IH), and by IH we have Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′ for some c ′ ⊆ c . Then,
by Lemma B.19, Kϕ′ ↓ is not a key either. Hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(c) If Kϕ ↓= k for some k ∈ K , then by IH there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Kϕ ↓∼ Kϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. Hence by Lemma B.18, Kϕ′ ↓= k
and Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) for some T . We then apply the IH to S , and either Sϕ ↓= Sϕ′ ↓= ⊥, in which case Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥; or there
exists c ′′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL→ c ′′. Therefore by rule TSignL, Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL→ c ′′.
(9) R = h(S)We apply the induction hypothesis to S . We distinguish two cases:
(a) Sϕ ↓= ⊥ In this case we also have Sϕ′ ↓= ⊥ and therefore Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) Sϕ ↓, ⊥ In this case, by the induction hypothesis, we also have Sϕ′ ↓, ⊥, and we also know that there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that
Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′ Thus, by rule THashL, Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′, which proves this case.
(10) R = π1(S)We apply the induction hypothesis to S and distinguish three cases.
(a) Sϕ ↓= ⊥ Then Sϕ′ ↓= ⊥ (by IH), hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) Sϕ ↓, ⊥ and is not a pair Then by IH there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′, which implies that Rϕ′ ↓ and is not
a pair either by Lemma B.19. Hence Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(c) Sϕ ↓= 〈t1, t2〉 is a pair Then by IH there exists c
′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. This implies, by Lemma B.17, that
Sϕ′ ↓= 〈t ′1, t
′
2〉 is also a pair, and that Γ ⊢ t1 ∼ t
′
1 : LL→ c
′′ for some c ′′ ⊆ c ′. Since Rϕ ↓= t1 and Rϕ
′ ↓= t ′1, this proves the case.
(11) R = π2(S) This case is analogous to the case 10.
(12) R = dec(S,K)We apply the induction hypothesis to K and, similarly to the case 6, we distinguish several cases.
(a) If Kϕ ↓= ⊥ or is not a key then, as in case 6, Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) If Kϕ ↓ is a key, then similarly to case 6 we can show that Kϕ ↓= Kϕ′ ↓, and Γ(Kϕ ↓) = Γ(Kϕ′ ↓) = keyLL(T ) for some T . We then
apply the IH to S , which creates two cases. Either Sϕ ↓= Sϕ′ ↓= ⊥, or there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. In
the first case, the claim holds, since Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥. In the second case, by Lemma B.19, we know that Sϕ ↓ is an encryption by
Kϕ ↓ if and only if Sϕ′ ↓ also is an encryption by this key. Consequently, if Sϕ ↓ is not an encryption by Kϕ ↓ (= Kϕ′ ↓), then it is
the same for Sϕ′ ↓; and Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥. Otherwise, Sϕ ↓= enc(t ,Kϕ ↓) and Sϕ′ ↓= enc(t ′,Kϕ′ ↓) for some t , t ′. In that case, by
IH, we have Γ ⊢ enc(t ,Kϕ ↓) ∼ enc(t ′,Kϕ′ ↓) : LL→ c ′. Therefore, by Lemma B.15 (point 5), Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : LL → c ′, which is to say
Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL→ c ′. Hence the claim holds in this case.
(13) R = adec(S,K)We apply the induction hypothesis to K and, similarly to the case 6, we distinguish several cases.
(a) If Kϕ ↓= ⊥ or is not a key then, as in case 6, Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) If Kϕ ↓ is a key, then similarly to case 6 we can show that Kϕ ↓= Kϕ′ ↓, and Γ(Kϕ ↓) = Γ(Kϕ′ ↓) = keyLL(T ) for some T . We then
apply the IH to S , which creates two cases. Either Sϕ ↓= Sϕ′ ↓= ⊥, or there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. In
the first case, the claim holds, since Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥. In the second case, by Lemma B.19, we know that Sϕ ↓ is an asymmetric
encryption by pk(Kϕ ↓) if and only if Sϕ′ ↓ also is an encryption by this key. Consequently, if Sϕ ↓ is not an encryption by pk(Kϕ ↓)
(= pk(Kϕ′ ↓)), then it is the same for Sϕ′ ↓, and Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥. Otherwise, Sϕ ↓= aenc(t , pk(Kϕ ↓)) and Sϕ′ ↓= aenc(t ′, pk(Kϕ′ ↓
)) for some t , t ′. Thus by IH we have Γ ⊢ aenc(t , pk(Kϕ ↓)) ∼ aenc(t ′, pk(Kϕ′ ↓)) : LL → c ′. Therefore, by Lemma B.15 (point 6),
we know that Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : LL→ c ′, which is to say Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′. Hence the claim holds in this case.
(14) R = checksign(S,K)We apply the induction hypothesis to K and, similarly to the case 7, we distinguish several cases.
(a) If Kϕ ↓= ⊥ or is not a verification key then, as in case 7, we can show that Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥.
(b) If Kϕ ↓ is a verification key vk(k) for some k ∈ K , then similarly to case 7 we can show that Kϕ ↓= Kϕ′ ↓, and k ∈ dom(Γ). We
then apply the IH to S , which creates two cases. Either Sϕ ↓= Sϕ′ ↓= ⊥, or there exists c ′ ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ Sϕ ↓∼ Sϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′.
In the first case, the claim holds, since Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥. In the second case, by Lemma B.19, we know that Sϕ ↓ is a signature
by k(= Kϕ ↓) if and only if Sϕ′ ↓ also is a signature by this key. Consequently, if Sϕ ↓ is not signed by k , then neither is Sϕ′ ↓,
and Rϕ ↓= Rϕ′ ↓= ⊥. Otherwise, Sϕ ↓= sign(t ,k) and Sϕ′ ↓= sign(t ′,k) for some t , t ′. Thus by IH we have Γ ⊢ sign(t ,k) ∼
sign(t ′,k) : LL → c ′. Therefore, by Lemma B.16 (point 2), we know that there exists c ′′ ⊆ c ′ such that Γ ⊢ t ∼ t ′ : LL→ c ′′. That
is to say Γ ⊢ Rϕ ↓∼ Rϕ′ ↓: LL → c ′′. Hence the claim holds in this case.

Lemma B.22 (Substitution preserves typing). For all Γ, Γ′, Γ′′, such that Γ∪Γ′∪Γ′′ ⊢ ⋄, (we do not require that Γ and Γ′ are well-formed),
for allM , N ,T , cσ , c , for all ground substitutions σ , σ
′, if
• Γ, Γ′ only contains variables, and have disjoint domains;
• Γ′′ only contains names and keys;
• for all x ∈ dom(Γ′), Γ′(x) is not of the form Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K,
• (Γ ∪ Γ′′)N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : (Γ ∪ Γ′′)X → cσ ,
• and Γ ∪ Γ′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c
then there exists c ′ ⊆ JcKσ ,σ ′ ∪ cσ such that
Γ
′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ Mσ ∼ Nσ ′ : T → c ′.
In particular, if we have Γ = Γ′′′X , Γ
′
= ∅, and Γ′′ = Γ′′′N,K for some Γ
′′′, then the first three conditions trivially hold.
Proof. Note that ΓN,K = Γ
′
N,K = ∅, ΓX = Γ, Γ
′
X = Γ
′, Γ′′N,K = Γ
′′ and Γ′′X = ∅. This proof is done by induction on the typing
derivation for the terms. The claim clearly holds in the TNonce, TNonceL, TCstFN, TPubKey, TVKey, TKey, THash, THigh, TLR1, TLR∞
since their conditions do not use Γ(x) (for any variable x) or another type judgement, and they still apply to the messages Mσ and Nσ ′.
It follows directly from the induction hypothesis in all other cases except the TVar and TLRVar cases, which are the base cases.
In the TVar case, the claim also holds, sinceM = N = x for some variable x ∈ dom(Γ)∪dom(Γ′). If x ∈ dom(Γ′), then xσ = xσ ′ = x , and
T = Γ′(x). Thus, by rule TVar, Γ′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ xσ ∼ xσ ′ : Γ′(x) → ∅ and the claim holds. If x ∈ dom(Γ), thenT = Γ(x), and, since by hypothesis
the substitutions are well-typed, there exists cx ⊆ cσ ,σ ′ such that (Γ ∪ Γ
′′)N,K ⊢ σ (x) ∼ σ
′(x) : Γ(x) → cx . Thus, since (Γ ∪ Γ
′′)N,K = Γ
′′,
and by applying Lemma B.10 to Γ′, Γ′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ σ (x) ∼ σ ′(x) : Γ(x) → cx and the claim holds.
Finally, in the TLRVar case, there exist two variables x , y, and types τ l,1m , τ
l ′,1
n , τ
l ′′,1
m′
, τ l
′′′
,1
n′
, such thatM = x , N = y, c = ∅, Γ ∪ Γ′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢
x ∼ x : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → ∅, Γ ∪ Γ′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ y ∼ y : Jτ l ′′,1m′ ; τ l ′′′,1n′ K → ∅, and T = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′′′,1n′ K.
By Lemma B.14, this implies that (Γ ∪ Γ′ ∪ Γ′′)(x) = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K and (Γ ∪ Γ′ ∪ Γ′′)(y) = J l ′′ ; 1Km′l ′′′1n′. Hence, since by hypothesis
Γ
′ does not contain such types, and Γ′′ does not contain variables, x ∈ dom(Γ) and y ∈ dom(Γ).
Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, there exist c ′, c ′′ ⊆ cσ such that Γ
′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ xσ ∼ xσ ′ : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → c ′, and Γ′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ yσ ∼
yσ ′ : Jτ l ′′,1
m′
; τ l
′′′
,1
n′
K → c ′′. That is to say, since x,y ∈ dom(Γ) = dom(σ ) = dom(σ ′), that Γ′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ σ (x) ∼ σ ′(x) : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → c ′, and
Γ
′ ∪ Γ′′ ⊢ σ (y) ∼ σ ′(y) : Jτ l ′′,1
m′
; τ l
′′′
,1
n′
K → c ′′. Hence, by Lemma B.14, and since σ , σ ′ are ground, we have σ (x) =m, σ ′(x) = n, σ (y) =m′,
and σ ′(y) = n′, and Γ′′(m) = τ l,1m and Γ
′′(n′) = τ
l ′′′,1
n′
.
Thus, by rule TLR1, Γ′ ⊢ σ (x) ∼ σ ′(y) : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′′′,1n′ K → ∅, which proves the claim. 
Lemma B.23 (Types LL and HH are disjoint). For all Γ, for all ground termsM , M ′, N , N ′, for all sets of constraints c , c ′, if Γ ⊢ M ∼ N :
LL → c and Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : HH → c ′ then M , M ′ and N , N ′.
Proof. First, it is easy to see by induction on the type derivation that for all ground terms M , N , for all c , if Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : HH → c then
either
• M is a noncem ∈ N such that Γ(m) = τ HH,am for some a ∈ {∞, 1};
• orM is a key and Γ(M) = keyHH(T ) for some T ;
• or Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : HH ∗T → c ′ for some T , c ′;
• or Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ∗ HH → c ′ for some T , c ′.
Indeed, (as Γ is well-formed) the only possible cases are TNonce, TSub, and TLR’. In the TNonce case the claim clearly holds. In the
TSub case we use Lemma B.1 followed by Lemma B.18. In the TLR’ case we apply Lemma B.14 and the claim directly follows.
Let us now show that for all M , N , N ′ ground, for all c , c ′, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c and Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : HH → c ′ cannot both hold.
(This corresponds, with the notations of the statement of the lemma, to proving by contradiction that M , M ′. The proof that N , N ′ is
analogous.)
We show this property by induction on the size of t1.
Since Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : HH→ c ′, by the property stated in the beginning of this proof, we can distinguish four cases.
• IfM is a nonce and Γ(M) = τ HH,a
M
: then this contradicts Lemma B.18. Indeed, this lemma (point 5) implies thatM ∈ BN , but also (by
point 6), since Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c , that either Γ(M) = τ LL,a
M
for some a ∈ {1,∞}, orM ∈ FN ∪ C.
• IfM is a key and Γ(M) = keyHH(T ) for some T : then by Lemma B.18, since Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c , there exists T ′ such that Γ(M) =
keyLL(T ′). This contradicts Γ(M) = keyHH(T ).
• If Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : HH ∗T → c ′′ for some T , c ′′: then by Lemma B.17, since M , N ′ are ground, there exist M1, M2, N
′
1 , N
′
2 , c
′
1 such that
M = 〈M1,M2〉, N
′
= 〈N ′1,N
′
2〉, and Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N
′
1 : HH → c
′
1. Moreover, since Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c , also by Lemma B.17, there exist
N1, N2, c1 such that N = 〈N1,N2〉 and Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : LL → c1. However, by the induction hypothesis, Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N
′
1 : HH → c
′
1 and
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : LL→ c1 is impossible.
• If Γ ⊢ M ∼ N ′ : T ∗ HH→ c ′′ for some T , c ′′: this case is similar to the previous one.

Lemma B.24 (Low terms are recipes on their constraints). For all ground messagesM , N , for all T <: LL, for all Γ, c , if Γ ⊢ M ∼ N :
T → c then there exists an attacker recipe R without destructors such that M = R(ϕl(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
) and N = R(ϕr(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the typing derivation of Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c . We distinguish several cases for the last rule
in this derivation.
• TNonce, TEnc, TAenc, THigh, TOr, TLR1, TLR∞, TLR’, TLRVar: these cases are not possible, since the type they give to terms is
never a subtype of LL by Lemma B.1.
• TVar: this case is not possible since M , N are ground.
• TSub: this case is directly proved by applying the induction hypothesis to the judgement ∅ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ′ → c where T ′ <: T <: LL,
which appears in the conditions of this rule, and has a shorter derivation.
• TLRL’: in this case, Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : Jτ LL,an ; τ LL,an K → c ′ for some nonce n, some a ∈ {∞, 1}, some c ′, and c = ∅. By Lemma B.14, this
implies thatM = N = n, and Γ(n) = τ LL,an . Thus, by definition, there exists x such that ϕ
Γ
LL
(x) = n and the claim holds with R = x .
• TNonceL: in this case M = N = n for some n ∈ N such that Γ(n) = τ LL,an for some a ∈ {1,∞}. Hence, by definition, there exists x
such that ϕΓ
LL
(x) = n and the claim holds with R = x .
• TCstFN: then M = N = a ∈ C ∪ FN , and the claim holds with R = a.
• TKey: then M = N = k ∈ K and there exists T ′ such that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′). By definition, there exists x such that ϕΓ
LL
(x) = k and
the claim holds with R = x .
• TPubKey, TVKey: then M = N = pk(k) (resp. vk(k)) for some k ∈ dom(Γ). By definition, there exists x such that ϕΓ
LL
(x) = pk(k)
(resp. vk(k)) and the claim holds with R = x .
• TPair, THashL: these cases are similar. We detail the TPair case. In that case, T = T1 ∗ T2 for some T1, T2. By Lemma B.1, T1, T2
are subtypes of LL. In addition, there exist M1, M2, N1, N2, c1, c2 such that Γ ⊢ Mi ∼ Ni : Ti → ci (for i ∈ {1, 2}). By applying the
induction hypothesis to these two judgements (which have shorter proofs), we obtain R1, R2 such that for all i ,Mi = Ri (ϕl(ci )∪ϕ
Γ
LL
)
and Ni = Ri (ϕr(ci ) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
). Therefore the claim holds with R = 〈R1,R2〉.
• TEncH, TAencH, THash, TSignH: these four cases are similar. In each case, by the form of the typing rule, we have c = {M ∼ N }∪c ′
for some c ′. Therefore by definition of ϕl(c), ϕr(c), there exists x such that ϕl(c)(x) = M and ϕr(c)(N ) = N . The claim holds with
R = x .
• TEncL, TAencL: these two cases are similar, we write the proof for the TEncL case. The form of this rule application is:
Π
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (LL)k → c Γ(k) = key
LL(T ′)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c
By Lemma B.15, there existM ′, N ′ such thatM = enc(M ′,k), N = enc(N ′,k), and Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c with a proof shorter that Π.
Thus by applying the induction hypothesis to this judgement, there exists R such thatM ′ = R(ϕl(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
) and N ′ = R(ϕr(c) ∪ϕ
Γ
LL
).
Moreover, since Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′), by definition, there exists x such that ϕΓ
LL
(x) = k (in the asymmetric case, the messages are
encrypted with a public key pk(k), which also appears in this frame). Therefore, the claim holds with the recipe enc(R,x).
• TSignL: the form of this rule application is:
Π
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL→ c Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′)
Γ ⊢ sign(M ′,k) ∼ sign(N ′,k) : LL→ c
with M = sign(M ′,k), N = sign(N ′,k). Thus by applying the induction hypothesis to Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c , there exists R such
thatM ′ = R(ϕl(c) ∪ ϕ
∆
LL
) and N ′ = R(ϕr(c) ∪ ϕ
∆
LL
).
Moreover, since Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′), by definition, there exists x such that ϕΓ
LL
(x) = k . Therefore, the claim holds with the recipe
sign(R, x).

Lemma B.25 (Low frames with consistent constraints are statically eqivalent). For all ground ϕ, ϕ′, for all c , Γ, if
• Γ ⊢ ϕ ∼ ϕ′ : LL→ c
• and c is consistent in ΓN,K ,
then new EΓ .ϕ and new EΓ .ϕ
′ are statically equivalent.
Proof. We can first notice that since ϕ and ϕ′ are ground, so is c (this is easy to see by examining the typing rules for terms). Let R, R′
be two attacker recipes, such that vars(R) ∪ vars(R′) ⊆ dom(ϕ)(= dom(ϕ′)).
For all x ∈ dom(ϕ)(= dom(ϕ′)), by assumption, there exists cx ⊆ c such that Γ ⊢ ϕ(x) ∼ ϕ
′(x) : LL → cx . By Lemma B.24, there exists a
recipe Rx such that ϕ(x) = Rx (ϕl(cx ) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
) and ϕ′(x) = Rx (ϕr(cx ) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
).
Since cx ⊆ c , we also have ϕ(x) = Rx (ϕl(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
) and ϕ′(x) = Rx (ϕr(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
).
Let R and R
′
be the recipes obtained by replacing every occurence of x with Rx in respectively R and R
′, for all variable x ∈ dom(ϕ)(=
dom(ϕ′)).
We then have Rϕ = R(ϕl(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
) and R′ϕ = R
′
(ϕl(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
); and similarly Rϕ′ = R(ϕr(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
) and R′ϕ′ = R
′
(ϕr(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL
).
Since c is ground, and consistent in ΓN,K , by definition of consistency, the frames new EΓ .ϕl(c)∪ϕ
Γ
LL
and new EΓ .ϕr(c)∪ϕ
Γ
LL
are statically
equivalent. Hence, by definition of static equivalence,
R(ϕl(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL) = R
′
(ϕl(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL) ⇐⇒ R(ϕr(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL) = R
′
(ϕr(c) ∪ ϕ
Γ
LL)
i.e.
Rϕ = R′ϕ ⇐⇒ Rϕ′ = R′ϕ′
Therefore, new EΓ .ϕ and new EΓ .ϕ
′ are statically equivalent. 
Lemma B.26 (Invariant). For all Γ, ϕP , ϕ
′
P
, ϕQ , σP , σ
′
P
, σQ , E
′, cϕ , cσ , for all multisets of processes P , P
′, Q, where the processes in P ,
P ′, Q are noted {Pi }, {P
′
i }, {Qi }; for all constraint sets {Ci }, if:
• |P| = |Q |
• dom(ϕP ) = dom(ϕQ )
• ∀i, there is a derivation Πi of Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci ,
• Γ ⊢ ϕP ∼ ϕQ : LL → cϕ
• for all i , j, the sets of bound variables in Pi and Pj (resp. Qi and Qj ) are disjoint, and similarly for the names
• σP , σQ are ground, and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ ,
•
r
(∪×iCi )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ is consistent,
• (EΓ ,P,ϕP ,σP )
α
−−→ (E′,P ′,ϕ′
P
,σ ′
P
),
then there exist a wordw , a multiset Q ′ = {Q ′i }, constraint sets {C
′
i }, a frame ϕ
′
Q
, a substitution σ ′
Q
, an environment Γ′, constraints c ′
ϕ
, and c ′σ
such that:
• w =τ α
• |P ′ | = |Q ′ |
• for all i , j, the sets of bound variables in P ′i and P
′
j (resp. Q
′
i and Q
′
j ) are disjoint, and similarly for the bound names;
• Γ′ ⊢ ϕ′
P
∼ ϕ′
Q
: LL→ c ′
ϕ
• E′ = EΓ′
• (EΓ ,Q,ϕQ ,σQ )
w
−−→∗ (EΓ′ ,Q
′
,ϕ′
Q
,σ ′
Q
),
• ∀i, Γ′ ⊢ P ′i ∼ Q
′
i → C
′
i ,
• σ ′
P
, σ ′
Q
are ground and Γ′N,K ⊢ σ
′
P
∼ σ ′
Q
: Γ′X → c
′
σ ,
• dom(ϕ′
P
) = dom(ϕ′
Q
),
•
r
(∪×iC
′
i )∪∀c
′
ϕ
z
σ ′
P
,σ ′
Q
∪∀c
′
σ is consistent.
Proof. First, we show that it is sufficient to prove this lemma in the case where Γ does not contain any union types. Indeed, assume
we know the property holds in that case. Let us show that the lemma then also holds in the other case, i.e. if Γ contains union types. By
hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground, and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ . Hence we know by Lemma B.4 that there exists a branch Γ
′′ ∈ branches(Γ)
(thus Γ′′ does not contain union types), such that (Γ′′)N,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : (Γ
′′)X → cσ .
Moreover, by Lemma B.7, ∀i, Γ′′ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → C
′′
i ⊆ Ci ; and by Lemma B.5, Γ
′′ ⊢ ϕP ∼ ϕQ : LL → cϕ . In addition by Lemma B.11,r
(∪×iC
′′
i )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ is a subset of
r
(∪×iCi )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ and is therefore consistent. Thus, if the lemma holds when the envi-
ronment does not contain union types, it can be applied to the same processes, frames, substitutions and to Γ′′, which directly concludes
the proof.
Therefore, we may assume that Γ does not contain any union types.
Note that the assumption on the disjointness of the sets of bound variables (and names) in the processes implies, using Lemma B.8,
that since (∪×i JCi KσP ,σQ∪∀cσ ) is consistent (by Lemma B.11), each of the JCiKσP ,σQ∪∀cσ is also consistent. Moreover, this disjointness
property for P ′ and Q ′ follows from the other points, as it is easily proved by examining the reduction rules that it is preserved by reduction.
By hypothesis, (EΓ ,P,ϕP ,σP ) reduces to (EΓ′ ,P
′
,ϕ′
P
,σ ′
P
) We know from the form of the reduction rules that exactly one process
Pi ∈ P is reduced, while the others are unchanged. By the assumptions, there is a corresponding process Qi ∈ Q and a derivation Πi of
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci .
We continue the proof by a case disjunction on the last rule of Πi . Let us first consider the cases of the rules PZero, PPar, PNew, and
POr.
• PZero: then Pi = Qi = 0. Hence, the reduction rule applied to P is Zero, and P
′
= P\{Pi }, E
′
P
= EP , ϕ
′
P
= ϕP , and σ
′
P
= σP . The
same reduction can be performed in Q:
(EQ ,Q,ϕQ ,σQ )
τ
−−→ (EQ ,Q\{Qi },ϕQ ,σQ )
Since the other processes, the frames, environments and substitutions do not change in this reduction, all the claims clearly hold in
this case (with c ′
ϕ
= cϕ , c
′
σ = cσ ). In particular, the consistency of the constraints follow from the consistency hypothesis. Indeed,
(∪× j,iCj )∪×Ci∪∀cϕ = (∪× j,iCj )∪×{(∅, Γ)}∪∀cϕ
= (∪× j,iCj )∪∀cϕ ,
since Γ is already contained in the environments appearing in each Cj (by Lemma B.12). Thusr
(∪× jC
′
j )∪∀c
′
ϕ
z
σ ′
P
,σ ′
Q
∪×c
′
σ =
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪×cσ
• PPar: then Pi = P
1
i | P
2
i , Qi = Q
1
i | Q
2
i . Hence, the reduction rule applied to P is Par:
(EΓ ,P,ϕP ,σP )
τ
−−→ (EΓ ,P\{Pi } ∪ {P
1
i , P
2
i },ϕP ,σP ).
We choose Γ′ = Γ.
In addition
Πi =
Π
1
Γ ⊢ P1i ∼ Q
1
i → C
1
i
Π
2
Γ ⊢ P2i ∼ Q
2
i → C
2
i
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
1
i ∪×C
2
i
.
The same reduction rule can be applied to Q:
(EΓ ,Q,ϕQ ,σQ )
τ
−−→ (EΓ ,Q\{Qi } ∪ {Q
1
i ,Q
2
i },ϕQ ,σQ )
In this case again, the claims on the substitutions and frames hold since they do not change in the reduction. Moreover the processes
in P ′ and Q ′ are still pairwise typably equivalent. Indeed, all the processes from P and Q are unchanged, except for Pi andQi which
are reduced to P1i , P
2
i , Q
1
i , Q
2
i , and those are typably equivalent using Π
1 and Π2.
Finally the constraint set is still consistent, since:r
(∪× jC
′
j )∪∀c
′
ϕ
z
σ ′
P
,σ ′
Q
∪∀c
′
σ =
r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
1
i ∪×C
2
i ∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
=
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
• PNew: then Pi = new n : τ
l,a
n .P
′
i and Qi = new n : τ
l,a
n .Q
′
i . Pi is reduced to P
′
i by rule New:
(EΓ ,P,ϕP ,σP )
τ
−−→ (EΓ ∪ {n},P\{Pi } ∪ {P
′
i },ϕP ,σP ).
In addition
Πi =
Π
′
i
Γ,n : τ l,an ⊢ P
′
i ∼ Q
′
i → Ci
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci
.
We choose Γ′ = Γ,n : τ l,an , and we have EΓ′ = EΓ ∪ {n}.
The same reduction rule can be applied to Q:
(EΓ ,Q,ϕQ ,σQ )
τ
−−→ (EΓ′ ,Q\{Qi } ∪ {Q
′
i },ϕQ ,σQ )
The claim clearly holds: the processes are still pairwise typable (using Π′i in the case of P
′
i and Q
′
i ; and Πj for j , i as these processes
are unchanged by the reduction), and all the frames, substitutions, and constraints are unchanged, and since σ , σ ′ are well-typed in
Γ
′ if and only if they are well-typed in Γ.
• POr: this case is not possible, since we have already eliminated the case where Γ contains union types.
In all the other cases for the last rule in Πi , we know that the head symbol of Pi is not | , 0 or new.
Hence, the form of the reduction rules implies that Pi ∈ P is reduced to exactly one process P
′
i ∈ P
′, while the other processes in P do
not change (i.e. P ′j = Pj for j , i), and E
′
= EΓ . If we show in each case that the same reduction rule that is applied to Pi can be applied to
reduce Q to a multiset Q ′ by reducing processQi into Q
′
i , we will also have Q
′
j = Qj for j , i . Therefore the claim on the cardinality of the
processes multisets will hold.
Since Pi , Qi can be typed and the head symbol of Pi is not new, it is clear by examining the typing rules that the head symbol of Qi is
not new either. Hence, we will choose a Γ′ containing the same nonces as Γ, and we will have EΓ′ = EΓ .
The proofs for theses cases follow the same structure:
• The typing rule gives us information on the form of Pi and Qi .
• The form of Pi gives us information on which reduction rule was applied to P .
• The form ofQi is the same as Pi . Hence (additional conditions may need to be checked depending on the rule)Qi can be reduced to
some processQ ′i by applying the same reduction rule that was applied to Pi (except in the PIfLR case).
• thus Q can be reduced too, with the same actions as P . We then check the additional conditions on the typing of the processes,
frames and substitutions, and the consistency condition.
First, let us consider the POut case.
• POut: then Pi = out(M).P
′
i and reduces to P
′
i via the Out rule, and Qi = out(N ).Q
′
i for some N and Q
′
i . In addition
Πi =
Π
Γ ⊢ P ′i ∼ Q
′
i → C
′
i
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
′
i∪∀c
.
We have E′ = EΓ , σ
′
P
= σP , ϕ
′
P
= ϕP ∪ {M/axn }, and α = new axn .out(axn).
The same reduction rule Out can be applied to reduce the processQi intoQ
′
i , hence the claim on the reduction of Q holds. We choose
Γ
′
= Γ. We have EΓ′ = EΓ , σ
′
Q
= σQ , and ϕ
′
Q
= ϕQ ∪ {N /axn}. We also choose c
′
ϕ
= cϕ ∪ c and c
′
σ = cσ . The substitutions σP ,
σQ are not extended by the reduction, and the typing environment does not change, which trivially proves the claim regarding the
substitutions.
Moreover, since onlyM and N are added to the frames in the reduction, Π′ suffices to prove the claim that Γ ⊢ ϕ′
P
∼ ϕ′
Q
: LL → c ′
ϕ
.
Since all processes other that Pi and Qi are unchanged by the reduction (and since the typing environment is also unchanged), Π
suffices to proves the claim that ∀j . Γ′ ⊢ P ′j ∼ Q
′
j → C
′
j (with C
′
j = Cj for j , i).
Thus, in this case, it only remains to be proved that
r
(∪× jC
′
j )∪∀c
′
ϕ
z
σ ′
P
,σ ′
Q
∪∀c
′
σ is consistent. This constraint set is equal to
r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀(cϕ ∪ c)
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
i.e. to r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×(C
′
i∪∀c)∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
i.e. r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
which is consistent by hypothesis. Hence the claim holds in this case.
In the remaining cases, from the form of the typing rules for processes, the head symbol of neither Pi nor Qi is out. Thus, the reduction
applied to Pi (from the assumption), as well as the one applied to Qi (we still must show it exists and is the same as for Pi , except in case
PIfLR, where Pi can follow one branch of the conditional while Qi follows the other), cannot be Out. Therefore no new term is output on
either side, and ϕ′
P
= ϕP and ϕ
′
Q
= ϕQ . Hence the claim on the domains of the frames holds by assumption. Moreover, as we will see, in
all cases Γ′ is either Γ, or Γ, x : T where x is a variable declared in (the head of) Pi and Qi , and T is not a union type. The condition that
EΓ = EΓ′ formulated previously will thus hold.
We choose c ′
ϕ
= cϕ . The claim that Γ
′ ⊢ ϕ′
P
∼ ϕ′
Q
: LL → c ′
ϕ
is then actually that Γ′ ⊢ ϕP ∼ ϕQ : LL → cϕ , which is true by Lemma B.10,
since by hypothesis Γ ⊢ ϕP ∼ ϕQ : LL→ cϕ .
Besides, in the cases where we choose Γ′ = Γ then it is true (by hypothesis) that for j , i , Γ′ ⊢ P ′j ∼ Q
′
j → Cj . In the cases where we
choose Γ′ = Γ, x : T , where x is bound in Pi andQi , then, since the processes are assumed to use different variable names, x does not appear
in Pj or Qj (for j , i). Hence, if j , i , using the assumption that Γ ⊢ Pj ∼ Qj → Cj , by Lemma B.10, we have Γ
′ ⊢ P ′j ∼ Q
′
j → C
′
j , where
C ′j = {(c, Γc ∪ {x : T })|(c, Γc ) ∈ Cj }.
Hence, for each remaining possible last rule of Πi , we only have to show that:
a) The same reduction rule can be applied toQi as to Pi , with the same action. (Except in the case of the rule PIfLR, as we will see, where
rule If-Then may be applied on one side while rule If-Else is applied on the other side, but this has no influence on the argument, as
these two rules both represent a silent action, and have a very similar form.)
b) (σ ′
P
,σ ′
Q
) are ground, and Γ′N,K ⊢ σ
′
P
∼ σ ′
Q
: Γ′X → c
′
σ for some set of constraints c
′
σ . Since at most one variable x is added to the
substitutions in the reduction, we only have to check that condition on this variable, i.e. Γ′N,K ⊢ σ
′
P
(x) ∼ σ ′
Q
(x) : Γ′(x) → cx for
some cx . We can then choose c
′
σ = cσ ∪ cx . As we will see in the proof, we will always have cx ⊆
r
cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪ cσ .
c) the new processes obtained by reducing Pi and Qi are typably equivalent in Γ
′, with a constraint C ′i , such thatr
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
is consistent.
The actual claim, from the statement of the lemma, is thatr
(∪× j,iC
′
j )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σ ′
P
,σ ′
Q
∪∀c
′
σ
is consistent, but we can show that the previous condition is sufficient.
In the case where Γ = Γ′, we have σ ′
P
= σP , σ
′
Q
= σQ ,C
′
j = Cj for j , i , and c
′
σ = cσ . Thus the proposed condition is clearly sufficient
(it is even necessary in this case).
In the case where Γ′ = Γ, x : T for some T which is not a union type, and the substitutions σ ′
P
, σ ′
Q
are σP , σQ extended with a term
associated to x , the proof that the condition is sufficient is more involved. First, we show that (∪× j,iC
′
j )∪×C
′
i = (∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i .
Indeed, if S denotes the set (∪× j,iC
′
j )∪×C
′
i , we have
S = {(
⋃
j
c ′j ,
⋃
j
Γ
′
j ) | ∀j . (c
′
j , Γ
′
j ) ∈ C
′
j ∧ ∀j, j
′
. Γ
′
j and Γ
′
j′ are compatible)}
= {(c ′i ∪
⋃
j,i
cj , Γ
′
i ∪
⋃
j,i
(Γj , x : T ) | (c
′
i , Γ
′
i ) ∈ C
′
i ∧ (∀j , i . (cj , Γj ) ∈ Cj ) ∧
(∀j , i, j ′ , i . (Γj ,x : T ) and (Γj′ , x : T ) are compatible) ∧ (∀j , i . Γ
′
i and (Γj ,x : T ) are compatible))}
since we already know that for j , i , C ′j = {(c, Γc ∪ {x : T })|(c, Γc ) ∈ Cj }. Assuming we show that Γ,x : T ⊢ P
′
i ∼ Q
′
i → C
′
i , by
Lemma B.12, we will also have that all the Γ′i appearing in the elements of C
′
i contain x : T (since T is not a union type). Hence:
S = {(c ′i ∪
⋃
j,i
cj , Γ
′
i ∪ (
⋃
j,i
Γj ) | (c
′
i , Γ
′
i ) ∈ C
′
i ∧ (∀j , i . (cj , Γj ) ∈ Cj ) ∧
(∀j , i, j ′ , i . Γj and Γj′ are compatible) ∧ (∀j , i . Γ
′
i and Γj are compatible))}
= (∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i
It is thus sufficient to ensure the consistency of r
S∪∀cϕ
z
σ ′
P
,σ ′
Q
∪∀cσ∪∀cx ,
i.e., since cσ and cx are ground (since the substitutions are), thatr
S∪∀cϕ∪∀cσ∪∀cx
z
σ ′
P
,σ ′
Q
is consistent. Using Lemma B.11, since σ ′
P
= σP ∪ {σ
′
P
(x)/x} (and similarly for Q), it then suffices to show the consistency ofsr
S∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ∪∀cx
{
σ ′
P
(x )/x,σ ′
Q
(x )/x
which is equal to sr
S∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
{
σ ′
P
(x )/x,σ ′
Q
(x )/x
since cx ⊆
r
cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪cσ (by point b)). Moreover, aswe observed previously, the environments in all elements in
r
S∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
contain x : T .
Therefore by Lemma B.11, since ΓN,K ⊢ σ
′
P
(x) ∼ σ ′
Q
(x) : T → cx (as we will show, as point b)), it suffices to ensure thatr
S∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
is consistent,to prove the claim. This is the condition stated at the beginning of this point, since S = (∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i .
We can now prove the remaining cases for the last rule of Πi , that is to say the cases of the rules PIn, PLet, PLetLR, PIfL, PIfLR, PIfS,
PIfLR*, PIfP, PIfI, PIfLR’*.
• PIn: then Pi = in(x).P
′
i and reduces to P
′
i via the In rule, and Qi = in(x).Q
′
i for someQ
′
i . In addition
Πi =
Π
Γ,x : LL ⊢ P ′i ∼ Q
′
i → C
′
i
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
′
i
.
We have α = in(R) for some attacker recipe R such that vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕP ), and RϕPσP ↓, ⊥. We also have E
′
= EΓ , σ
′
P
=
σP ∪ {RϕPσP ↓ /x}, ϕ
′
P
= ϕP .
The same reduction rule In can be applied to reduce the process Qi into Q
′. Indeed,
– vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕQ ) since dom(ϕQ ) = dom(ϕP ) by hypothesis;
– RϕQσQ ↓, ⊥. This follows from Lemma B.21, using the fact that by Lemma B.22, ΓN,K ⊢ ϕPσP ∼ ϕQσQ : LL → c , for some
c ⊆
r
cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪ cσ .
Therefore point a) holds.
We choose Γ′ = Γ, x : LL. We have σ ′
Q
= σQ ∪ {RϕQσQ ↓ /x}.
Lemmas B.22 and B.21, previously evoked, guarantee that
ΓN,K ⊢ RϕPσP ↓∼ RϕQσQ ↓: LL → c
′
for some c ′ ⊆
r
cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪ cσ . This proves point b).
Moreover, Π and the fact thatr
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ =
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
which is consistent by hypothesis, prove point c) and conclude this case.
• PLet: then Pi = let x = d(y) in P
′
i else P
′′
i and Qi = let x = d(y) in Q
′
i else Q
′′
i for some P
′
i , P
′′
i ,Q
′
i ,Q
′′
i . Pi reduces to either P
′
i
via the Let-In rule, or P ′′i via the Let-Else rule. In addition
Πi =
x < dom(Γ)
Π
Γ ⊢ d(y) : T
Π
′
Γ, x : T ⊢ P ′i ∼ Q
′
i → C
′
i
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ P ′′i ∼ Q
′′
i → C
′′
i
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
′
i ∪C
′′
i
.
We have α = τ .
Since ΓN,K ⊢ σP (y) ∼ σQ (y) : Γ(y) → cy (for some cy ⊆ cσ , by hypothesis), and using Π, by Lemma B.20, we have:
d(σP (y)) ↓, ⊥ ⇐⇒ d(σQ (y)) ↓, ⊥
Therefore, if rule Let-In is applied to Pi then it can also be applied to reduceQi intoQ
′
i , and if the rule applied to Pi is Let-Else then it
can also be applied to reduce Qi into Q
′′
i . This proves point a). We prove here the Let-In case. The Let-Else case is similar (although
slightly easier, since no new variable is added to the substitutions).
In this case we have σ ′
P
= σP ∪ {d(σP (y)) ↓ /x} and σ
′
Q
= σQ ∪ {d(σQ (y)) ↓ /x}.
By Lemma B.20, we know in this case that there exists c ⊆ cy such that ΓN,K ⊢ d(σP (y)) ↓∼ d(σQ (y)) ↓: T → c . Thus, by Lemma B.2,
there exists T ′ ∈ branches(T ) such that ΓN,K ⊢ d(σP (y)) ↓∼ d(σQ (y)) ↓: T
′ → c .
We choose Γ′ = Γ, x : T ′. Since Γ does not contain union types, Γ′ ∈ branches(Γ, x : T ).
Since c ⊆ cy ⊆ cσ and ΓN,K ⊢ d(σP (y)) ↓∼ d(σQ (y)) ↓: T
′ → c , point b) holds.
We now prove that point c) holds. Using Π′, we have Γ, x : T ⊢ P ′i ∼ Q
′
i → C
′
i . Hence, by Lemma B.7, there exists C
′′′
i ⊆ C
′
i (⊆ Ci )
such that Γ′ ⊢ P ′i ∼ Q
′
i → C
′′′
i .
Since C ′′′i ⊆ Ci , we have r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′′′
i ∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ ⊆
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ .
This last constraint set is consistent by hypothesis. Hence, by Lemma B.11,
r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′′′
i ∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ is also consistent.
This proves point c) and concludes this case.
• PLetLR: then Pi = let x = d(y) in P
′
i else P
′′
i and Qi = let x = d(y) in Q
′
i else Q
′′
i for some P
′
i , P
′′
i , Q
′
i , Q
′′
i .
Pi reduces to either P
′
i via the Let-In rule, or P
′′
i via the Let-Else rule.
In addition
Πi =
x < dom(Γ) Γ(y) = Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ P ′′i ∼ Q
′′
i → C
′′
i
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci (= C
′′
i )
.
We have α = τ .
By hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ . Hence, by definition of the well-typedness of substitutions, there
exists cy ⊆ cσ such that ΓN,K ⊢ σP (y) ∼ σQ (y) : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → cy . Therefore by Lemma B.14, σP (y) =m and σQ (y) = n.
Sincem, n are nonces, d(m) ↓= d(n) ↓= ⊥, and we thus have d(σP (y)) ↓= ⊥. Therefore the reduction rule applied to Pi can only be
Let-Else, and Pi is reduced to P
′′
i . Since we also have d(σQ (y)) ↓= ⊥, this rule can also be applied to reduce Qi into Q
′′
i . This proves
point a).
We therefore have σ ′
P
= σP and σ
′
Q
= σQ . We choose Γ
′
= Γ.
Since the substitutions and typing environments are unchanged by the reduction, point b) clearly holds.
Moreover, Π′′, and the fact thatr
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′′
i ∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ =
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
which is consistent by hypothesis, prove point c) and conclude this case.
• PIfL: then Pi = if M = M
′ then P⊤i else P
⊥
i and Qi = if N = N
′ then Q⊤i else Q
⊥
i for some Q
⊤
i , Q
⊥
i . Pi reduces to P
′
i which is
either P⊤i via the If-Then rule, or P
⊥
i via the If-Else rule. In addition
Πi =
Π
⊤
Γ ⊢ P⊤i ∼ Q
⊤
i → C
⊤
i
Π
⊥
Γ ⊢ P⊥i ∼ Q
⊥
i → C
⊥
i
Π
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c ′
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = (C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀(c ∪ c
′)
We have α = τ , and E′ = EΓ
Since Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c , by Lemma B.22, there exists c ′′ ⊆ JcKσP ,σQ ∪ cσ such that ΓN,K ⊢ MσP ∼ NσQ : LL → c ′′. Similarly,
there exists c ′′′ ⊆ Jc ′KσP ,σQ ∪ cσ such that ΓN,K ⊢ M ′σP ∼ N ′σQ : LL → c ′′′.
Let ϕ = {MσP /x,M
′σP /y} and ϕ
′
= {NσQ /x,N
′σQ /y}. We then have ΓN,K ⊢ ϕ ∼ ϕ
′ : LL → c ′′ ∪ c ′′′.
Let us prove that c∪c ′′′ is consistent in some typing environment. By hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ .
Hence, by Lemma B.4, there exists Γ′′ ∈ branches(Γ) such that Γ′′N,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : Γ
′′
X → cσ . By Lemma B.13, there exists
(c1, Γ
′′′) ∈ Ci such that Γ
′′ ⊆ Γ′′′. Since Ci = (C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀(c ∪ c
′), c1 is of the form c2 ∪ c ∪ c
′ for some c2.
As we noted previously, JCi KσP ,σQ∪∀cσ is consistent. Therefore, by Lemma B.11, {(Jc ∪ c ′KσP ,σQ ∪ cσ , Γ′′′)} is consistent. Hence,
by the same Lemma, c ′′ ∪ c ′′′ is also consistent in Γ′′′.
Thus, by Lemma B.25, ϕ and ϕ′ are statically equivalent. Hence, in particular,MσP = M
′σP ⇐⇒ NσQ = N
′σQ .
Therefore, if rule If-Then is applied to Pi then it can also be applied to reduceQi into Q
⊤
i , and if the rule applied to Pi is If-Else then
it can also be applied to reduceQi into Q
⊥
i . This proves point a). We prove here the If-Then case. The If-Else case is similar.
We choose Γ′ = Γ. We have σ ′
P
= σP and σ
′
Q
= σQ .
Since the substitutions and environments do not change in this reduction, point b) trivially holds.
Moreover, by hypothesis, r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×(C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀(c ∪ c
′ ∪ cϕ )
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
is consistent. Thus by Lemma B.11, r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×(C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
is also consistent. Since, using C ′i = C
⊤
i and Ci = (C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀ {M ∼ N ,M
′ ∼ N ′},r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
⊆
r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×(C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
,
we have by Lemma B.11 that
r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ is consistent. Π
⊤ and this fact prove point c) and conclude this case.
• PIfLR: then Pi = if M1 = M2 then P
⊤
i else P
⊥
i and Qi = if N1 = N2 then Q
⊤
i else Q
⊥
i for some Q
⊤
i , Q
⊥
i . Pi reduces to P
′
i which
is either P⊤i via the If-Then rule, or P
⊥
i via the If-Else rule. In addition
Πi =
Π
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → ∅
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l ′′,1m′ ; τ l ′′′,1n′ K → c ′ b = (τ l,1m ?= τ l ′′,1m′ ) b ′ = (τ l ′,1n ?= τ l ′′′,1n′ )
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ Pbi ∼ Q
b ′
i → C
′
i
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
′
i
We have α = τ in any case.
By hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ . Hence, by Lemma B.22, using Π, there exists c
′′ such that
ΓN,K ⊢ M1σP ∼ N1σQ : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → c ′′. Therefore by Lemma B.14, M1σP = m and N1σQ = n. Similarly we can show that
M2σP =m
′ and N2σQ = n
′.
There are four cases for b and b ′, which are all similar. We write the proof for the case where b = ⊤ and b ′ = ⊥, i.e. τ l,1m = τ
l ′′,1
m′
and
τ
l ′,1
n , τ
l ′′′,1
n′
.
Thus the reduction rule applied to Pi is If-Then and P
′
i = P
⊤
i . On the other hand, rule If-Else can be applied to reduceQi intoQ
′
i = Q
⊥
i .
This proves point a) (these rules both correspond to silent actions).
We choose Γ′ = Γ. We have σ ′
P
= σP and σ
′
Q
= σQ .
Since the substitutions and environments do not change in this reduction, point b) trivially holds.
Moreover, Π′′ and the fact thatr
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ =
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
prove point c) and conclude this case.
• PIfS: then Pi = if M = M
′ then P⊤i else P
⊥
i and Qi = if N = N
′ then Q⊤i else Q
⊥
i for some Q
⊤
i , Q
⊥
i . Pi reduces to P
′
i which is
either P⊤i via the If-Then rule, or P
⊥
i via the If-Else rule. In addition
Πi =
Π
⊥
Γ ⊢ P⊥i ∼ Q
⊥
i → C
′
i
Π
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : HH→ c ′
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
′
i
We have α = τ in any case.
By hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ . Hence, by Lemma B.22, using Π, there exists c
′′ such that
ΓN,K ⊢ MσP ∼ NσQ : LL → c
′′. Similarly we can show that ΓN,K ⊢ M
′σP ∼ N
′σQ : HH→ c
′′′ for some c ′′′.
Therefore by Lemma B.23,MσP , M
′σP and NσQ , N
′σQ . Hence the reduction for Pi is necessarily If-Else, which is also applicable
to reduceQi to Q
⊥
i . This proves point a).
We choose Γ′ = Γ. We have σ ′
P
= σP and σ
′
Q
= σQ .
Since the substitutions and typing environments do not change in this reduction, point b) trivially holds.
Moreover, Π′′ and the fact that r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ =
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
prove point c) and conclude this case.
• PIfI: then Pi = if M = M
′ then P⊤i else P
⊥
i and Qi = if N = N
′ then Q⊤i else Q
⊥
i for some Q
⊤
i , Q
⊥
i . This case is similar to the
PIfS case: the incompatibility of the types ofM , N and M ′, N ′ ensures that the processes can only follow the else branch.
Pi reduces to P
′
i which is either P
⊤
i via the If-Then rule, or P
⊥
i via the If-Else rule. In addition
Πi =
Π
⊥
Γ ⊢ P⊥i ∼ Q
⊥
i → C
′
i
Π
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ∗T ′ → c
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → c ′
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
′
i
We have α = τ in any case.
By hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ . Hence, by Lemma B.22, using Π, there exists c
′′ such that
ΓN,K ⊢ MσP ∼ NσQ : T ∗ T
′ → c ′′. By Lemma B.17, this implies that MσP and NσQ both are pairs. Similarly we can show that
ΓN,K ⊢ M
′σP ∼ N
′σQ : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → c ′′′ for some c ′′′. By Lemma B.14, this implies thatM ′σP =m and N ′σQ = n. Thus neither
of these two terms are pairs.
Therefore MσP , M
′σP and NσQ , N
′σQ . The end of the proof for this case is then the same as for the PIfS case.
• PIfP: then Pi = if M = t then P
⊤
i else P
⊥
i and Qi = if N = t then Q
⊤
i else Q
⊥
i for some Q
⊤
i , Q
⊥
i , some messages M , N , and
some t ∈ C ∪K ∪ N . Pi reduces to P
′
i which is either P
⊤
i via the If-Then rule, or P
⊥
i via the If-Else rule. In addition
Πi =
Π
⊤
Γ ⊢ P⊤i ∼ Q
⊤
i → C
⊤
i
Π
⊥
Γ ⊢ P⊥i ∼ Q
⊥
i → C
⊥
i
Π
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c
Π
′
Γ ⊢ t ∼ t : LL → c ′ t ∈ C ∪ K ∪N
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i
We have in any case α = τ .
By hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ . Hence, by Lemma B.22, using Π, there exists c
′′ ⊆ JcKσP ,σQ ∪ cσ
such that ΓN,K ⊢ MσP ∼ NσQ : LL → c
′′.
We then show that MσP = t if and only if NσQ = t (note that since t is ground, t = tσP = tσQ ). IfMσP = t , then ΓN,K ⊢ t ∼ NσQ :
LL→ c ′′. In all possible cases for t , i.e. t ∈ K, t ∈ N , and t ∈ C, Lemma B.18 implies that NσQ = t . This proves the first direction of
the equivalence, the other direction is similar.
Therefore, if rule If-Then is applied to Pi then it can also be applied to reduceQi into Q
⊤
i , and if the rule applied to Pi is If-Else then
it can also be applied to reduceQi into Q
⊥
i . This proves point a). We prove here the If-Then case. The If-Else case is similar.
We choose Γ′ = Γ. We have σ ′
P
= σP and σ
′
Q
= σQ .
Since the substitutions and typing environments do not change in this reduction, point b) trivially holds.
Moreover, by hypothesis, r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×(C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
is consistent. Since, using C ′i = C
⊤
i and Ci = (C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i ), we haver
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ ⊆
r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×(C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ ,
we have by Lemma B.11 that
r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ is consistent. This fact proves point c) and concludes this case.
• PIfLR*: then Pi = if M1 = M2 then P
⊤
i else P
⊥
i and Qi = if N1 = N2 then Q
⊤
i else Q
⊥
i for someQ
⊤
i , Q
⊥
i . Pi reduces to P
′
i which
is either P⊤i via the If-Then rule, or P
⊥
i via the If-Else rule. In addition
Πi =
Π
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → c1
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K → c2
Π
⊤
Γ ⊢ P⊤i ∼ Q
⊤
i → C
⊤
i
Π
⊥
Γ ⊢ P⊥i ∼ Q
⊥
i → C
⊥
i
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i
We have α = τ in any case.
By hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ . Hence, by Lemma B.22, using Π, there exists c
′′ such that
ΓN,K ⊢ M1σP ∼ N1σQ : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞m K → c ′′. Therefore by Lemma B.14, M1σP = m and N1σQ = n. Similarly we can show that
M2σP =m and N2σQ = n.
HenceM ′1 = M
′
2 and N
′
1 = N
′
2.
Thus the reduction rule applied to Pi is If-Then and P
′
i = P
⊤
i . On the other hand, rule If-Then can also be applied to reduce Qi into
Q ′i = Q
⊤
i . This proves point a).
Note that we still need to type the other branch, even though it is not used here, as when replicating the process this test may fail if
M1, N1 and M2, N2 are nonces from different sessions.
We choose Γ′ = Γ. We have σ ′
P
= σP and σ
′
Q
= σQ .
Since the substitutions and environments do not change in this reduction, point b) trivially holds.
Moreover, Π′′ and the fact that, with C ′i = C
⊤
i ,r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ ⊆
r
(∪× j,iCj )∪×(C
⊤
i ∪C
⊥
i )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
=
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
prove point c) and conclude this case.
• PIfLR’*: then Pi = if M1 = M2 then P
⊤
i else P
⊥
i andQi = if N1 = N2 then Q
⊤
i else Q
⊥
i for someQ
⊤
i ,Q
⊥
i . Pi reduces to P
′
i which
is either P⊤i via the If-Then rule, or P
⊥
i via the If-Else rule. In addition
Πi =
Π
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → c1
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l ′′,am′ ; τ l ′′′,an′ K → c2 τ l,am , τ l ′′,am′ τ l ′,an , τ l ′′′,an′
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ P⊥i ∼ Q
⊥
i → C
′
i
Γ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci = C
′
i
We have α = τ in any case.
By hypothesis, σP , σQ are ground and ΓN,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : ΓX → cσ . Hence, by Lemma B.22, using Π, there exists c
′′ such that
ΓN,K ⊢ M1σP ∼ N1σQ : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,an K → c ′′. Therefore by Lemma B.14, M1σP =m and N1σQ = n. Similarly, using Lemma B.14, we
can show thatM2σP =m
′ and N2σQ = n
′.
Moreover, since τ l,am , τ
l ′′,a
m′
, we know thatm ,m′ (by well-formedness of the processes), and similarly n , n′.
Hence, M1σP , M2σP and N1σQ , N2σQ .
Thus the reduction rule applied to Pi is If-Else and P
′
i = P
⊥
i . On the other hand, rule If-Else can also be applied to reduce Qi into
Q ′i = Q
⊥
i . This proves point a).
We choose Γ′ = Γ. We have σ ′
P
= σP and σ
′
Q
= σQ .
Since the substitutions and environments do not change in this reduction, point b) trivially holds.
Moreover, Π′′ and the fact thatr
(∪× j,iCj )∪×C
′
i∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ =
r
(∪× jCj )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ
prove point c) and conclude this case.

Theorem B.27 (Typing implies trace inclusion). For all processes P , Q ,for all ϕP , ϕQ , σP , σQ , for all multisets of processes P , Q for all
constraints C , for all sequence s of actions, for all Γ containing only keys,
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C,
and ifC is consistent, then
P ⊑t Q
that is, if
(∅, {P}, ∅, ∅)
s
−−→∗ (EP ,P,ϕP ,σP ),
then there exists a sequence s ′ of actions, a multiset Q, a set of names EQ , a frame ϕQ , a substitution σQ , such that
• s =τ s
′
• (∅, {Q}, ∅, ∅)
s ′
−−→∗ (EQ ,Q,ϕQ ,σQ ),
• new EP .ϕPσP and new EQ .ϕQσQ are statically equivalent.
Proof. We successively apply Lemma B.26 to each of the reduction steps in the reduction
(∅, {P}, ∅, ∅)
s
−−→∗ (EP ,P,ϕP ,σP ).
The lemma can indeed be applied successively. At each reduction step of P we obtain a sequence of reduction steps for Q with the same
actions, and the conclusions the lemma provides imply the conditions needed for its next application.
It is clear, for the first application, that all the hypotheses of this lemma are satisfied.
In the end, we know that there exist Γ′, some constraint sets Ci , some cϕ , cσ , and a reduction
(∅, {Q}, ∅, ∅)
s ′
−−→∗ (EΓ′ ,Q,ϕQ ,σQ )
with s =τ s
′, such that (among other conclusions)
• EP = EΓ′ ,
• σP , σQ are ground and Γ
′
N,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : Γ
′
X → cσ ,
• Γ′ ⊢ ϕP ∼ ϕQ : LL→ cϕ ,
• dom(ϕP ) = dom(ϕQ ),
• ∀i, Γ′ ⊢ Pi ∼ Qi → Ci ,
• for all i , j, the sets of bound variables in Pi and Pj (resp. Qi and Qj ) are disjoint, and similarly for the bound names;
•
r
(∪×iCi )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ is consistent in ∆, E
0
P
, E0
Q
.
To prove the claim, it is then sufficient to show that new EΓ′ .ϕPσP and new EΓ′ .ϕQσQ are statically equivalent.
We have Γ′ ⊢ ϕP ∼ ϕQ : LL→ cϕ and Γ
′
N,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : Γ
′
X → cσ . Hence, by Lemma B.22, there exists c ⊆
r
cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪ cσ such that
Γ
′
N,K ⊢ ϕPσP ∼ ϕQσQ : LL→ c .
We will now show that (c, Γ′N,K) is consistent. Since c ⊆
r
cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪ cσ , by Lemma B.11, it suffices to show that (
r
cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪
cσ , Γ
′
N,K) is consistent.
We have Γ′N,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : Γ
′
X → cσ . By Lemma B.4, there is a Γ
′′′ ∈ branches(Γ′) such that Γ′′′N,K ⊢ σP ∼ σQ : Γ
′′′
X → cσ .
By Lemma B.12, there exists for all i some (ci , Γ
′′
i ) ∈ Ci such that Γ
′′′ ⊆ Γ′′i . The disjointness condition on the bound variables implies
by Lemma B.8 that for all i , j, Γ′′i and Γ
′′
j are compatible. Thus ∪×iCi contains (c
′
, Γ
′′)
def
= (
⋃
i ci ,
⋃
i Γ
′′
i ). We have Γ
′′′ ⊆ Γ′′. Thereforer
(∪×iCi )∪∀cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪∀cσ , which is consistent, contains (
r
c ′ ∪ cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪ cσ , Γ
′′). Hence, by Lemma B.11, (
r
cϕ
z
σP ,σQ
∪ cσ , Γ
′′) is
consistent.
Therefore, (c, Γ′′) is consistent. Since c is ground, it follows from the definition of consistency that (c, Γ′′N,K ) is also consistent. Moreover,
Γ
′′′ ⊆ Γ′′, and Γ′′′ is a branch of Γ′. It is then clear that Γ′N,K ⊆ Γ
′′. Hence, by Lemma B.10, since Γ′N,K ⊢ ϕPσP ∼ ϕQσQ : LL → c , we
have Γ′′ ⊢ ϕPσP ∼ ϕQσQ : LL→ c .
Hence, we have Γ′′ ⊢ ϕPσP ∼ ϕQσQ : LL → c with (c, Γ
′′
N,K ) consistent.
Moreover, ϕPσP and ϕQσQ are ground (by well-formedness of the processes).
Therefore, by Lemma B.25, the frames new EΓ′′ .ϕPσP and new EΓ′′ .ϕQσQ are statically equivalent.
By definition of the reduction relation, and by well-formedness of the processes, since
(∅, {P}, ∅, ∅)
s
−−→∗ (EΓ′ ,P,ϕP ,σP )
and
(∅, {Q}, ∅, ∅)
s ′
−−→∗ (EΓ′ ,Q,ϕQ ,σQ )
it is clear that names(ϕPσP ) ⊆ EΓ′ and names(ϕQσQ ) ⊆ EΓ′ .
Thus, the only names that are relevant to the frames are EΓ′ .
Hence, new EΓ′ .ϕPσP and new EΓ′ .ϕQσQ are statically equivalent. 
This theorem corresponds to Theorem 6.1.
Theorem B.28 (Typing implies trace eqivalence). For all Γ containing only keys, for all P and Q , if
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
and C is consistent, then
P ≈t Q .
Proof. Theorem B.27 proves that under these assumptions, P ⊑t Q . This is sufficient to prove the theorem. Indeed, it is clear from the
typing rules for processes and terms that
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ⇔ Γ′ ⊢ Q ∼ P → C ′
where C ′ is the constraint obtained from C by swapping the left and right hand sides of all of its elements, and Γ′ is the environment
obtained from Γ by swapping the left and right types in all refinement types. Clearly from the definition of consistency, C is consistent
if and only if C ′ is. Therefore, by symmetry, proving that the assumptions imply P ⊑t Q also proves that they imply Q ⊑t P , and thus
P ≈t Q . 
B.2 Typing replicated processes
In this subsection, we prove the soundness result for replicated processes.
In this subsection, as well as the following ones, without loss of generality we assume, for each infinite nonce type τ l,∞m appearing in the
processes we consider, that N contains an infinite number of fresh names which we will denote by {mi | i ∈ N}; such that themi do not
appear in the processes or environments considered. We will denote byN0 the set of unindexed names and byNi the set of indexed names.
We similarly assume that for all the variables x appearing in the processes, the set X of all variables also contains variables {xi | i ∈ N}.
We denote X0 the set of unindexed variables, and Xi the set of indexed variables.
Definition B.29 (Renaming of a process). For all process P , for all i ∈ N, for all environment Γ, we define [ P ]Γi , the renaming of P for
session i with respect to Γ, as the process obtained from P by:
• for each nonce n declared in P by new n : τ l,∞n , and each nonce n such that Γ(n) = τ
l,∞
n for some l , replacing every occurrence of n
with ni , and the declaration new n : τ
l,∞
n with new ni : τ
l,1
ni ;
• replacing every occurence of a variable x with xi .
Lemma B.30 (Typing terms with replicated names). For all Γ, M , N , T and c , if
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c
then for all i,n ∈ N such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ),
Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : [T ]
n → [ c ]Γi
Proof. Let Γ, M , N , T , c be such as assumed in the statement of the lemma. Let i,n ∈ N such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ).
We prove this property by induction on the proof Π of
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c .
There are several possible cases for the last rule applied in Π.
• TNonce: then M =m and N = p for somem,p ∈ N , T = l for some l ∈ {HH, HL}, and
Π =
Γ(m) = τ
l,a
m Γ(p) = τ
l,a
p
Γ ⊢m ∼ p : l → ∅
.
It is clear from the definition of [ Γ ]ni that [ Γ ]
n
i ([m ]
Γ
i ) = τ
l,1
[m ]Γi
, and that [ Γ ]ni ([ p ]
Γ
i ) = τ
l,1
[ p ]Γi
. Hence, Γ′([m ]Γi ) = τ
l,1
[m ]Γi
and
Γ
′([ p ]Γi ) = τ
l,1
[ p ]Γi
. Then, by rule TNonce, we have Γ′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : l → ∅ and the claim holds.
• TNonceL, TCstFN, TKey, TPubKey, TVKey, THash, THigh, TLR1: Similarly to the TNonce case, the claim follows directly from
the definition of [ Γ ]ni , [M ]
Γ
i , [ N ]
Γ
i , [T ]
n and [ c ]Γi in these cases.
• TEncH: then T = LL and there exist T ′, k , c ′ such that
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : (T ′)k → c
′
Γ(k) = keyHH(T ′)
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c = c ′ ∪ {M ∼ N }
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, since [ (T ′)k ]
n
= ([T ′ ]n)k , there exists a proofΠ
′′ of Γ′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : ([T
′ ]n )k →
[ c ′ ]Γi
In addition [ Γ ]ni (k) = key
HH([T ′ ]n ) by definition of [ Γ ]ni . Hence Γ
′(k) = keyHH([T ′ ]n).
Therefore by rule TEncH, we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : LL→
[
c ′
]Γ
i
∪ {[M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i } = [ c ]
Γ
i
• TPair, TEnc, TEncL, TAenc, TAencH, TAencL, TSignH, TSignL, THashL, TOr: Similarly to the TEncH case, the claim is proved
directly by applying the induction hypothesis to the type judgement appearing in the conditions of the last rule in these cases.
• TVar: thenM = N = x for some x ∈ X, and
Π =
Γ(x) = T
Γ ⊢ x ∼ x : T → ∅
.
We have [M ]Γi = [ N ]
Γ
i = xi .
Since Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), we have Γ
′(xi ) ∈ branches([T ]
n).
Hence by rule TVar, Γ′ ⊢ xi ∼ xi : Γ
′(xi ) → ∅. Therefore, by rule TOr, we have
Γ
′ ⊢ xi ∼ xi : [T ]
n → ∅
which proves the claim.
• TLR’ (the TLRL’ case is similar): then there existm,p, l such that T = l , and
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : Jτ l,am ; τ l,ap K → c
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : l → c
.
Let us distinguish the case where a is 1 from the case where a is∞.
If a is 1: by applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, since
[ Jτ l,am ; τ l,ap K ]n = Jτ l,1m ; τ l,1p K, we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : Jτ l,am ; τ l,ap K → [ c ]Γi .
Thus by rule TLR’, we have
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [M ]
Γ
i ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : l → [ c ]
Γ
i .
If a is∞: by applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, since
[ Jτ l,am ; τ l,ap K ]n = ∨1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l,1pj K, we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i :
∨
1≤j≤n
Jτ l,1mj ; τ l,1pj K → [ c ]Γi .
Thus, by Lemma B.5, there exists j ∈ J1,nK and a proof Π′′ of
Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : Jτ l,1mj ; τ l,1pj K → [ c ]Γi .
Thus, by rule TLR’,
Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : l → [ c ]
Γ
i ,
which proves the claim.
• TLRVar: this case is similar to the TLR’ case, but only the case where a is 1 is possible.
• TSub: then there exists T ′ <: T such that
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ′ → c T ′ <: T
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i :
[
T ′
]n
→ [ c ]Γi .
Since it is clear by induction on the subtyping rules that T ′ <: T implies that [T ′ ]n <: [T ]n , rule TSub can be applied and proves
the claim.
• TLR∞: thenM =m, N = p, c = ∅, and T = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K for somem,p ∈ N , c = ∅, and
Π =
Γ(m) = τ
l,∞
m Γ(p) = τ
l ′,∞
p
Γ ⊢m ∼ p : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K → ∅ .
We have by definition [M ]Γi =mi and [ N ]
Γ
i = pi , and [ Γ ]
n
i (mi ) = τ
l,1
mi , and [ Γ ]
n
i (pi ) = τ
l ′,1
pi
. Thus Γ′(mi ) = τ
l,1
mi , and Γ
′(pi ) = τ
l ′,1
pi
.
Hence by rule TLR1, we have Γ′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : Jτ l,1mi ; τ l ′,1pi K → ∅.
In addition,
[ Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K ]n = ∨1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K. Therefore, by applying rule TOr, we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i :
[ Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K ]n → ∅
which proves the claim.

Lemma B.31 (Typing destructors with replicated names). For all Γ, d , x , T , if
Γ ⊢ d(x) : T
then for all i,n ∈ N such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ d(xi ) : [T ]
n
Proof. Immediate by examining the typing rules for destructors. 
Lemma B.32 (Branches and expansion). • For allT ,⋃
T ′∈branches(T )
branches(
[
T ′
]n
) = branches([T ]n)
• For all Γ for all i,n ∈ N, ⋃
Γ′∈branches(Γ)
branches(
[
Γ
′
]n
i
) = branches([ Γ ]ni )
Proof. The first point is proved by induction on T .
If T = T ′ ∨ T ′′ for some T ′, T ′′, then
branches([T ]n ) = branches([T ′ ]n) ∪ branches([T ′′ ]n)
= (
⋃
T ′′′∈branches(T ′) branches([T
′′′ ]n )) ∪ (
⋃
T ′′′∈branches(T ′′) branches([T
′′′ ]n))
by the induction hypothesis. Since branches(T ) = branches(T ′) ∪ branches(T ′′), this proves the claim.
Otherwise, branches(T ) = {T } and the claim trivially holds.
The second point directly follows from the first point, using the definition of [ Γ ]ni . 
Lemma B.33 (Typing processes in all branches). For all P , Q , Γ, {CΓ′}Γ′∈branches(Γ) , if
∀Γ
′ ∈ branches(Γ). Γ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → CΓ′
then
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q →
⋃
Γ′∈branches(Γ)
CΓ′ .
Consequently if for some C ,CΓ′ ⊆ C for all Γ
′, then there exists C ′ ⊆ C such that
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′.
Proof. The first point is easily proved by successive applications of rule POr.
The second point is a direct consequence of the first point. 
Lemma B.34 (Expansion and union). • For all C ,C ′, such that ∀(c, Γ) ∈ C ∪C ′. branches(Γ) = {Γ}, i.e. such that Γ does not contain
union types, and names(c) ⊆ dom(Γ) ∪ FN , and Γ only nonce types with names from N0 ( i.e. unindexed names), we have[
C∪×C
′
]n
i
= [C ]ni ∪×
[
C ′
]n
i
• For all C , c , Γ, such that names(c) ⊆ dom(Γ) and ∀(c, Γ′) ∈ C . ΓN,K ⊆ Γ
′, we have
[C∪∀c ]
n
i = [C ]
n
i ∪∀[ c ]
Γ
i
Proof. The first point follows from the definition of [ · ]ni and ∪×. Indeed, if C ,C
′ are as assumed in the claim, we have:
[C∪×C
′ ]ni = {([ c ]
Γ
i , Γ
′)|∃Γ. (c, Γ) ∈ C∪×C
′ ∧ Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni )}
= {([ c1 ∪ c2 ]
Γ1∪Γ2
i , Γ
′)|∃Γ1Γ2. (c1, Γ1) ∈ C ∧ (c2, Γ2) ∈ C
′ ∧ Γ1, Γ2 are compatible ∧
Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ]
n
i )}
= {([ c1 ]
Γ1
i ∪ [ c2 ]
Γ2
i , Γ
′)|∃Γ1Γ2. (c1, Γ1) ∈ C ∧ (c2, Γ2) ∈ C
′ ∧ Γ1, Γ2 are compatible ∧
Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ1 ]
n
i ∪ [ Γ2 ]
n
i )}
= {([ c1 ]
Γ1
i ∪ [ c2 ]
Γ2
i , Γ ∪ Γ
′)|∃Γ1Γ2. (c1, Γ1) ∈ C ∧ (c2, Γ2) ∈ C
′ ∧ Γ1, Γ2 are compatible ∧
Γ ∈ branches([ Γ1 ]
n
i ) ∧ Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ2 ]
n
i ) ∧ Γ, Γ
′ are compatible}
The last step is proved by directly showing both inclusions.
On the other hand we have:
[C ]ni ∪×[C
′ ]ni = {(c ∪ c
′
, Γ ∪ Γ′)|(c, Γ) ∈ [C ]ni ∧ (c
′
, Γ
′) ∈ [C ′ ]ni ∧ Γ, Γ
′ are compatible}
= {([ c1 ]
Γ1
i ∪ [ c2 ]
Γ2
i , Γ ∪ Γ
′)|∃Γ1Γ2. (c1, Γ1) ∈ C ∧ (c2, Γ2) ∈ C
′ ∧
Γ ∈ branches([ Γ1 ]
n
i ) ∧ Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ2 ]
n
i ) ∧ Γ, Γ
′ are compatible}
= {([ c1 ]
Γ1
i ∪ [ c2 ]
Γ2
i , Γ ∪ Γ
′)|∃Γ1Γ2. (c1, Γ1) ∈ C ∧ (c2, Γ2) ∈ C
′ ∧
Γ ∈ branches([ Γ1 ]
n
i ) ∧ Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ2 ]
n
i ) ∧ Γ, Γ
′ are compatible ∧ Γ1, Γ2 are compatible}
This last step comes from the fact that if (c1, Γ1) ∈ C and (c2, Γ2) ∈ C
′, then by assumption Γ1 and Γ2 do not contain union types.
This implies that if Γ ∈ branches([ Γ1 ]
n
i ) and Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ2 ]
n
i ) are compatible, then Γ1 and Γ2 are compatible. Indeed, let x ∈
dom(Γ1) ∩ dom(Γ2). Hence xi ∈ dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ
′), and since they are compatible, Γ(xi ) = Γ
′(xi ). That is to say that there exists
T ∈ branches([ Γ1(x) ]
n) ∩ branches([ Γ2(x) ]
n).
If Γ1(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K (for some m,p, l , l ′), then [ Γ1(x) ]n = ∨1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K, and thus there exists j ∈ J1,nK such that T =Jτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K. Hence, Jτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K ∈ branches([ Γ2(x) ]n). Because of the definition of [ · ]n , and since Γ2(x) is not a union type (by assumption),
this implies that Γ2(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K, and therefore Γ1(x) = Γ2(x).
If Γ1(x) is not of the form Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K (for somem,p, l , l ′), then neither is Γ2(x) (by contraposition, following the same reasoning as in
the previous case). Γ1(x) and Γ2(x) are not of the formT
′ ∨ T ′′ either, by assumption. Therefore, neither [ Γ1(x) ]
n nor [ Γ2(x) ]
n are union
types (from the definition of [ · ]n ). This implies that T = [ Γ1(x) ]
n
= [ Γ2(x) ]
n , which implies Γ1(x) = Γ2(x).
In both cases Γ1(x) = Γ2(x), and Γ1, Γ2 are therefore compatible.
Hence [C ]ni ∪×[C
′ ]ni = [C∪×C
′ ]ni , which proves the claim.
The second point directly follows from the definition of [ · ]ni and ∪∀. Indeed, for all C , c , Γ satisfying the assumptions, we have:
[C∪∀c ]
n
i = {([ c
′ ]Γ
′
i , Γ
′′)|∃Γ′. (c ′, Γ′) ∈ C∪∀c ∧ Γ
′′ ∈ branches([ Γ′ ]ni )}
= {([ c ′′ ∪ c ]Γ
′
i , Γ
′′)|∃Γ′. (c ′′, Γ′) ∈ C ∧ Γ′′ ∈ branches([ Γ′ ]ni )}
= {([ c ′′ ]Γ
′
i ∪ [ c ]
Γ
′
i , Γ
′′)|∃Γ′. (c ′′, Γ′) ∈ C ∧ Γ′′ ∈ branches([ Γ′ ]ni )}
= {([ c ′′ ]Γ
′
i ∪ [ c ]
Γ
i , Γ
′′)|∃Γ′. (c ′′, Γ′) ∈ C ∧ Γ′′ ∈ branches([ Γ′ ]ni )}
(since Γ, Γ′ give the same types to names and keys)
= {([ c ′ ]Γ
′
i , Γ
′′)|∃Γ′. (c ′, Γ′) ∈ C ∧ Γ′′ ∈ branches([ Γ′ ]ni )}∪∀[ c ]
Γ
i
= [C ]ni ∪∀[ c ]
Γ
i

Theorem B.35 (Typing processes with expanded types). For all Γ, P , Q and C , if
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
then for all i,n ∈ N such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the derivation Π of Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C . We distinguish several cases for the last rule applied
in this derivation.
• PZero: then P = Q = [ P ]Γi = [Q ]
Γ
i = 0, and C = {(∅, Γ)}. Hence
[C ]ni = {(∅, Γ
′) | Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni )}
Thus, by applying rule POr as many times as necessary to split [ Γ ]ni into all of its branches, followed by rule PZero, we have
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → [C ]
n
i .
• POut: then P = out(M).P ′, Q = out(N ).Q ′ for some messages M , N and some processes P ′, Q ′, and
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C = C ′∪∀c
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exists C ′′ ⊆ [C ′ ]ni and a proof Π
′′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′ ]Γi → C
′′.
Hence, by Lemma B.7, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exist CΓ′ ⊆ C
′′ and a proof ΠΓ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′ ]Γi → CΓ′ .
Moreover, by Lemma B.30, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exists a proof Π
′
Γ′
of Γ′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : LL→ [ c ]
Γ
i .
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ out(M).P
′ ]Γi = out([M ]
Γ
i ).[ P
′ ]Γi . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i = out([ N ]
Γ
i ).[Q
′ ]Γi . Therefore, using ΠΓ′ , Π
′
Γ′
and rule
POut, we have for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ) that Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → CΓ′∪∀[ c ]
Γ
i ⊆ C
′′∪∀[ c ]
Γ
i .
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C1 ⊆ C
′′∪∀[ c ]
Γ
i such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1.
Finally, [C ]ni = [C
′∪∀c ]
n
i = [C
′ ]ni ∪∀[ c ]
Γ
i (by Lemma B.34, whose conditions are satisfied, by Lemma B.12). Hence C
′′∪∀[ c ]
Γ
i ⊆
[C ]ni , which proves the claim.
• PIn: then P = in(x).P ′, Q = in(x).Q ′ for some variable x and some processes P ′, Q ′, and
Π =
Π
′
Γ, x : LL ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
.
Since
[ Γ, x : LL ]ni = [ Γ ]
n
i ,xi : [ LL ]
n
= [ Γ ]ni , xi : LL,
by applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there existsC ′ ⊆ [C ]ni and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ,xi : LL ⊢ [ P
′ ]
Γ,x :LL
i ∼ [Q
′ ]
Γ,x :LL
i → C
′.
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ in(x).P
′ ]Γi = in(xi ).[ P
′ ]Γi = in(xi ).[ P
′ ]
Γ,x :LL
i . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i = in(xi ).[Q
′ ]
Γ,x :LL
i .
Therefore, using Π′′ and rule PIn, we have [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
• PNew: then P = newm : τ l,am .P
′, Q = newm : τ l,am .Q
′ for somem, l ,a and some processes P ′,Q ′, and
Π =
Π
′
Γ,m : τ l,am ⊢ P
′ ∼ Q ′ → C
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
.
– If a = 1:
Since [
Γ,m : τ l,1m
]n
i
= [ Γ ]ni ,m : τ
l,1
m ,
by applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exists C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ,m : τ
l,1
m ⊢ [ P
′ ]
Γ,m:τ l,1m
i ∼
[Q ′ ]
Γ,m:τ l,1m
i → C
′.
In addition [ P ]Γi = [ newm.P
′ ]Γi = new m : τ
l,1
m .[ P
′ ]Γi = new m : τ
l,1
m .[ P
′ ]
Γ,m:τ l,1m
i ; and similarly for Q . Therefore, using Π
′′ and
rule PNew, we have [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
– If a = ∞: Since [
Γ,m : τ l,∞m
]n
i
= [ Γ ]ni ,mi : τ
l,1
mi ,
by applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exists C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ,mi : τ
l,1
mi ⊢ [ P
′ ]
Γ,m:τ l,∞m
i ∼
[Q ′ ]
Γ,m:τ l,∞m
i → C
′.
In addition [ P ]Γi = [ newm.P
′ ]Γi = newmi : τ
l,1
mi .[ P
′[mi/m] ]
Γ
i = newmi : τ
l,1
mi .[ P
′ ]
Γ,m:τ l,∞m
i ; and similarly forQ . Therefore, using
Π
′′ and rule PNew, we have [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
• PPar: then P = P ′ | P ′′, Q = Q ′ | Q ′′ for some processes P ′, Q ′, P ′′, Q ′′, and
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C = C ′∪×C
′′
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exists C ′′′ ⊆ [C ′ ]ni and a proof Π
′′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′ ]Γi → C
′′′. Similarly,
by applying the induction hypothesis to Π′′, there exists C ′′′′ ⊆ [C ′′ ]ni and a proof Π
′′′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′′′′.
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ P
′ | P ′′ ]Γi = [ P
′ ]Γi | [ P
′′ ]Γi . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i = [Q
′ | Q ′′ ]Γi = [Q
′ ]Γi | [Q
′′ ]Γi . Finally, [C ]
n
i = [C
′∪×C
′′ ]ni =
[C ′ ]ni ∪×[C
′′ ]ni , by Lemma B.34 (using Lemma B.9 to ensure the condition that the environments do not contain union types).
Therefore, using Π′′′, Π′′′′ and rule PPar, we have [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′′′∪×C
′′′′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
• POr: then Γ = Γ′, x : T ∨ T ′ for some Γ′, some x ∈ X and some typesT , T ′, and
Π =
ΠT
Γ
′
,x : T ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′
ΠT ′
Γ
′
,x : T ′ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ′′
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C = C ′ ∪C ′′
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to ΠT , there exist C1 ⊆ [C
′ ]ni and a proof Π1 of [ Γ
′ ]ni , xi : [T ]
n ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
′
,x :T
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
′
,x :T
i →
C1. Similarly with ΠT ′ , there exist C2 ⊆ [C
′′ ]ni and a proof Π2 of [ Γ
′ ]ni ,xi : [T
′ ]n ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
′
,x :T ′
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
′
,x :T ′
i → C2.
In addition [ P ]Γi = [ P ]
Γ
′
,x :T
i = [ P ]
Γ
′
,x :T ′
i , and similarly for Q .
Thus by rule POr, we have[
Γ
′
]n
i
,xi : [T ]
n ∨
[
T ′
]n
⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1 ∪C2 ⊆
[
C ′
]n
i
∪
[
C ′′
]n
i
= [C ]ni .
Since [ Γ ]ni = [ Γ
′
, x : T ∨ T ′ ]ni = [ Γ
′ ]ni , xi : [T ]
n ∨ [T ′ ]n , this proves the claim in this case.
• PLet: then P = let x = d(y) in P ′ else P ′′, Q = let x = d(y) in Q ′ else Q ′′ for some variable x and some processes P ′, Q ′, P ′′,
Q ′′, and
Π =
Πd
Γ ⊢ d(y) : T
Π
′
Γ, x : T ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C = C ′ ∪C ′′
.
Since
[ Γ, x : T ]ni = [ Γ ]
n
i ,xi : [T ]
n
,
by applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there existC ′′′ ⊆ [C ′ ]ni and a proofΠ
′′′ of [ Γ ]ni , xi : [T ]
n ⊢ [ P ′ ]
Γ,x :T
i ∼ [Q
′ ]
Γ,x :T
i →
C ′′′. Similarly, there exist C ′′′′ ⊆ [C ′′ ]ni and a proof Π
′′′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′′′′.
By Lemma B.31 applied to Πd , we also have
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ d(yi ) : [T ]
n
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ let x = d(y) in P
′ else P ′′ ]Γi = let xi = d(yi ) in [ P
′ ]Γi else [ P
′′ ]Γi = let xi = d(yi ) in [ P
′ ]
Γ,x :T
i else [ P
′′ ]Γi .
Similarly, [Q ]Γi = let xi = d(yi ) in [Q
′ ]
Γ,x :T
i else [Q
′′ ]Γi .
Therefore, using Π′′ and rule PLet, we have [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′′′ ∪C ′′′′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
• PLetLR: then P = let x = d(y) in P ′ else P ′′, Q = let x = d(y) in Q ′ else Q ′′ for some variable x ∈ X∗ and some processes P
′,
Q ′, P ′′, Q ′′, and
Π =
Γ(y) = Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,ap K
Π
′
Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
for somem, p.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exists C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′.
We have [ P ]Γi = [ let x = d(y) in P
′ else P ′′ ]Γi = let xi = d(yi ) in [ P
′ ]Γi else [ P
′′ ]Γi . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i = let xi =
d(yi ) in [Q
′ ]Γi else [Q
′′ ]Γi .
We distinguish two cases, depending on whether the types in the refinement Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,ap K are finite nonce types or infinite nonce
types, i.e. whether a is 1 or∞.
– If a is 1: Then by definition of [ Γ ]ni , we have [ Γ ]
n
i (yi ) = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K.
Therefore, using Π′′ and rule PLetLR, we have [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
– If a is ∞: Then by definition of [ Γ ]ni , we have [ Γ ]
n
i (yi ) =
∨
1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K. Let Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ). By definition, there
exists j ∈ J1,nK, such that Γ′(yi ) = Jτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K.
Using Π′′ and Lemma B.7, there exist C ′
Γ′
⊆ [C ]ni and a derivation Π
′′
Γ′
of Γ′ ⊢ [ P ′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′
Γ′
.
Therefore, using rule PLetLR, we have, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′
Γ′
⊆ [C ]ni . Thus, by Lemma B.33,
we have
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′′
,
where C ′′ ⊆ [C ]ni , which proves the claim in this case.
• PIfL: then P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N = N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′ for some messages M , N , M ′, N ′, and some
processes P ′, Q ′, P ′′, Q ′′, and
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′
Π1
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
Π2
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : LL → c ′
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C = (C ′ ∪C ′′)∪∀(c ∪ c
′)
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exists C ′′′ ⊆ [C ′ ]ni and a proof Π
′′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′ ]Γi → C
′′′. Similarly,
there exists C ′′′′ ⊆ [C ′′ ]ni and a proof Π
′′′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′′′′.
Hence, by Lemma B.7, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exist CΓ′ ⊆ C
′′′ and a proof Π1,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′ ]Γi → CΓ′ ; as well
as C ′
Γ′
⊆ C ′′′′ and a proof Π2,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′
Γ′
.
Moreover, by Lemma B.30, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exists a proof Π
′
1,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : LL → [ c ]
Γ
i . Similarly,
there exists a proof Π′2,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [M ′ ]Γi ∼ [ N
′ ]Γi : LL → [ c
′ ]Γi .
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ if M = M
′ then P ′ else P ′′ ]Γi = if [M ]
Γ
i = [M
′ ]Γi then [ P
′ ]Γi else [ P
′′ ]Γi . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i = if [ N ]
Γ
i =
[ N ′ ]Γi then [Q
′ ]Γi else [Q
′′ ]Γi .
Therefore, using Π1,Γ′ , Π2,Γ′ , Π
′
1,Γ′ , Π
′
2,Γ′ and rule PIfL, we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → (CΓ′ ∪C
′
Γ′
)∪∀([ c ]
Γ
i ∪
[
c ′
]Γ
i
) ⊆ (C ′′′ ∪C ′′′′)∪∀([ c ]
Γ
i ∪
[
c ′
]Γ
i
).
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C1 ⊆ (C
′′′ ∪C ′′′′)∪∀([ c ]
Γ
i ∪ [ c
′ ]Γi ) such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1.
Finally, [C ]ni = [ (C
′ ∪C ′′)∪∀(c ∪ c
′) ]ni = ([C
′ ]ni ∪ [C
′′ ]ni )∪∀([ c ]
Γ
i ∪ [ c
′ ]Γi ) (by Lemma B.34, whose conditions are satisfied, by
Lemma B.12). Hence (C ′′′ ∪C ′′′′)∪∀([ c ]
Γ
i ∪ [ c
′ ]Γi ) ⊆ [C ]
n
i , which proves the claim.
• PIfP: then P = if M = t then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N = t then Q ′ else Q ′′ for some messages M , N , some t ∈ K ∪ N ∪ C, and
some processes P ′, Q ′, P ′′, Q ′′, and
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′
Π
′′
Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C ′′
Π1
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL→ c
Π2
Γ ⊢ t ∼ t : LL → c ′
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C = C ′ ∪C ′′
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exist C ′′′ ⊆ [C ′ ]ni and a proof Π
′′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′ ]Γi → C
′′′. Similarly,
there exist C ′′′′ ⊆ [C ′′ ]ni and a proof Π
′′′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′′′′.
Hence, by Lemma B.7, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exist CΓ′ ⊆ C
′′′ and a proof Π1,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′ ]Γi → CΓ′ ; as well
as C ′
Γ′
⊆ C ′′′′ and a proof Π2,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′
Γ′
.
Moreover, by Lemma B.30, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exists a proof Π
′
1,Γ′
of Γ′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : LL → [ c ]
Γ
i . Similarly,
there exists a proof Π′2,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ t ]Γi ∼ [ t ]
Γ
i : LL → [ c
′ ]Γi .
Since t ∈ K ∪ N ∪ C, we also have [ t ]Γi ∈ K ∪N ∪ C.
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ if M = M
′ then P ′ else P ′′ ]Γi = if [M ]
Γ
i = [M
′ ]Γi then [ P
′ ]Γi else [ P
′′ ]Γi . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i = if [ N ]
Γ
i =
[ N ′ ]Γi then [Q
′ ]Γi else [Q
′′ ]Γi .
Therefore, using Π1,Γ′ , Π2,Γ′ , Π
′
1,Γ′
, Π′
2,Γ′
and rule PIfP, we have for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni )
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → CΓ′ ∪C
′
Γ′
⊆ C ′′′ ∪C ′′′′.
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C1 ⊆ (C
′′′ ∪C ′′′′) such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1.
Finally, [C ]ni = [C
′ ∪C ′′ ]ni = [C
′ ]ni ∪ [C
′′ ]ni (by Lemma B.34). Hence (C
′′′ ∪C ′′′′) ⊆ [C ]ni , which proves the claim.
• PIfLR: then P = if M1 = M2 then P⊤ else P⊥, Q = if N1 = N2 then Q⊤ else Q⊥ for some messages M1, N1, M2, N2, and some
processes P⊤, Q⊤, P⊥, Q⊥, and there existm, p,m
′, p ′ such that
Π =
Π1
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K → c
Π2
Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l ′′,1m′ ; τ l ′′′,1p′ K → c ′ b = (τ l,1m ?= τ l ′′,1m′ ) b ′ = (τ l ′′,1p ?= τ l ′′′,1p′ )
Π
′
Γ ⊢ Pb ∼ Qb ′ → C
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exist C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ Pb ]
Γ
i ∼ [Qb ′ ]
Γ
i → C
′.
Hence, by Lemma B.7, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exist CΓ′ ⊆ C
′, and a proof ΠΓ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ Pb ]
Γ
i ∼ [Qb ′ ]
Γ
i → CΓ′ .
Moreover, by Lemma B.30 applied to Π1, for all Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exists a proof Π
′
1,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [M1 ]
Γ
i ∼ [ N1 ]
Γ
i :Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K → [ c ]Γi . Similarly, there exists a proof Π′2,Γ′ of Γ′ ⊢ [M2 ]Γi ∼ [ N2 ]Γi : Jτ l ′′,1m′ ; τ l ′′′,1p′ K → [ c ′ ]Γi .
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ if M1 = M2 then P⊤ else P⊥ ]
Γ
i = if [M1 ]
Γ
i = [M2 ]
Γ
i then [ P⊤ ]
Γ
i else [ P⊥ ]
Γ
i . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i =
if [ N1 ]
Γ
i = [ N2 ]
Γ
i then [Q⊤ ]
Γ
i else [Q⊥ ]
Γ
i .
Therefore, using ΠΓ′ , Π
′
1,Γ′ , Π
′
2,Γ′ and rule PIfLR, we have for all Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni )
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → CΓ′ ⊆ C
′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C1 ⊆ [C ]
n
i such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1,
which proves the claim.
• PIfS: then P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N = N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′ for some messages M , N , M ′, N ′, and some
processes P ′, Q ′, P ′′, Q ′′, and
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C
Π1
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : LL → c
Π2
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : HH→ c ′
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exists C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′.
Hence, by Lemma B.7, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exist CΓ′ ⊆ C
′ and a proof ΠΓ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′ ]Γi → CΓ′ .
Moreover, by Lemma B.30, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exists a proof Π
′
1,Γ′
of Γ′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : LL → [ c ]
Γ
i . Similarly,
there exists a proof Π′2,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [M ′ ]Γi ∼ [ N
′ ]Γi : HH → [ c
′ ]Γi .
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ if M = M
′ then P ′ else P ′′ ]Γi = if [M ]
Γ
i = [M
′ ]Γi then [ P
′ ]Γi else [ P
′′ ]Γi . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i = if [ N ]
Γ
i =
[ N ′ ]Γi then [Q
′ ]Γi else [Q
′′ ]Γi .
Therefore, using ΠΓ′ , Π
′
1,Γ′
, Π′
2,Γ′
and rule PIfS, we have for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni )
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → CΓ′ ⊆ C
′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C1 ⊆ [C ]
n
i such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1,
which proves the claim.
• PIfI: then P = if M = M ′ then P ′ else P ′′, Q = if N = N ′ then Q ′ else Q ′′ for some messages M , N , M ′, N ′, and some
processes P ′, Q ′, P ′′, Q ′′, and there exist typesT , T ′, and namesm, p, such that
Π =
Π
′
Γ ⊢ P ′′ ∼ Q ′′ → C
Π1
Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T ∗T ′ → c
Π2
Γ ⊢ M ′ ∼ N ′ : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,ap K → c ′
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exist C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P
′′ ]Γi ∼ [Q
′′ ]Γi → C
′.
Let Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ). By applying Lemma B.7 to Π
′′, there exists CΓ′ ⊆ C
′, such that there exists a proof ΠΓ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ′′ ]Γi ∼
[Q ′′ ]Γi → CΓ′ .
Moreover, by Lemma B.30 applied to Π1, there exists a proof Π
′
1,Γ′
of Γ′ ⊢ [M ]Γi ∼ [ N ]
Γ
i : [T ]
n ∗ [T ′ ]n → [ c ]Γi . Similarly, there
exists a proof Π′2,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [M ′ ]Γi ∼ [ N
′ ]Γi :
[ Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,ap K ]n ) → [ c ′ ]Γi .
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ if M = M
′ then P ′ else P ′′ ]Γi = if [M ]
Γ
i = [M
′ ]Γi then [ P
′ ]Γi else [ P
′′ ]Γi . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i = if [ N ]
Γ
i =
[ N ′ ]Γi then [Q
′ ]Γi else [Q
′′ ]Γi .
We distinguish two cases.
– If a is 1: Then
[ Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K ]n = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K, and using ΠΓ′ , Π′1,Γ′ , Π′2,Γ′ and rule PIfI, we have for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni )
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → CΓ′ ⊆ C
′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C1 ⊆ [C ]
n
i such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1,
which proves the claim in this case.
– If a is ∞: Moreover, by applying Lemma B.5 to Π′2,Γ′ , there exists a type T
′′ ∈ branches(
[ Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K ]n), such that there exists
a proof Π′′
2,Γ′
of Γ′ ⊢ [M ′ ]Γi ∼ [ N
′ ]Γi : T
′′ → [ c ′ ]Γi .
By definition,
[ Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K ]n = ∨1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K. Therefore, by definition of branches, there exists j such that T ′′ =Jτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K.
Hence, using ΠΓ′ , Π
′
1,Γ′ , Π
′′
2,Γ′ , by applying rule PIfI, we have for all Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ) that
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → CΓ′ ⊆ C
′ ⊆ [C ]ni .
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C1 ⊆ [C ]
n
i such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1
which proves the claim in this case.
• PIfLR*: then P = if M1 = M2 then P⊤ else P⊥, Q = if N1 = N2 then Q⊤ else Q⊥ for some messages M1, N1, M2, N2, and some
processes P⊤, Q⊤, P⊥, Q⊥, and there existm,p, l , l
′ such that
Π =
Π1
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K → ∅
Π2
Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p′ K → ∅
Π⊤
Γ ⊢ P⊤ ∼ Q⊤ → C1
Π⊥
Γ ⊢ P⊥ ∼ Q⊥ → C2
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C = C1 ∪C2
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π⊤, there exist C
′ ⊆ [C1 ]
n
i ⊆ [C ]
n
i and a proof Π
′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P⊤ ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q⊤ ]
Γ
i → C
′.
Similarly with Π⊥, there exist C
′′ ⊆ [C2 ]
n
i ⊆ [C ]
n
i and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P⊥ ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q⊥ ]
Γ
i → C
′′.
Hence, by Lemma B.7, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there existC1,Γ′ ⊆ C
′(⊆ [C ]ni ),C2,Γ′ ⊆ C
′′(⊆ [C ]ni ), and proofs Π⊤,Γ′ and Π⊥,Γ′
of Γ′ ⊢ [ P⊤ ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q⊤ ]
Γ
i → C1,Γ′ and Γ
′ ⊢ [ P⊥ ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q⊥ ]
Γ
i → C2,Γ′ .
Moreover, by Lemma B.30 applied to Π1, for all Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exists a proof Π
′
1,Γ′
of Γ′ ⊢ [M1 ]
Γ
i ∼ [ N1 ]
Γ
i :∨
1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K → [ c ]Γi . Similarly, there exists a proof Π′2,Γ′ of Γ′ ⊢ [M2 ]Γi ∼ [ N2 ]Γi : ∨1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K → [ c ′ ]Γi .
Let Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ). By Lemma B.5, there exists T ∈ branches(
∨
1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K) such that there exists a proof Π′′1,Γ′ of
Γ
′ ⊢ [M1 ]
Γ
i ∼ [ N1 ]
Γ
i : T → [ c ]
Γ
i .
Similarly, there exists T ′ ∈ branches(
∨
1≤j≤nJτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K) such that there exists a proof Π′′2,Γ′ of Γ′ ⊢ [M2 ]Γi ∼ [ N2 ]Γi : T ′ → [ c ]Γi .
By definition of branches, there exist j, j ′ such that T = Jτ l,1mj ; τ l ′,1pj K and T ′ = Jτ l,1mj′ ; τ l ′,1pj′ K.
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ if M1 = M2 then P⊤ else P⊥ ]
Γ
i = if [M1 ]
Γ
i = [M2 ]
Γ
i then [ P⊤ ]
Γ
i else [ P⊥ ]
Γ
i . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i =
if [ N1 ]
Γ
i = [ N2 ]
Γ
i then [Q⊤ ]
Γ
i else [Q⊥ ]
Γ
i .
Therefore, using Π⊤,Γ′ , Π⊥,Γ′ , Π
′′
1,Γ′ , Π
′′
2,Γ′ and rule PIfLR, either j = j
′ and we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C1,Γ′(⊆ [C ]
n
i )
or j , j ′ and we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C2,Γ′(⊆ [C ]
n
i ).
This holds for any Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ).
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′
which proves the claim in this case.
• PIfLR’*: then P = if M1 = M2 then P⊤ else P⊥, Q = if N1 = N2 then Q⊤ else Q⊥ for some messages M1, N1, M2, N2, and some
processes P⊤, Q⊤, P⊥, Q⊥, and there exist namesm,p,m
′
,p ′ such that
Π =
Π1
Γ ⊢ M1 ∼ N1 : Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,ap K → ∅
Π2
Γ ⊢ M2 ∼ N2 : Jτ l ′′,a′m′ ; τ l ′′′,a′p′ K → ∅
Π
′
Γ ⊢ P⊥ ∼ Q⊥ → C
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to Π′, there exist C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni and a proof Π
′′ of [ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P⊥ ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q⊥ ]
Γ
i → C
′.
Hence, by Lemma B.7, for all Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exist CΓ′ ⊆ C
′(⊆ [C ]ni ), and a proofsΠΓ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [ P⊥ ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q⊥ ]
Γ
i → CΓ′ .
Moreover, by Lemma B.30 applied to Π1, for all Γ
′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ), there exists a proof Π
′
1,Γ′ of Γ
′ ⊢ [M1 ]
Γ
i ∼ [ N1 ]
Γ
i :[ Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,ap K ]n → [ c ]Γi . Similarly, there exists a proof Π′2,Γ′ of Γ′ ⊢ [M2 ]Γi ∼ [ N2 ]Γi : [ Jτ l ′′,a′m′ ; τ l ′′′,a′p′ K ]n → [ c ′ ]Γi .
We distinguish several cases, depending on a and a′.
– if a and a′ are both 1: Then this rule is a particular case of rule PIfLR, and the result is proved in a similar way.
– if a is 1 and a′ is∞: Then
[ Jτ l,am ; τ l ′,ap K ]n = [ Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K ]n , and [ Jτ l ′′,am′ ; τ l ′′′,ap′ K ]n = ∨1≤j≤nJτ l ′′,1m′j ; τ l ′′′,1pj K.
Let Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ).
By Lemma B.5, using Π′2,Γ′ , there exists j ∈ J1,nK such that there exists a proof Π′′2,Γ′ of Γ′ ⊢ [M2 ]Γi ∼ [ N2 ]Γi : Jτ l ′′,1m′j ; τ l ′′′,1p′j K →
[ c ′ ]Γi .
In addition, [ P ]Γi = [ if M1 = M2 then P⊤ else P⊥ ]
Γ
i = if [M1 ]
Γ
i = [M2 ]
Γ
i then [ P⊤ ]
Γ
i else [ P⊥ ]
Γ
i . Similarly, [Q ]
Γ
i =
if [ N1 ]
Γ
i = [ N2 ]
Γ
i then [Q⊤ ]
Γ
i else [Q⊥ ]
Γ
i .
For any j ∈ J1,nK, τ l,1m , τ l ′′,1m′j ; and τ l ′,1p , τ l ′′′,1p′j .
Therefore, using ΠΓ′ , Π
′
1,Γ′ , Π
′′
2,Γ′ and rule PIfLR, we have
Γ
′ ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → CΓ′(⊆ [C ]
n
i ).
This holds for any Γ′ ∈ branches([ Γ ]ni ).
Thus by Lemma B.33, there exists C ′ ⊆ [C ]ni such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′
which proves the claim in this case.
– if a is∞ and a′ is 1: This case is similar to the symmetric one.
– if a and a′ both are ∞: This case is similar to the case where a is 1 and a′ is∞.

Theorem B.36 (Typing n sessions). For all Γ, P , Q and C , such that
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C
then for all n ∈ N, there exists C ′ ⊆ ∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i such that
[ Γ ]n ⊢ [ P ]Γ1 | . . . | [ P ]
Γ
n ∼ [Q ]
Γ
1 | . . . | [Q ]
Γ
n → C
′
where [ Γ ]n is defined as
⋃
1≤i≤n [ Γ ]
n
i .
Proof. Let us assume Γ, P , Q and C are such that
Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C .
Let n ∈ N.
Note that the union
⋃
1≤i≤n [ Γ ]
n
i is well-defined, as for i , j, dom([ Γ ]
n
i ) ∩ dom([ Γ ]
n
j ) ⊆ K ∪N , and the types associated to keys and
nonces are the same in each [ Γ ]ni .
The property follows from Theorem B.35. Indeed, this theorem guarantees that for all i ∈ J1,nK, there exists Ci ⊆ [C ]ni such that
[ Γ ]ni ⊢ [ P ]
Γ
i ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → Ci .
By construction, all variables in dom([ Γ ]ni ) are indexed with i , and as we mentioned earlier, for all i, j, [ Γ ]
n
i and [ Γ ]
n
j have the same
values on their common domain.
Hence we have [ Γ ]n = [ Γ ]ni ⊎ (
⋃
j,i ([ Γ ]
n
j )X
). Therefore, by Lemma B.10, we have for all i ∈ J1,nK
[ Γ ]n ⊢ [ P ]Γi ∼ [Q ]
Γ
i → C
′
i
where
C ′i = {(c, Γ
′ ∪ Γ′′)|(c, Γ′) ∈ Ci ∧ Γ
′′ ∈ branches(
⋃
j,i
([ Γ ]nj )X
)}
Thus, by applying rule PPar n − 1 times, we have
[ Γ ]n ⊢ [ P ]Γ1 | . . . | [ P ]
Γ
n ∼ [Q ]
Γ
1 | . . . [Q ]
Γ
n → ∪×1≤i≤nC
′
i .
It only remains to be proved that ∪×1≤i≤nC
′
i ⊆ ∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i . Since for all i ∈ J1,nK we have Ci ⊆ [C ]ni , by Lemma B.11 we know
that ∪×1≤i≤nCi ⊆ ∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i .
Hence it suffices to show that ∪×1≤i≤nC
′
i ⊆ ∪×1≤i≤nCi .
Let (c, Γ′) ∈ ∪×1≤i≤nC
′
i . By definition there exist (c1, Γ1) ∈ C
′
1, . . . , (cn , Γn) ∈ C
′
n such that c =
⋃
1≤i≤n ci , Γ
′
=
⋃
1≤i≤n Γi , and for all
i , j, Γi and Γj are compatible.
For all i , (ci , Γi ) ∈ C
′
i . Thus by definition ofC
′
i there exist Γ
′
i and Γ
′′
i such that (ci , Γ
′
i ) ∈ Ci , Γ
′′
i ∈ branches(
⋃
j,i ([ Γ ]
n
j )X
), and Γi = Γ
′
i ∪Γ
′′
i .
Since for all i , j, Γi and Γj are compatible, we know that Γ
′
i and Γ
′
j also are, as well as Γ
′
i and Γ
′′
j .
Hence, Γ′ =
⋃
1≤i≤n Γi =
⋃
1≤i≤n(Γ
′
i ∪ Γ
′′
i ) = (
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′
i ) ∪ (
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′′
i ).
Moreover, (
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′′
i ) = (
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′
i ). Indeed, they have the same domain, i.e. {xi | x ∈ dom(Γ) ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and are compatible since
for all i , j, Γ′i and Γ
′′
j are compatible.
Thus Γ′ = (
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′
i ), and since the Γ
′
i are all pairwise compatible, and for all i , (ci , Γ
′
i ) ∈ Ci , we have (c, Γ
′) ∈ ∪×1≤i≤nCi .
This proves that ∪×1≤i≤nC
′
i ⊆ ∪×1≤i≤nCi , which concludes the proof. 
This next theorem corresponds to Theorem 6.2:
Theorem B.37. Consider P , Q , P ′ ,Q ′, C , C ′, such that P , Q and P ′, Q ′ do not share any variable. Consider Γ, containing only keys and
nonces with types of the form τ l,1n .
Assume that P and Q only bind nonces with infinite nonce types, i.e. using new m : τ l,∞m for some label l ; while P
′ and Q ′ only bind nonces
with finite types, i.e. using newm : τ l,1m .
Let us abbreviate by new n the sequence of declarations of each noncem ∈ dom(Γ). If
• Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C ,
• Γ ⊢ P ′ ∼ Q ′ → C ′,
• C ′∪×(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i ) is consistent for all n,
then new n. ((!P) | P ′) ≈t new n. ((!Q) | Q
′).
Proof. Note that since Γ only contains keys and nonces with finite types, for all i , [ P ]Γi = [ P ]
∅
i is just P where all variables and some
names have been α-renamed, and similarly forQ . Since P ′,Q ′ only contain nonces with finite types, [ P ′ ]Γ1 and [Q
′ ]Γ1 are P
′,Q ′ where all
variables have been α-renamed.
By Theorem B.36, we know that for all i,n,
[ Γ ]n ⊢ [ P ]Γ1 | . . . | [ P ]
Γ
n ∼ [Q ]
Γ
1 | . . . | [Q ]
Γ
n → C
′′
where [ Γ ]n =
⋃
1≤i≤n [ Γ ]
n
i , and C
′′ ⊆ ∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i .
By Theorem B.35, there also exists C ′′′ ⊆ [C ′ ]n1 , such that
[ Γ ]n1 ⊢
[
P ′
]Γ
1 ∼
[
Q ′
]Γ
1 → C
′′′
.
Therefore, by Lemma B.10, we have
[ Γ ]n ⊢
[
P ′
] Γ
1 ∼
[
Q ′
] Γ
1 → C
′′′′
where C ′′′′ is C ′′′ where all the environments have been extended with
⋃
1≤i≤n ([ Γ ]
n
i )X (note that this environment still only contains
nonces and keys).
Therefore, by rules PPar and PNew,
Γ
′ ⊢ new n. ([ P ]Γ1 | . . . | [ P ]
Γ
n) |
[
P ′
]Γ
1 ∼ new n. ([Q ]
Γ
1 | . . . | [Q ]
Γ
n) |
[
Q ′
]Γ
1 → C
′′∪×C
′′′′
where Γ′ is the restriction of [ Γ ]n to keys.
If [C ′ ]n1∪×(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i ) is consistent, similarly to the reasoning in the proof of Theorem B.36, C
′′∪×C
′′′′ also is.
Then, by Theorem B.28,
new n. ([ P ]Γ1 | . . . | [ P ]
Γ
n) |
[
P ′
]Γ
1 ≈t new n. ([Q ]
Γ
1 | . . . | [Q ]
Γ
n ) |
[
Q ′
]Γ
1
which implies (since [ P ′ ]Γ1 is just a renaming of the variables in P
′) that
new n. ([ P ]Γ1 | . . . | [ P ]
Γ
n ) | P
′ ≈t new n. ([Q ]
Γ
1 | . . . | [Q ]
Γ
n ) | Q
′
Since [ P ]Γi and [Q ]
Γ
i are just α-renamings of P , Q , this implies that for all n,
new n. (P1 | . . . | Pn ) | P
′ ≈t new n. (Q1 | . . . | Qn ) | Q
′
where P1 = · · · = Pn = P , and Q1 = · · · = Qn = Q . Therefore
new n. ((!P) | P ′) ≈t new n. ((!Q) | Q
′).

B.3 Checking consistency
In this subsection, we first recall the check_const procedure from Section 6.3, in more detail, and prove its correctness in the non-replicated
case.
For a constraint c and an environment Γ, let
step1Γ(c) := (JcKσF ,σ ′F , Γ′),
where
F = {x ∈ dom(Γ) | ∃m,n, l , l ′. Γ(x) = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K},
σF ,σ
′
F
are the substitutions defined by
• dom(σF ) = dom(σ
′
F
) = F
• ∀x ∈ F . ∀m,n, l , l ′.Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K ⇒ σF (x) =m ∧ σ ′F (x) = n,
and Γ′ is the environment obtained by extending the restriction of Γ to dom(Γ)\F with Γ′(n) = τ l,1n for all nonce n such that τ
l,1
n occurs in
Γ. This is well defined, since by assumption on the well-formedness of the processes and by definition of the processes, a name n is always
associated with the same label.
Let −→Γ be the reduction relation defined on couples of sets of constraints by (all variables are universally quantified)
({〈M,N 〉 ∼ 〈M ′,N ′〉} ∪ c, c ′) −→Γ ({M ∼ M
′
,N ∼ N ′} ∪ c, c ′)
({enc(M,k) ∼ enc(M ′,k)} ∪ c, c ′) −→Γ ({M ∼ M
′} ∪ c, c ′)
if Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) for some T
({aenc(M, pk(k)) ∼ aenc(M ′, pk(k))} ∪ c, c ′) −→Γ ({M ∼ M
′} ∪ c, c ′)
if Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) for some T
({sign(M,k) ∼ sign(M ′,k)} ∪ c, c ′) −→Γ ({M ∼ M
′} ∪ c, c ′)
if Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) for some T
({sign(M,k) ∼ sign(M ′,k)} ∪ c, c ′) −→Γ ({M ∼ M
′} ∪ c, {sign(M,k) ∼ sign(M ′,k)} ∪ c ′)
if Γ(k) = keyHH(T ) for some T
Let then step2Γ(c) = c1 ∪ c2 where (c1, c2) is the normal form of (c, ∅) for −→Γ . This definition is equivalent to the one described in
Section 6.3, but more practical for the proofs.
We define the condition step3Γ(c) as: check that c only contains elements of the formM ∼ N where M and N are both
• a key k ∈ K such that ∃T .Γ(k) = keyLL(T );
• noncesm,n ∈ N such that Γ(n) = τ LL,an ∧ Γ(m) = τ
LL,a
n ,
• or public keys, verification keys, or constants;
• or enc(M ′,k), enc(N ′,k) such that ∃T .Γ(k) = keyLL(T );
• or either hashes h(M ′), h(N ′) or encryptions aenc(M ′, pk(k)), aenc(N ′, pk(k))with a honest key k , i.e. such that ∃T .Γ(k) = keyHH(T );
such that M ′ and N ′ contain directly under pairs a nonce n such that Γ(n) = τ HH,an or a secret key k such that ∃T .Γ(k) = key
HH(T );
• or signatures sign(M ′,k), sign(N ′,k) with honest keys, such that ∃T .Γ(k) = keyHH(T );
step3Γ(c) returns true if this check succeeds and false otherwise.
We then proceed to step4. We define condition step4Γ(c) as follows. We consider all M ∼ M
′ ∈ c and N ∼ N ′ ∈ c , such that M , N are
unifiable with a most general unifier µ, and such that
∀x ∈ dom(µ). ∀l , l ′,m,n. (Γ(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K) ⇒ (xµ ∈ X ∨ ∃i . xµ =mi ).
We then define the substitution θ , over all variables x ∈ dom(µ) such that Γ(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K by
∀x ∈ dom(µ). ∀l , l ′,m,p, i . (Γ(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K ∧ µ(x) =mi ) ⇒ θ(x) = pi
and θ(x) = x otherwise.
Let then α be the restriction of µ to {x ∈ dom(µ) | Γ(x) = LL ∧ µ(x) ∈ N}.
We then check thatM ′αθ = N ′αθ .
Similarly, we check that the symmetric condition, whenM ′ and N ′ are unifiable, holds for allM ∼ M ′ ∈ c and N ∼ N ′ ∈ c .
If all these checks succeed, step4Γ(c) returns true.
Finally, check_const(C) is computed by considering all (c, Γ) ∈ C . We let (c, Γ) = step1Γ(c), and c˜ = step2Γ(c). We then check that
step3
Γ
(c˜) = true and step4
Γ
(c˜) = true. If this check succeeds for all (c, Γ) ∈ C , we say that check_const(C) = true.
Note that we only consider constraints obtained by typing, and therefore such that there exists cϕ such that Γ ⊢ ϕl(c) ∼ ϕr(c) : LL → cϕ .
Indeed, it is clear by induction on the typing rules for terms that:
∀Γ,M,N ,T , c . Γ ⊢ M ∼ N : T → c =⇒ (∀u ∼ v ∈ c . ∃c ′. Γ ⊢ u ∼ v : LL → c ′).
From this result, and using Lemmas B.3 and B.12, it follows clearly by induction on the typing rules for processes that
∀Γ, P ,Q,C . Γ ⊢ P ∼ Q → C =⇒ (∀(c, Γ′) ∈ C . ∀u ∼ v ∈ c . ∃c ′. Γ′ ⊢ u ∼ v : LL → c ′).
Let us now prove that the procedure is correct for constraints without infinite nonce types, i.e. constraint sets C such that
∀(c, Γ) ∈ C . ∀l , l ′,m,n. Γ(x) , Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K.
We fix such a constraint set C (obtained by typing).
Let (c, Γ) ∈ C . Let (c, Γ) = step1Γ(c), and c˜ = step2Γ(c). Let us assume that step3Γ(c˜) = true and step4Γ(c˜) = true.
Lemma B.38. If c is consistent in Γ, then c is consistent in Γ.
Proof. Let c ′ be a set of constraints and Γ′ be a typing environment such that c ′ ⊆ c , Γ′ ⊆ Γ, Γ′N,K = ΓN,K and vars(c
′) ⊆ dom(Γ′).
Let σ , σ ′ be two substitutions such that Γ′N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → cσ (for some set of constraints cσ ).
To prove the claim, we need to show that the frames new EΓ .(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′)) and new EΓ .(ϕΓLL∪ϕr(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′)) are statically equivalent.
Let D denote dom(Γ′X)(= dom(σ ) = dom(σ
′)).
For all x ∈ F ∩ D, by definition of F , there existm,n, l , l ′ such that Γ(x) = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K. Thus, by well-typedness of σ , σ ′, there exists cx
such that Γ ⊢ σ (x) ∼ σ ′(x) : Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K → cx . Hence, by Lemma B.14, since σ , σ ′ are ground, we have σ (x) =m and σ ′(x) = n. Therefore,
σ |D∩F = σF |D and σ
′ |D∩F = σ
′
F
|D .
Let c ′′ be the set Jc ′Kσ |D∩F ,σ ′ |D∩F . By Lemma B.11, we have Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′ = Jc ′′Kσ |D\F ,σ ′ |D\F . We also have c ′′ = Jc ′KσF |D ,σ ′F |D , which is
equal to Jc ′KσF ,σ ′F since vars(c ′) ⊆ D. Hence c ′′ ⊆ c .
Let Γ′′ = Γ′ |dom(Γ′)\F . We have Γ
′′ ⊆ Γ.
Moreover, since Γ′N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → cσ , it is clear from the definition of well-typedness for substitutions that we also have
Γ
′′
N,K ⊢ σ |D\F ∼ σ
′ |D\F : Γ
′′
X → c
′
σ for some c
′
σ . Finally, vars(c
′′) ⊆ vars(c ′)\F by definition of instantiation, thus vars(c ′′) ⊆ dom(Γ′′).
We have established that c ′′ ⊆ c , Γ′′ ⊆ Γ, vars(c ′′) ⊆ dom(Γ′′), and Γ′′N,K ⊢ σ |D\F ∼ σ
′ |D\F : Γ
′′
X → c
′
σ . Therefore, by definition of
the consistency of c in Γ, the frames new E
Γ
.(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc ′′Kσ |D\F ,σ ′ |D\F )) and new EΓ .(ϕΓLL ∪ϕr(Jc ′′Kσ |D\F ,σ ′ |D\F )) are statically equivalent.
Since ϕΓ
LL
⊆ ϕΓ
LL
, that is to say that new EΓ .(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′)) and new EΓ .(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′)) are statically equivalent. This proves
the consistency of c in Γ. 
Lemma B.39. If (c1, c2)−→Γ
∗(c ′1, c
′
2) then for all x ∈ dom(ϕl(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2)) there exists a recipe R such that
• vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c1 ∪ c2))
• ϕl(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2)(x) = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c1 ∪ c2)) ↓
• ϕr(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2)(x) = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c1 ∪ c2)) ↓.
Conversely, if (c1, c2)−→Γ
∗(c ′1, c
′
2) then for all x ∈ dom(ϕl(c1 ∪ c2)) there exists a recipe R without destructors, i.e. in which dec, adec,
checksign, π1, π2 do not appear, such that
• vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2))
• ϕl(c1 ∪ c2)(x) = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2))
• ϕr(c1 ∪ c2)(x) = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2)).
Proof. For both directions, it suffices to prove that the claim holds for all c1, c2, c
′
1, c
′
2 such that (c1, c2)−→Γ(c
′
1, c
′
2). Indeed, in that case
we prove the result for −→Γ
∗ by composing all the recipes. The proof for one reduction step is clear by examining the cases for the reduction
−→Γ .

Lemma B.40. If c˜ is consistent in Γ, then c is consistent in Γ.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma B.39.
Let c ′ be a set of constraints and Γ′ be a typing environment such that c ′ ⊆ c , Γ′ ⊆ Γ, Γ′N,K = ΓN,K and vars(c
′) ⊆ dom(Γ′). Let σ , σ ′
be two substitutions such that Γ′N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → cσ (for some set of constraints cσ ).
To prove the claim, we need to show that the frames new E
Γ
.(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′)) and new EΓ .(ϕΓLL∪ϕr(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′)) are statically equivalent.
Since c˜ is consistent in Γ, we know that the frames new E
Γ
.(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) and new EΓ .(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) are statically equivalent.
By Lemma B.39, the frames new E
Γ
.(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′)) and new EΓ .(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′)) can be written as a recipe on the frames
new E
Γ
.(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) and new EΓ .(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)).
Therefore, they are also statically equivalent, which proves the claim. 
Lemma B.41. There exists cϕ such that Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c) ∼ ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c) : LL→ cϕ .
Proof. As explained previously, there exists c ′
ϕ
such that Γ ⊢ ϕl(c) ∼ ϕr(c) : LL → c
′
ϕ
.
Moreover, we have by definition Γ = ΓF ⊎ Γ
′
, where F is defined as in step1 and ΓF is the restriction of Γ to F , and for some Γ
′
⊆ Γ.
In addition ΓF N,K ⊢ σF ∼ σ
′
F
: ΓF X → c
′ for some c ′. By definition of F , and since the refinement types in Γ only contain ground terms
by assumption, we also know that Γ does not contain refinement types. Hence, by Lemma B.22, and Lemma B.10, there exists cϕ such that
Γ ⊢ ϕl(c)σF ∼ ϕr(c)σ
′
F
: LL → cϕ . Since c = JcKσF ,σ ′F , this proves that Γ ⊢ ϕl(c) ∼ ϕr(c) : LL → cϕ . Besides, it is clear from the definition
of ϕΓ
LL
and rules TCstFN, TNonceL, TKey, TPubKey, TVKey that Γ ⊢ ϕΓ
LL
∼ ϕΓ
LL
: LL → ∅.
These two results prove the lemma. 
Lemma B.42. There exists cϕ such that Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜) ∼ ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜) : LL→ cϕ .
Proof. By Lemma B.41, there exists c ′
ϕ
such that Γ ⊢ ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c) ∼ ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c) : LL→ c
′
ϕ
.
Moreover, by definition, there exist c1, c2 such that (c, ∅)−→Γ
∗(c1, c2) and c˜ = c1 ∪ c2. Hence, we know by Lemma B.39 that for all
x ∈ dom(ϕl(c˜))(= dom(ϕr(c˜))) there exists a recipe R such that names(R) = ∅, ϕl(c˜)(x) = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(c)) ↓ and ϕr(c˜)(x) = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕr(c)) ↓.
Thus, by Lemma B.21, there exists cϕ such that Γ ⊢ ϕl(c˜) ∼ ϕr(c˜) : LL→ cϕ . Besides, it is clear from the definition of ϕ
Γ
LL
and rules TCstFN,
TNonceL, TKey, TPubKey, TVKey that Γ ⊢ ϕΓ
LL
∼ ϕΓ
LL
: LL → ∅.
These two results prove the lemma. 
We now assume that c˜ satisfies the condition step3
Γ
(c˜).
Note that we write −→Γ for −→Γ as these relations are equal.
Lemma B.43. If (c, ∅)−→Γ
∗(c1, c2) and sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k
′) ∈ c2 then there exists a recipe R without destructors, i.e. in which dec,
adec, checksign, π1, π2 do not appear, such that
• vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c1 ∪ c2))
• M = R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c1 ∪ c2))
• N = R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c1 ∪ c2)).
Proof. We prove this property by induction on the length of the reduction. It trivially holds if no reduction step is performed since in
that case c2 = ∅. Otherwise there exist c
′
1, c
′
2 such that (c, ∅)−→Γ
∗(c ′1, c
′
2)−→Γ(c1, c2).
If (c ′1, c
′
2)−→Γ(c1, c2) is any case except the honest signature case, we have c2 = c
′
2. Thus if sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k
′) ∈ c2, then by the
induction hypothesis there exists R′ without destructors such that
• vars(R′) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2))
• M = R′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2))
• N = R′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c
′
1 ∪ c
′
2)).
We then prove the claim by applying (the second part of) Lemma B.39 and composing the recipes.
If (c ′1, c
′
2)−→Γ(c1, c2) corresponds to the honest signature case, we have c
′
1 = c
′′
1 ∪ {sign(M
′
,k ′′) ∼ sign(N ′,k ′′)}, c1 = c
′′
1 ∪ {M
′ ∼ N ′},
and c2 = c
′
2 ∪ {sign(M
′
,k ′′) ∼ sign(N ′,k ′′)} for some c ′′1 , M
′, N ′, k ′′, T such that Γ(k ′) = keyHH(T ). If (sign(M ′,k ′′), sign(N ′,k ′′)) ,
(sign(M,k), sign(N ,k ′)), then the same proof as in the previous case shows the claim. Otherwise, M ∼ N ∈ c1, and therefore the claim
trivially holds. 
Lemma B.44. If sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k ′) ∈ c˜ then there exists a recipe R without destructors, i.e. in which dec, adec, checksign, π1 , π2
do not appear, such that
• names(R) = ∅,
• vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜))
• M = R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜))
• N = R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)).
Proof. This property directly follows from Lemma B.43, applied to (c, ∅)−→Γ
∗(c1, c2) such that c˜ = c1 ∪ c2. Indeed, since (c1, c2) is a
normal form for −→Γ , if sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k
′) ∈ c˜ = c1 ∪ c2, then sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k
′) ∈ c2, as if it was an element of c1 then
another reduction step would be possible. 
Lemma B.45. For all recipe R such that vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), and R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥ or R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓, ⊥, there exists a recipe
R′ without destructors, i.e. in which dec, adec, checksign, π1, π2, do not appear, such that
• vars(R′) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)),
• R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= R
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)),
• R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= R
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)).
Proof. Let us first note that
R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥ or R(ϕ
Γ
LL ∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓, ⊥
is equivalent to
R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥ and R(ϕ
Γ
LL ∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓, ⊥.
This follows from Lemmas B.42 and B.21.
We prove the property by induction on R.
• If R = n ∈ N or R = x ∈ AX or R = a ∈ C ∪ FN then the claim holds with R′ = R.
• If the head symbol of R is a constructor,i.e. if there exist R1, R2 such that R = pk(R1) or R = vk(R1) or R = enc(R1,R2) or R =
aenc(R1,R2) or R = sign(R1,R2) or R = 〈R1,R2〉 or R = h(R1), we may apply the induction hypothesis to R1 (and R2 when it is
present). All these case are similar, we write the proof generically for R = f (R1,R2). By the induction hypothesis, there exist R
′
1, R
′
2
such that
– vars(R′1) ∪ vars(R
′
2) ⊆ dom(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)),
– for all i ∈ {1, 2}, Ri (ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= R
′
i (ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)),
– for all i ∈ {1, 2}, Ri (ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= R
′
i (ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)).
Let R′ be f (R′1,R
′
2). The first two points imply that R
′ satisfies the conditions on variables. Since R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) ↓= f (R1(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) ↓
,R2(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓), the third point implies that R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= R
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)). Similarly, R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= R
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)), and
the claim holds.
• If R = dec(S,K) for some recipes S , K , then since R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥, we have K(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= k for some k ∈ K , and S(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪
ϕl(c˜)) ↓= enc(M,k), whereM = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓.
Similarly, there exists k ′ ∈ K such that K(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= k
′ and S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= enc(N ,k
′), where N = R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓.
In addition, by Lemma B.42, there exists c ′ such that Γ ⊢ ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜) ∼ ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜) : LL → c
′. Thus by Lemma B.21, there exists c ′′
such that Γ ⊢ K(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) ↓∼ K(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕr(c˜)) ↓: LL→ c
′′, which is to say Γ ⊢ k ∼ k ′ : LL → c ′′. Hence by Lemma B.18, k = k ′ and
Γ(k) = keyLL(T ) for some typeT .
Since S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= enc(M,k) , ⊥, by the induction hypothesis, there exists S
′ such that vars(S ′) ⊆ vars(S), S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) =
S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= enc(M,k), and S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) = S(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= enc(N ,k).
It is then clear that either S ′ = x for some variable x ∈ AX, or S ′ = enc(S ′′,K ′) for some S ′′, K ′. The first case is impossible, since
we have already shown that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ), and since by step3
Γ
(c˜), c˜ only contains messages encrypted with keys k ′′ such that
Γ(k ′′) = keyHH(T ′) for some T ′.
Hence there exist S ′′, K ′ such that S ′ = enc(S ′′,K ′). Since S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) = enc(M,k), we have S
′′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) = M . Hence
R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= M = S
′′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), and similarly for ϕr(c˜). Moreover, S
′′ being a subterm of S ′ it also satisfies the conditions
on the domains, and thus the property holds with R′ = S ′′.
• If R = adec(S,K) for some recipes S , K : this case is similar to the symmetric case.
• If R = checksign(S,K) for some recipes S , K : then since R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥, we have K(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= vk(k) for some k ∈ K , and
S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= sign(M,k), where M = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓.
Similarly, there exists k ′ ∈ K such that K(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= vk(k
′) and S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= sign(N ,k
′), where N = R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓.
Since S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= sign(M,k) , ⊥, by the induction hypothesis, there exists S
′ such that vars(S ′) ⊆ vars(S), S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) =
S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= sign(M,k), and S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) = S(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= sign(N ,k).
Since S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) = sign(M,k), it is clear from the definition of ↓ that either S
′
= x for some x ∈ AX, or S ′ = sign(S ′′,K ′) for
some S ′′, K ′.
In the first case, we therefore have sign(M,k) ∼ sign(N ,k ′) ∈ c˜ , and Lemma B.44 directly proves the claim.
In the second case, there exist S ′′, K ′ such that S ′ = sign(S ′′,K ′). Since S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) = sign(M,k), we have S
′′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) = M .
Hence R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= M = S
′′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), and similarly for ϕr(c˜). Moreover, S
′′ being a subterm of S ′ it also satisfies the
conditions on the domains, and thus the property holds with R′ = S ′′.
• If R = π1(S) for some recipe S then since R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥, we have S(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= 〈M1,M2〉, where M1 = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓,
and M2 is a message.
Similarly, S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= 〈N1,N2〉, where N1 = R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓, and N2 is a message.
Since S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= 〈M1,M2〉 , ⊥, by the induction hypothesis, there exists S
′ such that vars(S ′) ⊆ vars(S), S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) =
S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= 〈M,k〉, and S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) = S(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= 〈N ,k〉.
Since S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) = 〈M1,M2〉, it is clear from the definition of ↓ that either S
′
= x for some x ∈ AX, or S ′ = 〈S1, S2〉 for some S1,
S2.
The first case is impossible, since by step3
Γ
(c˜), c˜ does not contain pairs.
In the second case, there exist S1, S2 such that S
′
= 〈S1, S2〉. Since S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) = 〈M1,M2〉, we have S1(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) = M1. Hence
R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= M1 = S1(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), and similarly for ϕr(c˜). Moreover, S1 being a subterm of S
′ it also satisfies the conditions
on the domains, and thus the property holds with R′ = S1.
• If R = π2(S) for some S : this case is similar to the π1 case.

Lemma B.46. For all term t and substitution σ containing only messages, if t ↓, ⊥, then (tσ ) ↓= (t ↓)σ .
Proof. This property is easily proved by induction on t . In the base case where t is a variable x , by definition of ↓, since σ (x) is a
messages, σ (x) ↓= σ (x) and the claim holds. In the other base cases where t is a name, key or constant the claim trivially holds. We prove
the case where t starts with a constructor other than enc, aenc, sign generically for t = f (t1, t2). We then have t1σ ↓, ⊥ and t2σ ↓, ⊥,
and tσ ↓= f (t1σ ↓, t2σ ↓), which, by the induction hypothesis, is equal to f (t1 ↓ σ , t2 ↓ σ ), i.e. to f (t1, t2) ↓ σ . The case where f is enc,
aenc or sign is similar, but we in addition know that t2 ↓ is a key.
Finally if t starts with a destructor, t = d(t1, t2), we know that t1 ↓ starts with the corresponding constructor f : t1 ↓= f (t3, t4). In the
case of encryptions and signatures we know in addition that t4 ↓ and t2 ↓ are the same key (resp. public key/verification key). We then have
t ↓= t3 ↓, and tσ ↓= t3σ ↓ (or t4 in the case of the second projection π2()). Hence by the induction hypothesis, tσ ↓= t3 ↓ σ = t ↓ σ and the
claim holds.

Lemma B.47. For all σ , σ ′, for all recipe R such that vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), if R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ then R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥;
and similarly if R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ then R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓, ⊥.
Proof. We prove the property for ϕl(c˜), as the proof for ϕr(c˜) is similar.
We prove this by induction on R.
• if R = n ∈ N or R = x ∈ AX or R = a ∈ C ∪ FN : then R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥ is trivial.
• If the head symbol of R is 〈·, ·〉, h: all these cases are similar, we detail here the pair case. We have R = 〈R1,R2〉. By assumption, we
have R1(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ and R2(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥. By the induction hypothesis, we thus have R1(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥
and R2(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥, and therefore R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥.
• if the head symbol of R is enc, aenc, sign, pk, vk: all these cases are similar, we detail the proof for the asymmetric encryption case.
We have R = aenc(S,K) for some recipes S , K . Since R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥, we have S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥, and K(ϕΓLL ∪
ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= pk(k) for some k ∈ K.
By the induction hypothesis, we thus have S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥ and K(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥. Hence, by Lemma B.45, there exists a recipe
K ′ without destructors, such that K(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= K
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)). Hence, using Lemma B.46, we have
pk(k) = K(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= K((ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(c˜))σ ) ↓= (K(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓)σ = K ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜))σ
Since K ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜))σ = pk(k), there exists a variable x such that
– either K ′ = x , and then since ϕl(c˜) does not contain variables by step3Γ(c˜), we have (ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜))(x) = pk(k). If x ∈ dom(ϕl(c˜)),
since by Lemma B.42, there exists cx such that Γ ⊢ ϕl(c˜)(x) ∼ ϕr(c˜)(x) : LL → cx , we know by Lemma B.18 that ϕr(c˜)(x) = pk(k).
– or K ′ = pk(x), and then since ϕl(c˜) does not contain variables by step3Γ(c˜), we have (ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜))(x) = k . If x ∈ dom(ϕl(c˜)), since
by Lemma B.42, there exists cx such that Γ ⊢ ϕl(c˜)(x) ∼ ϕr(c˜)(x) : LL→ cx , we know by Lemma B.18 that ϕr(c˜)(x) = k .
In any case K ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜))σ = K
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), and therefore
K(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= K
′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) = pk(k)
which, together with the fact that S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥, implies that R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥.
• if the head symbol of R is dec, adec, checksign: all these cases are similar, we detail the proof for the signature verification case. We
have R = checksign(S,K) for some recipes S , K . Since R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥, we know that S(ϕΓLL ∪ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= sign(M,k)
for some message M and some k ∈ K, and K(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= vk(k).
By the induction hypothesis, we thus have S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥ and K(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥. Hence, by Lemma B.45, there exist recipes
S ′, K ′ without destructors, such that S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) and K(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= K
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)).
Hence, using Lemma B.46, we have
sign(M,k) = S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= S((ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(c˜))σ ) ↓= (S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓)σ = S ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜))σ
Since S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜))σ = sign(M,k), and considering that step3Γ(c˜) holds there exists a variable x such that either S
′
= x and
ϕl(c˜)(x) = sign(M
′
,k) for some message M ′; or S ′ = sign(S ′′, x) (for some recipe S ′′) and ϕΓ
LL
(x) = k (similarly to the previous
case).
In any case S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) is a signature by k . That is to say S(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓ is a signature by k .
Similarly to the asymmetric encryption case, we can also show that K(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= vk(k).
Therefore, R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= (checksign(S,K))(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥.
• if the head symbol of R is π1, π2: all these cases are similar, we detail the proof for the π1 case. We have R = π1(S) for some recipe S .
Since R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥, we know that S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= 〈M,N 〉 for some messages M , N .
By the induction hypothesis, we thus have S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥. Hence, by Lemma B.45, there exists a recipe S
′ without destructors,
such that S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)).
Hence, using Lemma B.46, we have
〈M,N 〉 = S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= S((ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(c˜))σ ) ↓= (S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓)σ = S ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜))σ
Since S ′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜))σ = 〈M,N 〉, and cconsidering that step3Γ(c˜) holds there exist some recipes S
′′ and S ′′′ such that S ′ = 〈S ′′, S ′′′〉.
That is to say S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓ is a pair.
Therefore, R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= (π1(S))(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥.

Lemma B.48. For all σ , σ ′, for all recipe R such that vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(c˜)), R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ and R(ϕΓLL ∪ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥,
there exists a recipe R′ without destructors, i.e. in which dec, adec, checksign, π1, π2, do not appear, such that
• vars(R′) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)),
• R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)),
• R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)).
Proof. By Lemma B.47, R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥ and R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓, ⊥.
Hence we may apply Lemma B.45, and there exists a recipe R′ without destructors, such that
• vars(R′) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)),
• R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓= R
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)),
• R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓= R
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)).
By Lemma B.46, we have
(R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓= (R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜))σ ) ↓= (R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓)σ
Hence
(R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓= R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜))σ = R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)).
Similarly we can show that
(R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓= R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)).
This proves the claim. 
Lemma B.49. For all σ , σ ′, for all recipe R such that vars(R) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), for all x ∈ dom(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), if R(ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′) =
(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(x) then R is a variable y ∈ dom(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)), or R ∈ C ∪ FN .
Similarly, if R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′) = (ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(x) then R is a variable y ∈ dom(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(c˜)) or R ∈ C ∪ FN .
Proof. We only detail the proof for ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′), as the proof for ϕr(c˜) is similar.
We distinguish several cases for R.
• If R = a ∈ C ∪ FN : the claim clearly holds.
• If R = x ∈ AX then the claim trivially holds.
• If R = enc(S,K) or sign(S,K) for some recipes S , K : these two cases are similar, we only detail the encryption case. (ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(x)
is then an encrypted message, which, because of the form of c˜ , implies that K(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = k for some k ∈ K such that
Γ(k) = keyHH(T ) for some T . This is only possible if there exists a variable z such that K = z and (ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(z) = k , which,
by step3
Γ
(c˜) and the definition of ϕΓ
LL
, implies that Γ(k) = keyLL(T ′) for some T ′, which is contradictory.
• If R = aenc(S,K) or h(S) for some recipes S , K : these two cases are similar, we only detail the encryption case. (ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(x)
is then an asymmetrically encrypted message, which, because of the form of c˜ , implies that S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) contains directly
under pairs a nonce n such that Γ(n) = τ HH,an , or a key k ∈ K such that Γ(k) = key
HH(T ) for some T . This is only possible if there
exists a recipe S ′ such that S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = n (resp. k).
Since R can only contain names from FN , this implies that there exists a variable z such that (ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(z) = n (resp. k),
which, by step3
Γ
(c˜), and the definition of ϕΓ
LL
, implies that Γ(n) = τ LL,an (resp. Γ(k) = key
LL(T ′) for someT ′), which is contradictory.
• Finally, the head symbol of R cannot be 〈·, ·〉, dec, adec, checksign, π1, π2, because of the form of c˜ (step3Γ(c˜)).

We now assume that step4
Γ
(c˜) holds. Note that since Γ, and hence Γ, do not contain refinements or nonces with infinite nonce types,
the step4
Γ
(c˜) condition is simpler than in the general case. Indeed the condition on the most general unifier µ is always trivially satisfied,
and the substitution θ is the identity.
Lemma B.50. For all σ , σ ′ such that ∃Γ′ ⊆ Γ. ∃cσ . Γ
′
N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → cσ , the frames new EΓ . ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′) and new EΓ . ϕΓLL ∪
ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′) are statically equivalent.
Proof. Let R, S be two recipes such that vars(R) ∪ vars(S) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = dom(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)).
Let us show that
(R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓= (S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓ ⇐⇒ (R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓= (S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓
We only detail the proof for the (⇒), as the other direction is similar. We then assume that (R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓= (S(ϕΓLL ∪
ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓.
Let us first note that
(R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜))) ↓, ⊥ ⇐⇒ (R(ϕ
Γ
LL ∪ ϕr(c˜))) ↓, ⊥.
This follows from Lemmas B.42 and B.21.
Since Γ′N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → cσ , as by definition we only type messages, σ and σ
′ only contain messages. Hence, by Lemmas B.47
and B.46,
R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ ⇐⇒ R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(c˜)) ↓, ⊥
and
R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ ⇐⇒ R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(c˜)) ↓, ⊥.
Hence, by chaining all these equivalences, we have
R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ ⇐⇒ R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥.
Similarly, we can show that
S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ ⇐⇒ S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥.
Therefore, if R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= ⊥, i.e. S(ϕΓLL ∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= ⊥, then R(ϕΓLL ∪ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= S(ϕΓLL ∪ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= ⊥, and the
claim holds.
Let us now assume that R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥, then R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥ and S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓, ⊥.
By Lemma B.48, there exist R′, S ′ without destructors such that
• vars(R′) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) and vars(S
′) ⊆ dom(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)),
• R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)),
• R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)).
• S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= S ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)),
• S(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= S ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)).
Since (R(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓= (S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))) ↓, we have R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = S ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)).
We show that R′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = S ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)). by induction on the recipes R′, S ′. Since R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = S ′(ϕΓLL ∪
ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)), we can distinguish four cases for R′ and S ′.
• If they have the same head symbol, either this symbol is a nonce or constant and the claim is trivial, or it is a variable, and we handle
this case later, or it is a destructor or constructor. We write the proof for this last case generically for R′ = f (R′′) and S ′ = f (S ′′).
We have necessarily R′′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = S ′′(ϕΓLL ∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)). It then follows by applying the induction hypothesis to R′′ and
S ′′ that R′′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = S ′′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)). The claim follows by applying f on both sides of this equalities.
• If R′ is a variable and not S ′: then by Lemma B.49, S ′ ∈ C ∪ FN . Let us denote R′ = x . By Lemma B.42, there exists cx such that
Γ ⊢ (ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜))(x) ∼ (ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜))(x) : LL → cx . Since (ϕ
Γ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜))(x) = R
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) = S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)) ∈ C ∪ FN , by
Lemma B.18, we have (ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜))(x) = S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(c˜)), i.e. R
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)) = S
′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(c˜)).
• If S ′ is a variable and not R′: this case is similar to the previous one.
• If R′, S ′ are two variables x and y, we have (ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(x) = (ϕΓLL∪ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(y).We can then prove (ϕΓLL∪ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(x) =
(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(y). Indeed:
– if x,y ∈ dom(ϕΓ
LL
), this follows from the definition of ϕΓ
LL
.
– if x ∈ dom(ϕΓ
LL
) and y ∈ dom(ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)): then by definition of ϕΓLL , R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = ϕΓLL(x) is a nonce, key, public
key, or verification key. Hence ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)(y) is also a nonce, key, public key or verification key. By step3Γ(c˜), ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)(y) =
ϕl(c˜)(y). This implies that ϕl(c˜)(y) is also a nonce, key, public key or verification key. By Lemma B.42, there exists cy such that
Γ ⊢ ϕl(c˜)(y) ∼ ϕr(c˜)(y) : LL → cy , and hence by Lemma B.18, ϕr(c˜)(y) = ϕl(c˜)(y). That is to say
R′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′) = (ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)(x) = ϕΓLL(x) = (ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′))(y) = ϕl(c˜)(y) = ϕr(c˜)(y) = S ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′).
– if x,y ∈ dom(ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)): then there exist M ∼ M ′ ∈ c˜ , N ∼ N ′ ∈ c˜ such that ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)(x) = Mσ , ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)(x) = M ′σ ′,
ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)(y) = Nσ , ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)(y) = N ′σ ′. Since Mσ = Nσ , M , N are unifiable, let µ be their most general unifier. There exists
θ such that σ = µθ .
Let then α be the restriction of µ to {x ∈ vars(M) ∪ vars(N ) | Γ(x) = LL ∧ µ(x) ∈ N is a nonce}.
By step4
Γ
(c˜), we have M ′α = N ′α .
Let x ∈ dom(α). Then µ(x) = n for some n ∈ N . Thus σ (x) = µ(x)θ = n.
Since, by assumption, ∃Γ′ ⊆ Γ. ∃cσ . Γ
′
N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → cσ , there exists some cx such that ∅ ⊢ n ∼ σ
′(x) : LL → cx .
Hence by Lemma B.18, σ ′(x) = n = µ(x) = α(x).
Since this holds for any x ∈ dom(α), we have ασ ′ = σ ′.
Therefore, since M ′α = N ′α , we have M ′ασ ′ = N ′ασ ′, i.e.M ′σ ′ = N ′σ ′. This proves the claim.
Finally, since R′(ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) = S ′(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)), we have R(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓= S(ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′)) ↓.
This proves the property. 
Lemma B.51. c is consistent in Γ.
Proof. By Lemmas B.38 and B.40, it suffices to show that c˜ is consistent in Γ.
Let c ′ ⊆ c˜ , Γ′ ⊆ Γ be such that vars(c ′) ⊆ dom(Γ′). Let σ , σ ′ be such that Γ′N,K ⊢ σ ∼ σ
′ : Γ′X → cσ for some cσ .
By Lemma B.50, the frames new E
Γ
. ϕΓ
LL
∪ ϕl(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′) and new EΓ . ϕΓLL ∪ ϕr(Jc˜Kσ ,σ ′) are statically equivalent.
Since the frames new E
Γ
. ϕΓ
LL
∪ϕl(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′) and new EΓ . ϕΓLL∪ϕr(Jc ′Kσ ,σ ′) are subsets of these frames, they also are statically equivalent.
Therefore c˜ is consistent in Γ. 
This next theorem corresponds to Theorem 6.4.
Theorem B.52 (Soundness of the procedure). Let C be a constraint set without infinite nonce types, i.e.
∀(c, Γ) ∈ C . ∀l , l ′,m,n.Γ(x) , Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞n K.
If check_const(C) succeeds, then C is consistent.
Proof. The previous lemmas directly imply that for all (c, Γ) ∈ C , c is consistent in Γ. This proves the theorem. 
B.4 Consistency for replicated processes
In this subsection, we prove the results regarding the procedure when checking consistency in the replicated case.
In this subsection, we only consider constraints obtained by typing processes (with the same key types). Notably, by the well-formedness
assumptions on the processes, this means that a nonce n is always associated with the same nonce type.
This theorem corresponds to Theorem 6.5.
Theorem B.53. Let C and C ′ be two constraint sets such that
∀(c, Γ) ∈ C . ∀(c ′, Γ′) ∈ C ′. dom(ΓX) ∩ dom(Γ
′
X) = ∅.
For all n ∈ N, if check_const([C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 ) = true, then check_const(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i )∪×[C
′ ]n1 ) = true.
Proof. Let n ∈ N. Let C be such that ∀(c, Γ) ∈ C . ∀(c ′, Γ′) ∈ C ′. dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ′) = ∅.
Let (c, Γ) ∈ (∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i )∪×[C
′ ]n1 . By definition of ∪×, there exists (c
′
, Γ
′) ∈ [C ′ ]n1 , and for all i ∈ J1,nK, there exists (ci , Γi ) ∈ [C ]ni ,
such that
• c = (∪1≤i≤nci ) ∪ c
′;
• Γ = (⊎1≤i≤nΓi ) ⊎ Γ
′.
Let i ∈ J1,nK. Since (ci , Γi ) ∈ [C ]ni , by definition of [C ]ni there exists (c ′i , Γ′i ) ∈ C such that
• ci =
[
c ′i
]Γi
i
;
• Γi ∈ branches(
[
Γ
′
i
]n
i
).
Note that this implies dom(Γi X) only contains variables indexed by i , and, from the assumption that vars(c
′
i ) ⊆ dom(Γ
′
i X
), that vars(ci ) ⊆
dom(ΓiX).
For all i ∈ J1,nK, let δ1i denote the function on terms which consists in exchanging all occurrences of the indices i and 1, i.e. replacing
any occurrence ofmi (for all noncem with an infinite nonce type) withm1, any occurrence ofm1 withmi , any occurrence of xi with x1
(for all variable x), and any occurrence of x1 with xi (also for all variable x).
We also (abusing notations) apply this function to constraints, types, typing environments and constraint sets. In the case of types we
use it to denote the replacement of nonces appearing in the refinements. In the case of typing environments it denotes the replacement of
nonces appearing in the types, and of nonces and variables in the domain of the environment, i.e. (δ1i (Γ))(x1) = δ
1
i (Γ(xi )). In the case of
constraint sets it denotes the application of the function to each constraint and environment in the constraint set.
Similarly, we denote δ2i the function exchanging indices i and 2.
For all h ∈ J1,nK and all i , j ∈ J1,nK, such that i , 2 and j , 1, let
(c
i, j
h
, Γ
i, j
h
) = (ch , Γh)δ
1
i δ
2
j .
Similarly, for all h ∈ J1,nK and all i ∈ J1,nK, let
(c
i,i
h
, Γ
i,i
h
) = (ch , Γh)δ
1
i .
Finally, for all i ∈ J1,nK, let Γ′i be the typing environment such that dom(Γ′i ) = dom(Γ′) and ∀x ∈ dom(Γ′i ). Γ′i (x) = Γ′(x)δ1i .
Since (ci , Γi ) ∈ [C ]
n
i , we can show that (c
i, j
i , Γ
i, j
i ) ∈ [C ]
n
1 . Indeed, recall that there exists (c
′
i , Γ
′
i ) ∈ C such that ci =
[
c ′i
]Γi
i
and
Γi ∈ branches(
[
Γ
′
i
]n
i
). ci only contains variables and names indexed by i , hence it is clear that c
i, j
i =
[
c ′i
] Γi
1
. Moreover, since Γi ∈
branches(
[
Γ
′
i
]n
i
), it is clear that Γ
i, j
i ∈ branches(
[
Γ
′
i
]n
i
δ1i δ
2
j ). By definition, indexed nonces or variables appear in
[
Γ
′
i
]n
i
only in its
domain, and as parts of union types of the form J m1 ; p1K ∨ . . . J mn ; pnK. This union type is left unchanged by δ1i δ2j : since i , j,
i , 2, and j , 1, δ1i δ
2
j is indeed only performing a permutation of the indices. Hence,
[
Γ
′
i
]n
i
δ1i δ
2
j =
[
Γ
′
i
]n
1
. Thus Γ
i, j
i ∈ branches(
[
Γ
′
i
]n
1
).
Therefore, (c
i, j
i , Γ
i, j
i ) ∈ [C ]
n
1 .
Note that dom(Γ
i, j
i ) only contains variables indexed by 1; and that, since vars(ci ) ⊆ dom(Γi ), we have vars(c
i, j
i ) ⊆ dom(Γ
i, j
i ).
Similarly, if j , i , i , 2 and j , 1, (c
i, j
j , Γ
i, j
j ) ∈ [C ]
n
2 . Note that dom(Γ
i, j
j ) only contains variables indexed by 2; and that vars(c
i, j
j ) ⊆
dom(Γ
i, j
j ).
Similarly, we also have (c ′, Γ′i ) ∈ [C ′ ]n1 .
Note that for all (c ′′, Γ′′) ∈ [C ]n1 , and all (c
′′′
, Γ
′′′) ∈ [C ′ ]n1 , and since by assumption:
∀(c, Γ) ∈ C . ∀(c ′, Γ′) ∈ C ′. dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ′) = ∅,
we know that Γ′′ and Γ′′′ are compatible. In particular this applies to all the Γ
i, j
i and Γ
′ (as well as Γ
i, j
i and Γ
′i ).
Moreover, for all (c ′′, Γ′′) ∈ [C ]n2 , and all (c
′′′
, Γ
′′′) ∈ [C ′ ]n1 , since dom(Γ
′′′) ⊆ {x1 | x ∈ X}, and dom(Γ
′′) ⊆ {x2 | x ∈ X}, Γ
′′ and Γ′′′
are also compatible. This in particular applies to Γ
i, j
j for all i , j ∈ J1,nK and Γ′ (as well as Γi, jj and Γ′i ).
If C is empty, then so is ∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i and the claim clearly holds. Let us now assume thatC is not empty. Hence for all i ∈ J1,nK, [C ]ni
is not empty.
The procedure for c, Γ is as follows:
(1) We compute step1Γ(c). Following the notations used in the procedure, we have
F = {x ∈ dom(Γ) | ∃m,n, l , l ′. Γ(x) = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1n K},
and we write (c, Γ)
def
= step1Γ(c).
For all i ∈ J1,nK, let (ci , Γi ) def= step1Γi (ci ). Let also (c ′, Γ′) def= step1Γ′(c ′). We have c = (∪1≤i≤nci ) ∪ c ′, and Γ = (∪1≤i≤nΓi ) ∪ Γ′.
For all h, i, j ∈ J1,nK, such that either i , j and i , 2 and j , 1, or i = j, let also (ci, j
h
, Γ
i, j
h )
def
= step1
Γ
i, j
h
(c
i, j
h
). Similarly, for all i ∈ J1,nK,
let also (c ′
i
, Γ′
i
)
def
= step1
Γ′
i (c ′). Since, for i , j, (c
i, j
h
, Γ
i, j
h
) = (ch , Γh )δ
1
i δ
2
j , it can easily be shown (by induction on the terms) that
(c
i, j
h
, Γ
i, j
h ) = (ch , Γh )δ
1
i δ
2
j . Similarly, (c
i,i
h
, Γ
i,i
h ) = (ch , Γh )δ
1
i . Finally, we similarly also have (c
′i , Γ′
i
) = (c′, Γ
′
)σ1p .
(2) We compute c˜
def
= step2
Γ
(c).
Note that, by the assumption that C and C ′ are obtained by typing processes, all the environments Γ, Γi , Γ
′, Γ
i, j
h
, Γi,i
h
, Γ′i contain
the same keys, associated with the same labels. The same is thus true for Γ, Γi , Γ
′
, Γ
i, j
h , Γ
i,i
h , Γ
′
i . Hence, step2Γ , step2Γi
, step2
Γ
′ ,
step2
Γ
i, j
h
, step2
Γ
i, i
h
, step2
Γ
′
i
all denote the same function.
For all i ∈ J1,nK, let c˜i def= step2Γ(ci ). Similarly, let c˜ ′ = step2Γ(c ′). It is clear that c˜ = (∪1≤i≤nc˜i ) ∪ c˜ ′.
Similarly, for all h, i, j ∈ J1,nK, such that either i , j and i , 2 and j , 1, or i = j, let c˜i, j
h
def
= step2
Γ
(c
i, j
h
). Let also c˜ ′
i def
= step2
Γ
(c ′
i
).
It can easily be seen that for all h ∈ J1,nK, all i , j ∈ J1,nK such that i , 2 and j , 1, since ci, j
h
= chδ
1
i δ
2
j , we have c˜
i, j
h
= c˜hδ
1
i δ
2
j .
Similarly, c˜i,i
h
= c˜hδ
1
i . Finally, we similarly also have c˜
′i
= c˜ ′δ1i .
(3) We check that step3
Γ
(c˜) holds, i.e. that each M ∼ N ∈ c˜ has the correct form (with respect to the definition of step3).
IfM ∼ N ∈ c˜ , either M ∼ N ∈ c˜ ′, or there exists i ∈ J1,nK such that M ∼ N ∈ c˜i .
• In the first case, M ∼ N ∈ c˜ ′. By assumption, [C ]n1 and [C ]
n
2 are not empty. Hence there exist (c
′′
, Γ
′′) ∈ [C ]n1 and (c
′′′
, Γ
′′′) ∈
[C ]n2 . Thus, (c
′′ ∪ c ′′′ ∪ c ′, Γ′′ ∪ Γ′′′ ∪ Γ′) ∈ [C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 (as noted previously, Γ
′′, Γ′′′, and Γ′ are compatible). Hence,
by assumption, check_const({(c ′′ ∪ c ′′′ ∪ c ′, Γ′′ ∪ Γ′′′ ∪ Γ′)}) succeeds.
If c˜ ′′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′(c
′′))), and c˜ ′′′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′′(c
′′′))), then c˜ ′′ ∪ c˜ ′′′ ∪ c˜ ′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′∪Γ′′′∪Γ′(c
′′ ∪
c ′′′ ∪ c ′))). Therefore, step3
Γ
(c˜ ′′ ∪ c˜ ′′′ ∪ c˜ ′) = true.
In particular,M ∼ N ∈ c˜ ′ has the correct form.
• In the second case, M ∼ N ∈ c˜i for some i ∈ J1,nK.
Let M ′ = Mδ1i and N
′
= Nδ1i . Since c˜
i,i
i = c˜iδ
1
i , we have M
′ ∼ N ′ ∈ c˜
i,i
i .
By assumption, [C ]n2 is not empty, hence there exists (c
′′
, Γ
′′) ∈ [C ]n2 . Thus, (c
i,i
i ∪c
′′∪c ′, Γ
i,i
i ∪Γ
′′∪Γ′) ∈ [C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1
(as noted previously, Γi,ii , Γ
′′, and Γ′ are compatible). Hence, by assumption, check_const({(ci,ii ∪c
′′∪c ′, Γ
i,i
i ∪Γ
′′∪Γ′)}) succeeds.
If c˜ ′′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′(c
′′))), then c˜i,ii ∪c˜
′′∪c˜ ′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′i,1∪Γ
′′∪Γ′ (˜c
i,i
i ∪c
′′∪c ′)). Therefore, step3
Γ
(˜c
i,i
i ∪c˜
′′∪c˜ ′)
holds.
In particular,M ′ ∼ N ′ ∈ c˜i,ii , has the correct form. It follows by examining all the cases and using the fact that for allmi ,m j , ifmi
is associated with the type τ l,ami andm j with τ
l ′,a
mj then l = l
′, thatM ∼ N also has the correct form.
Therefore, step3
Γ
(c˜) holds.
(4) Finally, we check that step4
Γ
(c˜) holds. Let M1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜ and M2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜ . Let us prove the property in the case where M1 and M2
are unifiable with a most general unifier µ. The case where N1 and N2 are unifiable is similar.
Let then α be the restriction of µ to {x ∈ vars(M1) ∪ vars(M2) | Γ(x) = LL ∧ µ(x) ∈ N}.
We have prove that N1α = N2α .
Since we already have c˜ = (∪1≤i≤nc˜i ) ∪ c˜
′, we know that:
• either there exists i ∈ J1,nK such thatM1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜i ;
• orM1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜
′;
and
• either there exists j ∈ J1,nK such thatM2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜j ;
• orM2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜
′.
Let us first prove the case where there exist i, j ∈ J1,nK such thatM1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜i and M2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜j . We distinguish two cases.
• if i , j: The property to prove is symmetric between M1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜ and M2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜ . Hence without loss of generality we may
assume that i , 2 and j , 1. Indeed, if we assume that the property can be proved in that case, then in the case where i = 2 or
j = 1, we may exchange the two constraints. The property holds for M2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜j and M1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜i : as i , j, and i = 2 or j = 1,
we know that i , 1 and j , 2. Then by symmetry it also holds forM1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜i and M2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜j .
Let us hence assume that i , 2 and j , 1.
Let then M ′1 = M1δ
1
i δ
2
j , N
′
1 = N1δ
1
i δ
2
j ,M
′
2 = M2δ
1
i δ
2
j , N
′
2 = N2δ
1
i δ
2
j .
Since c˜
i, j
i = c˜iδ
1
i δ
2
j , we have M
′
1 ∼ N
′
1 ∈ c˜
i, j
i . Similarly,M
′
2 ∼ N
′
2 ∈ c˜
i, j
j .
SinceM1 andM2 are unifiable, then so areM
′
1 andM
′
2, with a most general unifier µ
′ which satisfies µ(x) = t ⇔ µ′(xδ1i δ
2
j ) = tδ
1
i δ
2
j .
Let then α ′ be the restriction of µ′ to {x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | (Γ
i, j
i ∪ Γ
i, j
j )(x) = LL ∧ µ
′(x) ∈ N is a nonce}.
Similarly α ′ is such that ∀x ∈ dom(α ′).∀n. α(x) = n ⇔ α ′(xδ1i δ
2
j ) = nδ
1
i δ
2
j , i.e. δ
1
i δ
2
j α
′δ1i δ
2
j = α .
By assumption, check_const({(c
i, j
i ∪c
i, j
j ∪c
′
, Γ
i, j
i ∪Γ
i, j
j ∪Γ
′)}) succeeds since (c
i, j
i ∪c
i, j
j ∪c
′
, Γ
i, j
i ∪Γ
i, j
j ∪Γ
′) ∈ [C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 .
Thus, step4
Γ
i, j
i ∪Γ
i, j
j ∪Γ
′ (˜c
i, j
i ∪ c˜
i, j
j ∪ c˜
′) holds, and since {M ′1 ∼ N
′
1,M
′
2 ∼ N
′
2} ⊆ c˜
i, j
i ∪ c˜
i, j
j ∪ c˜
′, we know that since M ′1, M
′
2 are
unifiable, N ′1α
′
= N ′2α
′.
Thus N ′1α
′δ1i δ
2
j = N
′
2α
′δ1i δ
2
j , i.e., since i , j, and δ
1
i δ
2
j α
′δ1i δ
2
j = α , N1α = N2α . Therefore the claim holds in this case.
• if i = j then let M ′1 = M1δ
1
i , N
′
1 = N1δ
1
i , M
′
2 = M2δ
1
i , N
′
2 = N2δ
1
i . Since c˜
i,i
i = c˜iδ
1
i , we have M
′
1 ∼ N
′
1 ∈ c˜
i,i
i . Similarly,
M ′2 ∼ N
′
2 ∈ c˜
i,i
i .
Since M1 and M2 are unifiable, then so are M
′
1 and M
′
2, with a most general unifier µ
′ which satisfies µ(x) = t ⇔ µ′(xδ1i ) = tδ
1
i .
Let then α ′ be the restriction of µ′ to {x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | Γ
i,i
i (x) = LL ∧ µ
′(x) ∈ N is a nonce}.
Similarly α ′ is such that ∀x ∈ dom(α ′).∀n. α(x) = n ⇔ α ′(xδ1i ) = nδ
1
i , i.e. δ
1
i α
′δ1i = α .
By assumption, [C ]n2 is not empty, hence there exists (c
′′
, Γ
′′) ∈ [C ]n2 . Thus, (c
i,i
i ∪c
′′∪c ′, Γ
i,i
i ∪Γ
′′∪Γ′) ∈ [C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 .
Hence, by assumption, check_const({(ci,ii ∪c
′′∪c ′, Γ
i,i
i ∪Γ
′′∪Γ′)}) succeeds. If c˜ ′′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′(c
′′))), then c˜i,ii ∪˜c
′′∪c˜ ′ =
step2
Γ
(f st(step1
Γ
i, i
i ∪Γ
′′∪Γ′
(c
i,i
i ∪ c
′′ ∪ c ′))).
Thus, step4
Γ
i, i
i ∪Γ
′′
∪Γ
′ (˜c
i,i
i ∪ c˜
′′ ∪ c˜ ′) holds, and since {M ′1 ∼ N
′
1,M
′
2 ∼ N
′
2} ⊆ c˜
i,i
i ∪ c˜
′′ ∪ c˜ ′, we know that N ′1α
′
= N ′2α
′.
Thus N ′1α
′δ1i = N
′
2α
′δ1i , i.e., since δ
1
i α
′δ1i , N1α = N2α . Therefore the claim holds in this case.
Let us now prove the case where there exists i ∈ J1,nK such that M1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜i , and M2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜ ′. The symmetric case, where
M1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜
′ and there exists j ∈ J1,nK such thatM2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜j , is similar.
Let thenM ′1 = M1δ
1
i , N
′
1 = N1δ
1
i ,M
′
2 = M2δ
1
i , N
′
2 = N2δ
1
i . Since c˜
i,i
i = c˜iδ
1
i , we have M
′
1 ∼ N
′
1 ∈ c˜
i,i
i . Similarly,M
′
2 ∼ N
′
2 ∈ c˜
′i .
Since M1 and M2 are unifiable, then so areM
′
1 and M
′
2, with a most general unifier µ
′ which satisfies µ(x) = t ⇔ µ′(xδ1i ) = tδ
1
i .
Let then α ′ be the restriction of µ′ to {x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | (Γ
i,i
i ∪ Γ
′i )(x) = LL ∧ µ′(x) ∈ N is a nonce}.
Similarly α ′ is such that ∀x ∈ dom(α ′).∀n. α(x) = n ⇔ α ′(xδ1i ) = nδ
1
i , i.e. δ
1
i α
′δ1i = α .
By assumption, [C ]n2 is not empty, hence there exists (c
′′
, Γ
′′) ∈ [C ]n2 . Moreover, as noted previously, (c
′
, Γ
′i ) ∈ [C ′ ]n1 . Thus,
(c
i,i
i ∪ c
′′ ∪ c ′, Γ
i,i
i ∪ Γ
′′ ∪ Γ′i ) ∈ [C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 .
Hence, by assumption, check_const({(ci,ii ∪c
′′∪c ′, Γ
i,i
i ∪Γ
′′∪Γ′i )}) succeeds. If c˜ ′′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′(c
′′))), then c˜i,ii ∪c˜
′′∪c˜ ′
i
=
step2
Γ
(f st(step1
Γ
i, i
i ∪Γ
′′∪Γ′i
(c
i,i
i ∪ c
′′ ∪ c ′))).
Thus, step4
Γ
i, i
i ∪Γ
′′
∪Γ′
i (˜c
i,i
i ∪ c˜
′′ ∪ c˜ ′
i
) holds, and since {M ′1 ∼ N
′
1,M
′
2 ∼ N
′
2} ⊆ c˜
i,i
i ∪ c˜
′′ ∪ c˜ ′
i
, we know that N ′1α
′
= N ′2α
′.
Thus N ′1α
′δ1i = N
′
2α
′δ1i , i.e., since δ
1
i α
′δ1i = α , N1α = N2α .
Finally, only the case where M1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜
′ and M2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜
′ remains. By assumption, [C ]n1 and [C ]
n
2 are not empty, hence there
exist (c ′′, Γ′′) ∈ [C ]n1 and (c
′′′
, Γ
′′′) ∈ [C ]n2 . Thus, (c
′′ ∪ c ′′′ ∪ c ′, Γ′′ ∪ Γ′′′ ∪ Γ′) ∈ [C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 .
Hence, by assumption, check_const({(c ′′ ∪ c ′′′ ∪ c ′, Γ′′ ∪ Γ′′′ ∪ Γ′)}) succeeds. If c˜ ′′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′(c
′′))) and c˜ ′′′ =
step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′′(c
′′′))), then c˜ ′′ ∪ c˜ ′′′ ∪ c˜ ′ = step2
Γ
(f st(step1Γ′′∪Γ′′′∪Γ′(c
′′ ∪ c ′′′ ∪ c ′))).
Thus, step4
Γ
′′
∪Γ
′′′
∪Γ
′(c˜ ′′ ∪ c˜ ′′′ ∪ c˜ ′) holds, and since {M1 ∼ N1,M2 ∼ N2} ⊆ c˜
′′ ∪ c˜ ′′′ ∪ c˜ ′, we know that N1α = N2α .
Therefore the claim holds in this case, which concludes the proof that step4
Γ
(c˜) holds.
Therefore, for every (c, Γ) ∈ (∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i )∪×[C
′ ]n1 , check_const({(c, Γ)}) succeeds, which proves the claim. 
This next lemma is a more general version of Theorem 6.6.
Lemma B.54. For all (c, Γ) such that vars(c) ⊆ dom(Γ) which only contains variables indexed by 1 or 2, and all names in c have finite
nonce types, if check_const({(c, Γ)}) succeeds, then for all Γ′′ ∈ branches(Γ′), where Γ′ = Γ[
∨
1≤i≤nJτ l,1mi ; τ l ′,1pi K / Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K]m,p ∈N ,
check_const({(c, Γ′′)}) succeeds.
Proof. Let n ∈ N.
Let (c, Γ) be as assumed in the statement of the lemma.
Let us assume that check_const({(c, Γ)}) succeeds. Let Γ′ = Γ[
∨
1≤i≤nJτ l,1mi ; τ l ′,1pi K / Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K]m,p ∈N , and let Γ′′ ∈ branches(Γ′).
The procedure check_const({(c, Γ′′)}) is as follows:
(1) We compute (c, Γ
′′
) = step1Γ′′ (c). Following the notations in the procedure, we denote
F = {x ∈ dom(Γ′′) | ∃m,p, l , l ′. Γ′′(x) = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K}.
Let F ′ = {x ∈ dom(Γ) | ∃m,p, l , l ′. Γ(x) = Jτ l,1m ; τ l ′,1p K}; and F ′′ = {x ∈ dom(Γ) | ∃m,p, l , l ′. Γ(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K}.
It is easily seen from the definition of Γ′ that F = F ′ ⊎ F ′′.
By definition of step1Γ′′(c), Γ
′′
contains Γ′′ |dom(Γ′′)\F .
Let (c ′, Γ) = step1Γ(c).
It is clear from the definitions of Γ′ and Γ′′ that for all x ∈ F ′′, there exists i ∈ J1,nK andm,p, l , l ′ such that Γ(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K and
Γ
′′(x) = Jτ l,1mi ; τ l ′,1pi K. Let σl and σr be the substitutions defined by
dom(σl) = dom(σr) = F
′′
and
∀x ∈ F ′′.∀m,p ∈ N . ∀l , l ′. ∀i ∈ J1,nK. Γ′′(x) = Jτ l,1mi ; τ l ′,1pi K ⇒ (σl(x) =mi ∧ σr(x) = pi ).
It is clear from the definition of c and c ′ that c = Jc ′Kσl,σr .
(2) We compute c˜
def
= step2
Γ
(c).
Similarly, let c˜ ′
def
= step2
Γ
(c′).
It can easily be seen by induction on the reduction (c, ∅)−→
Γ
∗(c1, c2) (using the fact that −→Γ = −→Γ ) that c˜ = Jc˜ ′Kσl,σr .
(3) We check that step3
Γ
′′(c˜) holds.
Let u ∼ v ∈ c˜ . Since c˜ = Jc˜ ′Kσl,σr , there exists u ′ ∼ v ′ ∈ c˜ ′ such that u = u ′σl and v = v ′σr.
Since check_const({(c, Γ)}) = true, we know that u ′ and v ′ have the required form. Note that by definition of Γ
′′
, the keys which
are low in Γ
′′
, i.e. the keys k ∈ K such that there exist T such that Γ
′′
(k) = keyLL(T ), are exactly the keys which are low in Γ.
It clearly follows, by examining all cases for u ′ and v ′, that u ′σl and v
′σr, i.e. u and v , also have the required form.
Therefore, step3
Γ
′′(c˜) holds.
(4) Finally, we check the condition step4
Γ
′′(c˜).
LetM1 ∼ N1 ∈ c˜ andM2 ∼ N2 ∈ c˜ . Since c˜ = Jc˜ ′Kσl,σr , there existM ′1 ∼ N ′1 ∈ c˜ ′ andM ′2 ∼ N ′2 ∈ c˜ ′ such thatM1 = M ′1σl, N1 = N ′1σr,
M2 = M
′
2σl, and N2 = N
′
2σr.
Let us prove the first direction of the equivalence, i.e. the case where M1, M2 are unifiable. The proof for the case where N1, N2 are
unifiable is similar.
IfM1,M2 are unifiable, let µ be their most general unifier. We have M1µ = M2µ, i.e. (M
′
1σl)µ = (M
′
2σl)µ.
Let τ denote the substitution σlµ. Since M
′
1τ = M
′
2τ , M
′
1 and M
′
2 are unifiable. Let µ
′ be their most general unifier. There exists θ
such that τ = µ′θ .
Let also α be the restriction of µ to {x ∈ vars(M1) ∪ vars(M2) | Γ
′′
(x) = LL ∧ µ(x) ∈ N}.
Note that Γ
′′
(x) = LL ⇔ Γ(x) = LL.
We have to prove that N1α = N2α .
Let x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) such that there existm,p, l , l
′ such that Γ(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K, i.e. x ∈ F ′′. By definition of σl (point 1),
there exists i ∈ J1,nK such that xσl =mi (and xσr = pi ). Hence, we have
(xµ′)θ = xτ = xσlµ = (xσl)µ =mi µ =mi .
Thus, xµ′ can only be either a variable y such that yθ =mi , or the noncemi .
Therefore, µ′ satisfies the conditions on the most general unifier expressed in step4
Γ
(c˜ ′).
Let x ∈ vars(M1) ∪ vars(M2) such that Γ
′′
(x) = LL and µ(x) ∈ N . We have (xµ′)θ = xτ = xσlµ = (xσl)µ = xµ = µ(x) ∈ N . Thus,
xµ′ can only be either a variable y (such that yθ = µ(x)), or the nonce µ(x).
Conversely, let x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) such that Γ(x) = LL and µ
′(x) ∈ N . We have xµ = (xσl)µ = xτ = (xµ
′)θ = µ′(x).
Let then θ ′ be the substitution with domain {x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | ∃m,p, l , l
′
.∃i ∈ J1,nK. Γ(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K ∧ µ′(x) =mi }
such that ∀x ∈ dom(θ ′). θ ′(x) = pi if µ
′(x) =mi and Γ(x) = Jτ l,∞m ; τ l ′,∞p K.
Let also α ′ be the restriction of µ′ to {x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | Γ(x) = LL ∧ µ
′(x) ∈ N}.
Since check_const({(c, Γ)}) = true, we know that step4
Γ
(c˜ ′) holds. Since M ′1 ∼ N
′
1 ∈ c˜
′, and M ′2 ∼ N
′
2 ∈ c˜
′, this implies that
N ′1α
′θ ′ = N ′2α
′θ ′.
As we have just shown, for all x ∈ dom(θ ′), there exists i ∈ J1,nK such that xσl = mi and xσr = pi , and µ′(x) is either mi or a
variable. By definition of dom(θ ′), only the case where µ′(x) =mi is actually possible, and we have θ
′(x) = pi .
Thus, ∀x ∈ dom(θ ′). σr(x) = θ
′(x).
It then is clear from the definitions of the domains of θ ′ and σr that there exists τ
′ such that σr = θ
′τ ′.
Thus, since we have shown that N ′1α
′θ ′ = N ′2α
′θ ′, we have (N ′1α
′θ ′)τ ′ = (N ′2α
′θ ′)τ ′, that is to say N ′1α
′σr = N
′
2α
′σr, i.e., since α
′
and σr have disjoint domains, and are both ground, N1α
′
= N2α
′.
Moreover, we have shown that for all x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) such that Γ(x) = LL and µ
′(x) ∈ N , µ(x) = µ′(x). That is to say that
for all x ∈ dom(α ′), µ(x) = α ′(x).
In addition, it is clear from the definition of σl that
{x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | Γ(x) = LL} = {x ∈ vars(M1) ∪ vars(M2) | Γ
′′
(x) = LL}.
Hence
dom(α) = {x ∈ vars(M1) ∪ vars(M2) | Γ
′′
(x) = LL ∧ µ(x) ∈ N}
= {x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | Γ(x) = LL ∧ µ(x) ∈ N}
⊇ {x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | Γ(x) = LL ∧ µ(x) ∈ N ∧ µ
′(x) ∈ N}
= {x ∈ vars(M ′1) ∪ vars(M
′
2) | Γ(x) = LL ∧ µ
′(x) ∈ N}
= dom(α ′).
Therefore, ∀x ∈ dom(α ′). x ∈ dom(α) ∧ α ′(x) = α(x). Thus there exists α ′′ such that α = α ′α ′′.
Since we already have N1α
′
= N2α
′, this implies that N1α = N2α , which concludes the proof that step4
Γ
′′(c˜) holds. Hence,
check_const({(c, Γ′′)}) = true.

We can now prove the following theorem:
Theorem B.55. Let C , and C ′ be two constraint sets without any common variable.
check_const([C ]1∪×[C ]2∪×
[
C ′
]
1) = true ⇒ ∀n.
[
C ′
]n
1∪×(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i ) is consistent.
Proof. Assume check_const([C ]1∪×[C ]2∪×[C
′ ]1) = true. Let n > 0. Let us show that [C
′ ]n1∪×(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i ) is consistent.
By Theorem B.52, it suffices to show that check_const([C ′ ]n1∪×(∪×1≤i≤n[C ]
n
i )) = true.
By Theorem B.53, it suffices to show that check_const([C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 ) = true.
By assumption, we know that check_const([C ]1∪×[C ]2∪×[C
′ ]1) = true.
That is to say, for each (c1, Γ1) ∈ C , (c2, Γ2) ∈ C , (c3, Γ3) ∈ C
′, if c ′ = [ c1 ]
Γ1
1 ∪ [ c2 ]
Γ2
2 ∪ [ c3 ]
Γ3
1 , and Γ
′
= [ Γ1 ]1 ∪ [ Γ2 ]2 ∪ [ Γ3 ]1,
check_const({(c ′, Γ′)}) = true.
Thus, by Lemma B.54, for all (c1, Γ1) ∈ C , (c2, Γ2) ∈ C , (c3, Γ3) ∈ C
′, if c ′ = [ c1 ]
Γ1
1 ∪ [ c2 ]
Γ2
2 ∪ [ c3 ]
Γ3
1 , and Γ
′
= [ Γ1 ]
n
1 ∪ [ Γ2 ]
n
2 ∪ [ Γ3 ]
n
1 ,
check_const({(c ′, Γ′)}) = true.
That is to say, check_const([C ]n1∪×[C ]
n
2∪×[C
′ ]n1 ) = true, which concludes the proof.

